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  Preface i 
Preface 
When the Crop Post-Harvest Programme began to implement its ‘Partnerships for 
Innovation’ strategy in 2002, the management team decided to commission an evaluation 
of this approach in order for future programmes to learn from our experiences. 
From the start of this study, Andrew Barnett has been a most thorough evaluator, both in 
reviewing the literature and mass of documentation passed to him, and through interviews 
of a wide range of stakeholders in the UK and overseas.  He has offered us all the 
opportunity to comment on early drafts of his work and this final report. 
The Programme would like to thank all those who have given freely of their time and 
opinions to feed into this study – without which it could not have happened. 
The final product, this report, is rich in experiences and lessons for future research 
programmes.  It does not shy away from pointing out where things may have been done 
differently.  I trust its contents will be of use to all those involved in funding, managing, 
implementing and monitoring/evaluating natural resources research, or innovation, 
programmes. 
 
Tim Donaldson 
Programme Manager,  
Crop Post-Harvest Programme,  
NR International Limited 
28 February 2006. 
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  Short Brief 1 
Short Brief 
This is the final report of an exercise commissioned by NR International Limited (NRIL) 
to ‘learn the lessons’ from the way the £24 million Crop Post-Harvest Programme funded 
by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) has evolved over its 
eleven-year history from a traditional research-funding programme to one based on 
‘Partnerships for Innovation’ (P4I).  
Since 2002, the Programme has sought to adopt best practice associated with the 
achievement of innovation – the so-called Innovation Systems (IS) approach, in which 
research becomes just one element of a wider process of transforming ‘new knowledge’ 
into goods and services.  
This review examined a large number of project documents, and interviewed key 
informants in nine countries: the UK, India, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia and Ghana. 
The Crop Post-Harvest Programme (CPHP) represents an exciting experiment in 
improving the impact of research funding.  One of the more surprising conclusions is just 
how effective the IS approach was, even at the project level and even in very difficult 
environments.   
This review, consistent with other evaluations, was not able to attribute quantified impacts 
of specific DFID-funded research projects, particularly in terms of poverty reduction.  This 
made it difficult to demonstrate that one approach to research management has more 
impact than another.  Despite this, the review provided prima facie evidence that the IS 
approach is more likely to lead to innovation (and thereby poverty impact) than the 
previous more conventional research-funding model.  The Programme did appear to have 
considerable and wide-ranging impact, including on scientific knowledge. 
The CPH Programme provides a number of important lessons about how to achieve 
innovation and identified some of the pitfalls to be avoided.  In particular, the production 
of both ‘local impact’ and ‘public-good knowledge’, requires special investments, 
particularly in ‘learning’.  Considerably more could have been achieved through targeted 
cross-project and cross-regional comparisons, and special activities to extract higher-level 
generalisations of use to others about the process and content of project implementation. 
Valuable lessons were learned about ‘coalition’ formation and management, and the 
approach appeared relevant to a wide range of problems and countries.  The key elements 
of the IS approach are simple, are widely understood and can be implemented effectively 
even at the level of individual projects.  However, a hands-on approach to project and 
programme management is required.  This requires additional expenditure, but these are 
‘investments’ in the capacities necessary for innovation rather than overheads.   
DFID has a significant influence on the innovation systems in which it operates, but could 
add substantially more value to its research investments. 
Future challenges will involve identifying and utilising the UK’s own comparative 
advantages, and building future research funding on existing organisations in developing 
countries rather than setting up its own parallel systems in countries and regions.  
   
 
  Summary 3 
Summary 
S1. This is the final report of an exercise commissioned by NR International Limited 
(NRIL) to ‘learn the lessons’ from the way the Crop Post-Harvest Programme has 
evolved over its eleven-year history from a traditional research-funding programme to 
one funding what it calls ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ (P4I).  In particular, the main aim 
was to determine whether this new ‘innovation’ approach was in some sense more 
effective than the previous more traditional approach to research management (see 
Annex 1 for the terms of reference).  
S2. The Crop Post-Harvest Programme (CPHP) is a £24m research programme funded 
by the Department for International Development (DFID)1.  Over the last few years, the 
Programme has shifted its focus so that most of the research expenditure is now spent 
in, and is managed by, institutions in developing countries.  The Programme has taken 
an increasingly interventionist approach to management by actively seeking to create 
partnerships between governments, research institutes, NGOs and the private sector – at 
the level of projects these are known as ‘coalitions’.  As part of this strategy, it 
established Regional Offices in India, Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe, in order to 
understand the local research environment more effectively and to take a more hands-on 
approach to project development, capacity development and monitoring.   
S3. During this most recent phase, which started in 2002, the Programme has sought to 
adopt best practice associated with the achievement of innovation, by drawing on the 
literature and experience of the so-called National Systems of Innovation (NSI) 
approach, or more generally the Innovation Systems (IS) approach.  
S4. The essential insight of the IS approach is to switch attention from “research” to the 
“processes of innovation” (see Chapter 4).  Research becomes just one element of a 
wider process of transforming ‘new knowledge’ into goods and services.  The IS 
approach emphasises the importance of: 
• Understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the system involved in effective 
innovation.  The essential ‘systems diagnosis’ can be as simple or complex, as 
resources allow and depending on where the boundaries are set;  
• Involving a wider range of key actors and institutions that are necessary for 
successful innovation (not just researchers and their organisations).  Effective 
innovation requires a shift of power from a narrower to a wider set of actors; 
• Continuous two-way communication between these actors so that the users and 
suppliers of new knowledge effectively understand each others’ needs; 
• The context of rules, institutions, and infrastructure that constrain and facilitate the 
innovation process.  International trends that are operating against poor people in 
renewable natural resource systems make successful innovation difficult, 
particularly at the level of projects.  
S5. The essential prediction following the adoption of the innovation approach is that 
the nature of the research will change.  Change will result from the continuous 
interaction between researchers and other elements of the innovation system and as a 
                                                 
1 http://www.cphp.uk.com/aboutcphp/default.asp?step=4&pid=1. 
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consequence of the shift in power over resources from a narrower to a wider set of 
actors.  Such change requires a very flexible and evolutionary approach to programme 
finance and management. 
S6. As part of this review, a large number of project documents have been examined 
and a large number of people have been interviewed in the nine countries visited: the 
UK, India, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Ghana (see 
Annexes 3 and 4).  The huge variability in project types and the conditions in which 
researchers operate provides richly textured evidence from which useful lessons can be 
learned.  The overwhelming impression is of a great number of skilled and dedicated 
people doing important work2, often under difficult conditions, in which many of the 
features of National Systems of Innovation are deteriorating, particularly in Africa (see 
Chapter 5). 
S7. The main findings of the review are described in this summary chapter, with more 
specific conclusions set out in the final chapter, Chapter 12.  Chapter 1 provides an 
introduction to the study.  The approach to the review is set out in Chapter 2 and this is 
followed in Chapter 3 by a brief history of the Crop Post-Harvest Programme.  Chapter 
4 summarises the essence of what has come to be known as the Innovation Systems 
Approach.  Chapter 5 sets the context in which the CPH Programme’s research has 
taken place, by mapping some of the elements in the National Innovation Systems of 
four of the main countries in which the Programme has operated.  Chapter 6 describes 
the main evidence gained during the review.  The ‘lessons’ from this experience are 
then presented in five chapters, each concentrating on a particular audience: lessons for 
the operation of coalitions in Chapter 7; lessons for research funders in Chapter 8; 
lessons for research Programme managers in Chapter 9; lessons for UK research 
institutions in Chapter 10; and, in Chapter 11, lessons for the Governance of Research. 
Major Findings 
An Exciting Experiment 
S8. The Crop Post-Harvest Programme certainly represents a most exciting experiment 
to improve the impact of research by fundamentally changing the way research is 
contracted and executed – in effect moving from ‘research’ to ‘innovation’.  The 
Programme has broken new ground by enabling research institutes to work in different 
ways and often for the first time in formal relationships with the private sector and 
NGOs.  These changes probably represent irreversible improvements in the way 
research is conducted. 
S9. One of the more surprising conclusions of this review is just how effective the IS 
approach was even at the project level and even in very hostile environments.  It may 
well be that, as this environment deteriorates, projects have to do much more 
themselves if change is to be successful.  Yet there is a growing sense that the 
innovation approach has its greatest policy relevance at the sectoral or product level, 
precisely because the problems are often so sector-specific.   
                                                 
2 Thanks are due to many people, particularly at NR International, but also researchers, administrators and 
government officials in the countries visited.  Without such unstinting help, this report would not have been possible.  
While every attempt has been made to weigh the evidence and to reflect people’s opinions, those errors that do 
remain are the responsibility of the author alone. 
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S10. A related ‘synthesis’ study shows that many of the elements that make up the 
‘Innovation Systems approach’ have been increasingly incorporated within the other 
DFID Renewable Natural Resources Research Strategy (RNRRS) Programmes as the 
emphasis on ‘poverty impact’ has strengthened in recent years3.  However, this 
synthesis study suggests that the development of these elements has been unsystematic.  
As the CPH Programme demonstrates, using the IS approach provides both an essential 
clarifying framework and clear policy directions. 
A Major Change in the Conduct of RNR Research 
S11. The uniqueness of the CPH Programme was noted by the recent evaluation of the 
whole DFID RNRRS which described it as “a brave and novel departure”4.  There is 
certainly evidence of a dramatic transformation of the Programme over time.  It has 
moved from a mode of operation in which scientists largely define what is important to 
research, to a Programme of more wide-ranging (and equal) partnerships, where the 
various actors contribute their differing expertise to a commonly agreed purpose.  
Important scientific knowledge has been created, but equally, important knowledge has 
been gained about the pros and cons of different ways of working.  Genuinely 
innovative work has taken place, and it is particularly timely given the changes going on 
in DFID to improve the effectiveness of research funding. 
Difficulty in Quantifying Poverty Impacts 
S12. However, this review, together with the much larger study involved with the 
RNRRS Evaluation, faced considerable difficulty in quantifying the impact of DFID-
funded research, particularly in the area of poverty reduction.  Without this kind of 
evidence of impact at the project level, it is particularly difficult to demonstrate that one 
approach has more impact than another (see paragraphs 167 and 170).  This is not to say 
that there are no impacts.  Many impacts were found and are described in Chapter 6, but 
these were often qualitative, diffuse, cumulative over long periods of time, and difficult 
to attribute to individual research inputs.  What poverty impacts there were appeared 
limited to those farmers, processors and traders directly involved in the research 
projects. 
Qualitative Evidence Suggests IS Approach Does Increase Impact 
S13. However, despite the lack of quantitative evidence of impact, the review provides 
prima facie evidence that the new approach is more likely to lead to innovation (and 
thereby poverty impact) than the previous, more conventional research-funding model.  
This conclusion was strongly supported by almost all the people interviewed (the main 
exceptions being researchers in the UK, see paragraph 171).  This support is not 
surprising, given that the approach itself is based on the experience of achieving 
innovation in a wide range of countries and sectors.  What is surprising is just how 
many ‘obvious’ partnerships had not been formed before, even if the parties knew each 
other well, and that it needed a more proactive intervention by Programme management 
to seek out and catalyse the coalition partners (see paragraph 296).   
S14. Chapter 6 provides a large number of cases where the major components of the 
innovation approach led to a wide range of significant impacts.  These impacts include 
                                                 
3 Rath, Amitav and Andrew Barnett, Innovations systems: concepts, approaches and lessons from RNRRS, RNRRS 
Synthesis Study No 10, The Policy Practice Limited, discussion draft, 23 November 2005. 
4 Although they went on to say that “the jury must be regarded as still out as to whether the benefits outweigh the 
transaction costs”. Paragraph  4.5.6 
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policy change, institutional learning, changes in practice, and scientific knowledge of 
relevance to the scientific community, extension services and NGOs.  The Chapter also 
shows a number of other projects where it would appear the lack of impacts were in part 
explained by constraints within the innovation system (and indeed where impacts may 
well have been more extensive if the IS approach had been adopted).  The main findings 
of the review are summarised below: 
If the Objective is Impact then the CPH Programme has Demonstrated and Documented 
the Process 
S15. If DFID wants its research investment to result in poverty reduction in the near 
future, attention has to be paid to the processes for harnessing new knowledge in 
poverty-reducing development – namely the innovation systems.  The CPH Programme 
provides a wealth of material and experience about how this can be done at the level of 
projects and sub-sectoral programmes.  Many of the processes and procedures are 
already documented. 
Many Lessons have been Learned and Pitfalls Identified 
S16. Despite the relatively short period in which the Innovation Systems approach has 
been applied, the CPH Programme also provides a number of lessons about how the 
process could be improved and pitfalls can be avoided.  These include: 
Achieving ‘Local Impact’ and ‘Public Goods’ Requires Special Efforts  
S17. As projects become more focused on local poverty impacts, there is a concern that 
they become little more than relatively marginal ‘development’ projects, prompting the 
question as to whether they are indeed ‘research’.  The extent to which they are research 
depends on their design, and their ability ‘to produce generalised lessons of relevance to 
others’.  However, there were examples within the Programme that show that a great 
deal of this public-good knowledge is present, and that particular efforts (and probably 
specialist staff) are required to extract it.  These public goods concern both the process 
(how to improve the innovation process) and the content.   
Institutional Learning was Considerable but More Value Could be Achieved 
S18. One of the major claims for the innovation approach is that it produces 
‘institutional learning’ and this was a major output mentioned in the Logical 
Frameworks  of many CPH coalition projects.  There was evidence of a great deal of 
this type of learning (particularly in the sense of research groups working together with 
the private sector and NGOs in ways that they had not done before and in ways that 
enabled quite different methods of working).  However, the processes for turning this 
type of learning into public goods (for instance, by writing ‘institutional histories’) were 
generally not successful within the CPH Programme.  Where they were successful, for 
instance in the CPH Programme in India, additional funds and external specialists were 
hired to extract these lessons.  While some institutional learning takes place through 
‘action research’, it is necessary to use these experiences to generate and document the 
evidence necessary to encourage change at the policy level.   
Value can be added through Targeted Cross-Project and Cross-Regional Learning 
S19. The project approach (and possibly the processes of competitive tendering) 
appeared to militate against producing international public-good knowledge that would 
have been extracted through comparing different projects from a number of different 
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countries5.  Many projects operated as if they were ‘stand alone’, even if they were 
conceived as being part of a planned sequence of activities.  Again, this tendency could 
be countered by setting strategic objectives at the Programme level covering these 
issues, by specific funding, and by engaging specialist staff to do this (see paragraph 
266).  Some activities along these lines are now being undertaken, and others might 
usefully follow under future programmes. 
The Need to Go Beyond Written Instructions 
S20. While there was a striking level of ownership of the ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ 
approach and ‘coalition projects’, there was also considerable variability in 
understanding about what the new approach really involved.  It probably would have 
taken more time than was available, for project and Programme staff fully to understand 
what the Innovation Systems approach entailed.  In large part, this can be explained by 
the pressure to get projects approved and operating.  The Programme put considerable 
effort into producing guidelines and providing training.  However, there were limits to 
what could be achieved in the time available.  Furthermore, it became clear that some 
types of knowledge are difficult to codify into guidelines, and in these cases, there is 
probably no substitute for using the tacit knowledge of experienced people.  This proved 
to be particularly true with writing project proposals, final project reports and 
institutional histories.  These all required experienced people (often with social science 
skills) rather than detailed sets of guidelines. 
Valuable Lessons were Learned about Coalition Formation and Management 
S21. The Programme generated considerable experience about the pitfalls associated 
with partner selection and about the management of coalition projects.  There is a clear 
trade-off between adding partners too early and finding that they are not able to deliver, 
and leaving it too late, thereby missing important views at the initial stages of problem 
specification.  Attracting partners with the competencies required for innovation is more 
important than just increasing the number of partners.  Partner selection should be 
driven by an assessment of the ‘comparative advantage’ of each actor.  The costs of 
managing coalitions and participating in networks needs to be fully costed and 
resourced. 
Critical Mass and the Need for Larger Projects 
S22. The need to involve additional players in innovation coalitions, combined with the 
need to attain a critical mass of effort, suggests that there should be larger projects, if 
not full ‘programmes’, rather than, project-funding.  Budget constraints meant that 
many partners’ contributions were very part-time, and projects lasted only two to three 
years. 
Is the IS Approach Relevant to all Problems and Sectors? 
S23. While it might be expected that the Innovation Systems approach was most 
applicable to the introduction of ’machines‘, the CPH Programme showed that it was 
also effective in the introduction of new ways of doing things, and in achieving policy 
change (paragraph 330).  However, as the innovation process proceeds through time, 
some actors will need to be more involved than others.  This might be said to be 
                                                 
5 For instance, there was useful experience with informally vended foods in a number of countries.  It would appear 
that there were important common lessons coming out of this, both about the coalition approach and about what 
worked and what did not work.  Efforts are now being made to extract these lessons.  Another common theme might 
cover the large number of projects that introduced small-scale agro-processing machines. 
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particularly so for ‘agenda setting’ research that maps out areas that policy makers and 
others may not have thought about.  However, the essence of the IS approach is that, in 
priority setting and the allocation of research and other resources, a wider range of 
actors and experience is required. 
Is the IS Approach too Complicated? 
S24. It is certainly the case that the IS approach is more complicated than administering 
a passive research-grant programme.  However, the CPH Programme’s experience 
shows that the passive approach is probably no longer an option if the objective is 
impact through innovation.  The CPH Programme’s experience demonstrates the 
necessity of an interventionist approach to the formation of coalitions, that innovation 
requires capacities to be strengthened at many parts of the ‘system’, and that 
engagement between the public and private sectors has to be facilitated.  Yet the CPH 
Programme also demonstrates that the key elements of the IS approach are simple, 
widely understood and can be implemented effectively even at the level of individual 
projects. 
Country-Level Representation in Programme Management 
S25. The CPH Programme’s adoption of the IS approach demonstrated the need for 
Programme management to be flexible enough to evolve as more experience is gained.  
A decentralised form of Programme management was tested through the creation of 
Regional Offices.  This proved to be highly successful and it is certain that the 
Programme’s effectiveness was partly due to the close contact that the Regional Offices 
were able to maintain with the situation on the ground.  This enabled them to adapt 
rapidly to the changing situation, to participate actively in the formation of coalitions 
and to provide mentoring advice about project proposals, the new approach and, indeed, 
aspects of running coalitions. 
Is the IS Approach too Costly? 
S26. Certainly there are additional costs associated with the proactive interventions 
necessary to bring key actors to work together and to strengthen the weaker elements of 
the system to facilitate innovation.  However, there is some confusion about the costs 
involved.  In most cases, these are not ‘overheads’ that need reducing, but rather 
‘investments’ in capacities that are necessary for innovation.  The costs may be high, 
but the costs of not doing it are higher – “invest now or pay later”! Only in those 
innovation systems that are well resourced and operating effectively is a reactive 
approach to research funding possible.   
S27. There are also costs involved with the competitive tendering approach, and these 
were increased by the CPH Programme’s requirements.  Some of these costs were 
reduced by the combination of short concept documents preceding full proposals.  Some 
other costs were reimbursed.  In future, such costs could be lowered by having larger 
projects and longer projects.  Nevertheless, such costs remain a major problem for many 
partners, including the private sector, which cannot afford the time to participate in 
lengthy meetings. 
The CPH Programme’s  Experience has many Implications for Research Donors such 
as DFID 
S28. The CPH Programme was both constrained and enabled by the procedures and 
mechanism adopted by DFID, but DFID’s funding is itself constrained by its internal 
rules, not least about the limits set on the relationship between centrally funded 
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programmes and its country programmes.  This suggests that it either should define its 
objectives in relation to the instruments available to it, or attempt to widen the range of 
instruments.  These issues are explored in Chapter 8. 
The Question of Going Beyond ‘Research’ Projects 
S29. Examination of conditions in the countries in which the CPH Programme operated 
showed severe weaknesses in their National Innovation Systems, even in India, where 
huge research capacities often appeared constrained by bureaucracy.  This experience, 
together with the wider innovation systems literature suggests that the ’research project’ 
mode of financing may well not be the most appropriate instrument for bringing science 
and technology to bear on poverty reduction.  In such cases, the approaches pioneered 
by DFID’s Governance Programmes, such as their ‘Drivers of Change’ approach might 
offer more direct and effective interventions.  Such analysis draws attention to the 
incentives, disincentives, and questions about whose (research) priorities are to be met, 
and who wins and who loses from the process.   
S30. In addition, a number of projects’ efforts to innovate were constrained by their 
inability to cover the risks that the private sector is exposed to when trying to 
commercialise new technology or approaches.  It will be a challenge to find ways of 
financing these activities and for DFID to decide how far along this route it is prepared 
to go in such public/private partnerships. 
Strengthening Capacity is Necessary 
S31. The necessity of strengthening capacities has run through many of the conclusions 
of this study.  DFID rules and procedures have made this difficult in the past.  A major 
challenge still remains as to whether to strengthen existing institutions within 
developing countries or to set up parallel facilities at the regional or international 
(including UK) level.  Interviewees in Africa clearly felt there was no alternative but to 
build capacities at the national level, not least as these are the elements of the system 
that need to absorb and implement new knowledge, even if it were generated regionally. 
Separating Research Fund Management from Doing Research 
S32. A related question is whether to continue the separation of the management of 
research from doing research.  While this arrangement has not been without its critics 
and problems of implementation, the separation has been successful and provides more 
flexibility in implementing an Innovation Systems approach.  The innovation literature 
attaches considerable importance to the role of ‘intermediary organisations’ and the 
balance of power relations between the supply side and the knowledge side of the 
innovation system.  This is probably easier to achieve when fund management is kept 
separately. 
The Issue of Research Governance 
S33. The CPH Programme Advisory Committee (PAC) has documented the lessons 
learned and provided many useful conclusions.  The CPH Programme was the only one 
of the RNRRS Programmes to expand the membership of its Programme Advisory 
Committee to include people from developing countries.  More generally, this is in 
keeping with the IS approach, which suggests that successful innovation requires 
changes in the governance of the research programmes to prevent ‘capture’ by any one 
particular interest group, and particularly to strengthen the voice of what might be called 
the ‘users’ of new knowledge.  This implies the need for wide representation on future 
PACs both in the UK and in country or regional programmes. 
 
10 Summary 
Public Goods and the Issue of Access 
S34.   While one of the objectives of DFID centrally funded research is to produce 
‘public-good knowledge’, there is considerable confusion about what this means in 
practice.  Many researchers say they face conflicting incentives: either to share their 
knowledge or to publish in journals that help their careers but are largely unavailable in 
developing countries.  This situation needs to be resolved by DFID.  At the least, 
contractual arrangements should be put in place to ensure that, if research outputs are 
not published within a fixed period after the research contract ends (such as a year), then 
their Final Technical Report (that must contain the main results of the research) and 
associated data sets can be placed on the web by the Programme.   
DFID’s Role in Global and National Innovation Systems 
S35. The devolvement of responsibility for the bulk of the aid programme to DFID 
offices in developing countries, together with the trend to budgetary support, and 
reduced head counts sets a difficult context in which centrally funded research can 
operate and have an impact.  Many researchers felt that DFID itself was, and should be, 
a major component of the innovation system in which they operate, but over the period 
of the RNRRS, DFID has largely abrogated this responsibility.  This left three major 
gaps: links between research funded by DFID’s Central Research Department with 
DFID’s other activities in developing countries; the lack of ‘ownership’ of the results of 
DFID-funded research that is necessary for feeding them into the international 
development process using the networks in which DFID is involved, qua UK 
government; and systematic cross-programme efforts to learn from experience and use 
the knowledge gained to strengthen the evolution of the programmes.  Hopefully, these 
issues will be addressed in DFID’s forthcoming “Science and Innovation Strategy”. 
The Challenge of Identifying and Utilising the UK’s Comparative Advantage 
S36. The project portfolio sheds important light on the very positive contributions that 
British-based research has made to the CPH Programme over its life.  These are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.  Given their relatively high cost, there is a 
pressing need for UK institutions themselves and for DFID more generally to define 
where their comparative advantage lies, and to find mechanisms through which this 
asset can be best maintained and used in the future development by itself and its 
development partners. 
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1 Introduction 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
                                                
 The British Government provides funds through the Department for International 
Development (DFID) for research in the area of Crop Post-Harvest.  This Programme is 
managed by NR International Limited.  The aim of the Crop Post-Harvest Programme 
(CPHP) is to increase and strengthen the livelihood options of poor households, in rural 
and urban areas of developing countries, for whom food crops – cereal, oilseeds, legumes, 
root crops and horticulture – offer a route out of poverty6.  Some £24 million has been 
invested so far. 
 The CPH Programme aims to increase and strengthen the livelihood options of poor 
households, by funding research and extension to: 
• Reduce post-harvest losses through reduced perishability, more effective storage 
and handling, and improved access to transport; 
• Identify and exploit market opportunities and remove constraints to market access; 
• Reduce drudgery and release labour for on- or off-farm activities through more 
efficient processing; 
• Improve the quality of, and add value to, primary crops through processing 
technologies and improvements in storage and handling; 
• Improve opportunities for on- and off-farm employment through backward and 
forward linkages in the agricultural sector and the development and management of 
small enterprises; 
• Strengthen pro-poor innovation systems; 
• Strengthen the (post-harvest) information market; 
• Upscale (post-harvest) research findings; 
• Provide tools for packaging and delivery of (post-harvest) information7. 
 Over the past ten years, the CPH Programme has evolved what it describes as “a new 
research paradigm, which emphasises the important of understanding and working with 
national institutional systems in order to convert research into successful innovation” (the 
CPH Programme web site http://www.cphp.uk.com). 
 According to the current Logical Framework, the purpose of the CPH Programme is that 
“national and international crop post-harvest innovation systems respond more effectively 
to the needs of the poor”8.  Furthermore, the Logical Framework suggests that indicators 
showing that this purpose has been achieved will be that “by 2005, a replicable range of 
different institutional arrangements which effectively and sustainably improve access to 
post-harvest knowledge and/or stimulate post-harvest innovation to benefit the poor has 
been validated in four regions”9 . 
 The purpose of this report is to examine this evolution and to add value to it by 
extracting the positive and negative lessons that can be learned from the various 
 
6 Executive Summary, CPHP Annual Report, 2003–4, page iii. 
7 http://www.cphp.uk.com/aboutcphp/default.asp?step=4&pid=21. 
8 CPHP Logical Framework (2002–2005).  This has now been extended to 2006 and is currently under revision and 
will be reported in the quarterly reports to DFID’s Central Research Group. 
9 As footnote 8. 
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approaches that have been used, particularly from the traditional form of research 
contracts, through to the current ‘coalition approach’ to project design and implementation.  
In essence, the traditional model can be considered as contracting research institutes to 
carry out research, while the coalition approach engages both the ‘suppliers’ of new 
knowledge and the ‘users’ of new knowledge in a joint endeavour to solve problems and 
implement the solution within its institutional context. 
The Questions to be Addressed 
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
                                                
 The overarching question is whether the new approach is in some sense more effective 
than the previous one.  This requires a comparison of essential elements of both the new 
and the older approaches, and an examination of the context in which the Programme has 
operated.  However, this question leads on to another, which is more fundamental: what is 
the purpose of DFID’s investment?  As we shall see, during the course of the Programme, 
DFID changed its view of the purpose of its investment, from the generation of new 
knowledge, to more general concerns about its ‘impact’, particularly on poverty reduction.  
So the question is whether the new approach is more likely to result in poverty-reducing 
impacts than the previous approach. 
 These questions of ‘impact’ are notoriously difficult to answer.  In addition to the well-
known problems of ‘attribution’ between research inputs and outcomes10, the short lapsed 
time between the start of the CPH Programme’s new projects in 2002 and this review 
limits what can be expected in terms of observable change.   
 More fundamentally, DFID’s funds usually form only a small part of the resources 
currently going into any particular national system of research and innovation.  It therefore 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to ascribe any particular outcome to DFID’s input 
alone.   
 While it was recognised at the outset that it was unlikely that it would be possible to 
determine quantitative links between inputs and outcomes in statistically significant terms, 
this study is premised on the notion that important qualitative lessons can be drawn from 
these different approaches, both about what  seems to work and about what does not.  The 
aim was therefore to go beyond projects and regions to the level of the whole Programme 
in order to derive “higher-level generalisations” about the “lessons learned” that may be 
useful for research funders, research managers, researchers and the other key actors in the 
process of generating and applying new knowledge to reduce poverty. 
 This attempt to learn lessons from the CPH Programme’s experience, and indeed the 
activities of the Programme itself, have been given added importance by the fact that it has 
taken place when DFID (and other agencies) are reconsidering how science and 
technology can best be applied in the fight against poverty, and when DFID is itself 
changing the way it supports research11.  During the course of this study, it has been 
possible to feed some of the CPH Programme’s experience into this process, and into the 
major evaluation of the Renewable Natural Resource Research Strategy that took place 
 
10  These are explored in DFID’s recent Research Policy Paper: Surr, Martin (team leader), Andrew Barnett, Alex 
Duncan, Melanie Speight, with David Bradley, Alan Rew, John Toye, Paragraph 240. 
(http://www.DFID.gov.uk/Pubs/files/pov_red_pol_paper.pdf).  
11 DFID Research Funding Framework 2005–2007, http://www.DFID.gov.uk/pubs/files/researchframework/research-
framework-2005.pdf. 
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during 2004/200512.  It is hoped that this final report will provide a valuable resource to 
DFID and other research donors and also to the managers of future research programmes. 
11.
12.
                                                
 It has been suggested that this review looks at the problem from the point of view of 
researchers and those that manage and fund research13.  This is probably inevitable given 
its origins and the way that DFID allocates its resources to ‘research’.  Yet, if the focus is 
on innovation, there are many other perspectives that need to be taken into account, 
particularly those that ‘use’ research.  Certainly there is a ‘market’ for knowledge, with 
numerous suppliers and users, wholesalers and retailers.  The perspectives of these 
different actors would no doubt merit more attention, not least in demonstrating how other 
aid instruments available to country programmes could contribute to improving the impact 
of research and increasing poverty-reducing innovation.  
 It should be stressed at the outset that, while care has been taken to weigh up 
conflicting opinions and other evidence, it is inevitable that many of the lessons learned are 
based on the subjective judgements of the author and have benefited from hindsight.  It is 
hoped that these judgements are presented constructively, and in good faith.  In all cases, 
the researchers and other people who were interviewed were very helpful, hard-working 
and serious people.  It is also the case that many of these criticisms apply with equal or 
greater force to other programmes funded by DFID and other donors. 
 
12 Evaluation of DFID Renewable Natural Resource Research Strategy, June 2005, EVD 659. 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev659-cover.pdf. 
13 Frank Almond, member of CPH Programme Advisory Committee, comment on an earlier draft. 
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2 The Approach to the Review 
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
                                                
 The initial question was whether the ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ approach was in 
some sense better than the more traditional approach to funding and managing research.  It 
was hoped that this could be approached by examining two samples of projects: the first 
sample was examined in 2003 and 2004 and included projects that were designed prior to 
the major shift in emphasis that took place in 2002.  A second sample was examined in 
2005 and constituted so-called ‘coalition’ projects that started at the end of 200214.  
 An initial concern was that ‘coalition projects’ examined in the second phase would 
not have had insufficient ‘lapsed time’ to enable them to demonstrate observable impact.  
This proved to be the case, even though the extension of DFID’s contract with NR 
International for a further year enabled the second phase of the review to take place in 
2005, rather at the end of 2004 as was originally envisaged. 
 It was also important for the review to establish at an early stage: 
• what were the essential elements of the new ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ 
approach, and the extent to which this approach contained the elements of best 
practice contained in the ‘innovation’ literature; and  
• the context in which the Programme operated, in relation both to the national 
context in which the projects were carried out and to the changing perspective of 
DFID and its requirements. 
 During the initial phase of the review, an attempt was therefore made to develop a 
common language with NR International’s UK and regional staff15 about what is meant by  
‘Partnerships for Innovation’, ‘coalitions’ and the National Systems of Innovation 
literature.  Background papers were prepared and a training exercise conducted at the 
annual meeting of the CPH Programme Regional Co-ordinators that took place in South 
Africa in June 200316.  Furthermore, a policy brief was prepared summarising the National 
Systems of Innovation literature.  This brief forms the basis of Chapter 4 of this report.  
During the course of the review, advice has been given to the CPH Programme’s staff on a 
number of issues concerning innovation in general, and about ‘institutional learning’ in 
particular.  While these interactions will be interpreted by some people as compromising 
the independence of the review, it is important to stress that this was a lesson-learning 
exercise rather than an evaluation.  The primary purpose of the review was to go beyond 
evaluations of individual projects to derive “higher-level generalisations” about the 
“lessons learned” from the whole Programme.   
 Visits were made to Ghana (October 2003 and September 2005), India (November 
2003 and June 2005), Uganda (February 2004 and October 2005), Kenya (October 2005), 
Zimbabwe and Zambia (May 2005) and Tanzania (February 2004).  A large proportion of 
the CPH Programme’s 155 projects were examined, including all of the 16 ‘Partnerships 
 
14 See Annex 1 for the initial terms of reference and approach.  The extension of the RNRRS Programme for an 
additional year provided an opportunity to carry out the review of ‘coalition projects’ in 2005, rather than 2004 as had 
originally been envisaged. 
15 Regional staff are contractually consultants. 
16 See, for instance, Barnett, Andrew, Towards a common understanding of key NSI terms: a personal view, CPHP,  
May 2003. 
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for Innovation’ projects started after 2002.  Interviews were guided by a checklist of 
questions (see Annex 4).  In addition, as part of the research, an attempt was made to 
develop a matrix that would summarise each project according to a number of indicators of 
‘project impact’, together with indicators of the extent to which the projects contained 
characteristics that experience suggests are likely to contribute to successful innovation – 
‘their NSI-ness’17.  This was not successful.  The results of these activities are described in 
Chapter 6.  
18.
19.
20.
21.
                                                
 While it was not possible to reduce the subjective nature of the approach, efforts were 
made to ‘triangulate’ the results by consulting widely and by subjecting draft reports and 
interview notes to key informants.  In addition, the interviews were carried out on a 
confidential basis.  This means that in some cases it has been necessary to make a point 
without naming a specific source for the information or without naming the specific project 
to which the comment was directed.  The point is to extract the lessons not to attribute 
blame.  While each example cited might not provide ‘definitive evidence’ of a 
phenomenon, collectively they do represent the honestly held views of at least some of the 
people interviewed. 
The Evolution of the Review 
 The plan during the initial phase was to undertake a subjective examination of the older 
projects using the perspective of (using the ‘lens’ provided by) the ‘innovation system’ 
approach (see Chapter 4).  The aim was to try to explain subjective impressions of 
success/failure in terms of the existence or absence of the various elements of the 
innovation systems (and partnerships) in which the activity took place.   
 It was recognised from the beginning that projects in the first phase of the Programme 
may well be successful in terms of innovation and impact, even if the inputs to the process 
are not seen by the participants as forming part of a ‘knowledge or innovation system’.  
Such successes, and indeed failures, were in part due to the existence or absence of the 
other parts of the ‘system’ necessary for successful innovation.  This proved to be the case.  
Similarly, while the Innovation Systems approach may require coalitions of partners, 
clearly the existence of partnerships does not necessarily imply the adoption of an IS 
approach. 
 However, it became clear during the first-stage reviews that it was impracticable to 
focus solely on the pre-2002 projects during these initial interviews.  The post-2002 
projects were almost entirely continuations of earlier projects funded by the CPH 
Programme.  So it became impossible to separate outputs and impacts from the pre- and 
post-2002 projects.  Many of the participants in these older projects are also engaged in the 
current round of coalition projects and were keen to talk about them.  Indeed, many 
respondents had difficulty in distinguishing between the large number of projects funded 
by the CPH Programme (and other funders), and the various phases of the projects with 
which they had been involved.  This is itself an important insight: from the viewpoint of a 
number of researchers, each ‘project’ forms only a small part of their own research agenda.  
They may obtain their funding from a number of sources at the same time (not least the 
government funding of their own institution) and see each ‘project’ as contributing to a 
larger and longer-term research endeavour. 
 
17 The inelegant term ‘NSI-ness’ refers to the literature on National Systems of Innovation; however, as this review 
proceeded at the project level, the emphasis on ‘national’ systems was dropped in favour of the term Innovation 
Systems. 
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22. Nonetheless, the second follow-up field visits to Ghana, India, and Uganda in 2005 
focused almost exclusively on projects that were implementing an Innovation Systems 
approach. 
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3 A Brief History of the Programme 
The Changing Motivations and Context of DFID-Funded Research 
23.
24.
25.
26.
                                                
 The CPH Programme is a £24m research Programme funded by the Department for 
International Development.  It has changed significantly along a number of different 
dimensions since it first started in April 1995.  Initially the emphasis was on ‘research’ and 
the need to contribute above all else to the production of ‘scientific publications’18.  
Subsequently, greater emphasis was given to the impact of research on poverty reduction, 
on the dissemination of research results, and, more particularly, on the uptake of the 
research by poor people themselves.  
 The history and evolution of DFID’s Renewable Natural Resources Programme are 
now well known and are described in some detail in the recent evaluation of the RNRRS19.  
The evaluators suggest that the Strategy as set out in the so-called “Yellow Brick”20 was 
“envisaged to support field RNR projects and programmes being undertaken by DFID” 
(paragraph 3.4.2).  Although the Programme was demand-driven, “initially the demand for 
research seems to have been identified more by the UK research community itself … or by 
certain more upstream target organisations” (paragraph 5.6.3).  As time went on, and 
particularly following the DFID White Paper, DFID’s emphasis turned to demonstrable 
poverty reduction.  The evaluators believe that all Programme Managers and the 
Programme Advisory Committees responded effectively to the new challenge (paragraph 
4.2.2). “Programmes have … initiated work on uptake and capacity building as a direct 
response to being committed to achieving research outputs focused on securing poverty 
reduction” (paragraph S59).  However, “with [DFID’s] holistic emphasis on poverty 
eradication it may have reduced its contribution to more basic research in this field” 
(paragraph 4.2.4).  Since the 1997 White Paper, “all Programmes have increasingly 
incorporated a mix of specific projects, or built appropriate aspects into projects, to support 
strengthening of the enabling environment, including explicit support for policy, 
institutions and associated processes” (paragraph S59).  
 The evaluators reflect a widely held view that the RNRRS framework has been 
characterised by the “changing political aims within DFID as a whole” (paragraph 4.2.1) 
and has undergone a string of internal reorganisations, including untying the requirement 
that DFID research funding had to be managed by UK institutions.   
 From the innovation perspective, it is particularly important to note the RNRRS 
Evaluations finding that: 
In 1994, RNRRS was primarily a Programme envisaged to support field RNR 
projects aid programmes being undertaken by DFID.  The policy changes that 
have occurred since then (5.6 and 7.2) mean that this natural DFID constituency, 
 
18 “These changes in emphasis and focus have been partly developed through programme activity and reviews, but 
also prompted by the changing agenda at DFID.  The latter has often had quite major impacts on the type of research 
undertaken and the characteristics of research outputs”: Marter, A D, Analysis of recent marketing research 
undertaken by the CPHP: an overview, Final Report, NR International, November 2002. 
19 Evaluation of DFID’s Renewable Natural Resources Research Strategy (RNRRS) 1995–2005 by Dunstan Spencer, 
Stein Bie, Ursula Blackshaw and Anne Thompson with ten subject matter specialists, June 2005. 
20 The Yellow Brick is the short-hand name given to the RNRRS Strategy Document  prepared by DFID in 1994 that 
set out the agenda for the 1995 – 2005 period. ODA, Renewable Natural Resources Strategy 1995–2005, Final 
Report, Research Task Group. May 1994. 
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through which uptake, capacity building and other impacts could be achieved, no 
longer exists. (3.4.2) 
[during the evaluation it became] apparent that all programmes have needed to 
initiate strategies to resource the enabling environment, within which the outputs of 
their research are framed.  Programmes and projects are now building in support to 
the enabling environment including institutional support, and capacity building, and 
direct support into market led uptake of research findings.  It is a challenge for 
programmes to balance this since the resourcing, for these built in inputs, is 
insufficient to be able to generate a sustainable enabling environment. (3.4.5). 
27.
28.
29.
30.
                                                
 These drivers of change within DFID are set to continue with the trends towards 
increasing budget support (rather than project or sectoral aid), and the policy to separate 
responsibilities for particular aspects of the aid Programme between DFID’s UK offices 
(such as the programme funded by the Central Research Department) and their offices 
within developing countries.   
 In addition to these parochial changes, it is important to stress that there have been 
much larger global trends that have been diminishing the role of agriculture in 
development and seen downward shifts in the national capacities in specific countries, 
especially in Africa, in particular in extension services.  This has also impacted negatively 
on the uptake of research and its subsequent impact.  Such changes also determine what it 
is sensible for DFID (or any other donor) to do when investing in research. 
 Although DFID did not use the specific language of innovations in the 1997 or 2000 
White Papers, they did contain many of the ideas.  However, as DFID’s thinking has 
evolved, these terms have been used explicitly and with growing frequency in DFID’s recent 
research-strategy documents and consultations21.  Although this trend is dismissed by some 
commentators as just another DFID fad22, this probably is based on a misunderstanding, as 
the innovation approach is largely a summary of historical best practice rather than a new 
hypothesis.  Furthermore, this approach could now be said to be the dominant paradigm in 
research funding for most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries (including the British Government’s Department for Trade and Industry) 
and has recently been adopted by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
Ministers of Science and Technology, and various elements of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system. 
 DFID’s most recent statement about its attitude to the Innovation Systems approach 
was made in their response to an electronic consultation on their proposed Strategy for 
Research on Sustainable Agriculture (SRSA).  They say that: 
DFID recognizes that research is only one component of agricultural innovation 
processes.  For agricultural research to have real impact strong linkages into 
 
21 See, for instance, Surr, Martin (team leader), Andrew Barnett, Alex Duncan, Melanie Speight, with David Bradley, 
Alan Rew, John Toye, DFID Research Policy Paper, Research For Poverty Reduction, paragraph 240 
(http://www.DFID.gov.uk/Pubs/files/pov_red_pol_paper.pdf). See also  “For agricultural research to have real impact 
strong linkages into innovation that lifts people out of poverty are crucial. These linkages include demand appraisal 
and problem identification, participatory research, site-specific validation of outputs and effective promotion of 
outputs” (paragraph 11, Consultation on DFID research funding framework: Synthesis of Comments and DFID 
response by the Central Research Department, 7 September 2004). 
22 See, for instance, the views of British researchers reported in the RNRRS Evaluation, page 372, and Pound, B and 
B Adolf, Research capacity development, desk study for DFID, NRI, draft, August 2005.. 
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innovation that lifts people out of poverty are crucial.  These linkages include 
demand appraisal and problem identification, participatory research, site-specific 
validation of outputs and effective promotion of outputs.  The regional programmes 
will need to assess the effectiveness of these linkages with respect to the research 
they fund and to find ways of strengthening them where necessary.  Hence it is to 
be expected that each regional Programme will develop differently23. 
Changing Concepts of the Research Process 
31.
32.
33.
 These changes within DFID also reflected more general changes within the wider 
community of donors and development thinkers.  Over the past ten years, many agencies 
have stressed the need for more equal ‘partnerships’ in all aid relationships, including those 
between northern and southern researchers.  Stress was placed on ‘local’ involvement, the 
need to ‘build local capacities’, and the processes rather than just the product of research24.   
 During this time, there has also been an important process by which DFID divested 
itself of its own dedicated ‘tropical’ research institutes and introduced a competitive 
tendering model, which reached its conclusion with the ‘untying’ of DFID research grants 
from UK institutions in 2000.  Over the period covered by the Programme, the proportion 
of funds going to UK institutions, or expatriate institutions more generally, has declined.   
 This decline is not restricted to the CPH Programme, as all RNRRS programmes have 
shifted their funding from the UK.  According to figures supplied by DFID to the House of 
Common Select Committee on Science and Technology, the proportion of DFID research 
projects contracted to UK-led groups has fallen from just under ninety percent in 1999–
2000, to just over fifty percent in 2003–2004.  However, these figures do not state what 
proportion of funds is spent in Britain.  Nor are these trends universal.  As the following 
table demonstrates, the position varies considerably between programmes.  DFID support to 
health research, for instance, continues to be contracted exclusively through UK institutions.  
Proportion of DFID Research Projects Contracted to UK–led Groups 
 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 
 
Research 
Area  
Number 
of 
contracts  
% 
UK
– 
led  
Number 
of 
contracts 
% 
UK– 
led  
Number 
of 
contracts 
% 
UK– 
led  
Number 
of 
contracts  
% 
UK– 
led  
Number 
of 
contracts 
% 
UK– 
led  
Health  19  100  12  100  11  91  6  100  1  100 
Engineering  42  100  59  96  70  95  34  97  18  94  
Renewable 
Natural 
Resources  
152  87  100  74  54  52  78  51  33  54  
Economics/ 
Social/Political 
Science  
10  100  100  98  36  100  38  86  14  85  
Education  2  100  23  100  11  90  1  100  3  66  
Source: DFID; cited by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, The Use of Science in UK 
International Development Policy Thirteenth Report of Session 2003–04 Volume I, Table 7 
                                                 
23 Paragraph 11: DFID Response to Electronic Consultation on the proposed Strategy for Research on Sustainable 
Agriculture, 2005, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/research/srsa-response-final.pdf. 
24 Typical of these trends is the much cited Swiss Commission for Research Partnerships with Developing Countries 
(KFPE), Guidelines for Research in Partnership with Developing Countries, which was published in 1998. 
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34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
                                                
 It seems that three trends have been responsible for this shift: the greater emphasis on 
partnerships; the high cost of keeping expatriates overseas; and the untying of British 
research budgets (although this latter change is relatively recent and is said to have little 
impact so far on the location of funds).  These forces resulted in an increasingly large 
percentage of funds being spent in developing countries, by local partners, allowing greater 
local partnership and local leadership in strategy, direction and execution.   
 A major touchstone of ‘equality in partnerships’ that has emerged in the past few years 
is the extent to which all partners have a knowledge of, and even a say in, the allocation of 
each project’s research budget25.  Many researchers in developing countries that were 
interviewed for this review reported that, for a substantial period in which the Programme 
has operated, they did not know the details of the project budget, nor the process by which 
the funds had been allocated between the various ‘partners’.  There was a widespread 
feeling that, in the early years, they were often treated as research assistants or contractors 
in someone else’s research, but, over the years, they had become to feel more like equal 
partners in a mutually beneficial relationship. 
Major Changes within the CPH Programme 
 At its start in 1995, the thrust and nature of the Programme was shaped by the fact that 
the research was mainly carried out and managed by the Natural Resources Institute (NRI).  
Many projects continued research started prior to 1995.  NRI, and its predecessors since 
1894, had been part of a department of government, undertaking research on ‘tropical 
products’ and natural resources related to developing countries.   
 From 1996, the management of the Programme was transferred to NR International 
Limited (NRIL), a specially created limited liability company owned by the Universities of 
London (Imperial College), Greenwich, Wye College and Edinburgh, when NRI itself was 
finally sold to the University of Greenwich.  The move was seen by many key informants 
as being highly controversial and many reasons have been suggested for it.  Some people 
suggest that the creation of NRIL was mainly driven by the need to reduce the overhead 
cost of the operation, while others suggest that it was to emphasise the arm’s length 
relationship between the managers of the funds and some of its largest contractors, namely 
NRI, Imperial College and Edinburgh University.  
 Interviews with NRI staff involved at the start of the CPH Programme indicated that, in 
so far as they sought partners in developing countries at this initial stage, they did so with 
those who were largely self-financed, in order to maximise the income flow to NRI during 
its transfer from DFID to the University of Greenwich26.  This was understandable and is 
reflected in the budgets of early projects, which show, not only that NRI was the major 
beneficiary of DFID CPH funds, but also that a very large proportion of the money 
allocated to each project was spent on NRI staff.  The important contribution that NRI and 
 
25 Jacques Gaillard was perhaps the first to argue that the touchstones of equal power relations were involvement in 
the conceptualisation of the project, knowledge of all elements of the budget, and ultimately control of budgets and 
quality assurance: see his North–South research partnership: is collaboration possible between unequal partners?, 
Knowledge and Policy, 7(2), 1994, pp. 31–63. 
26 The people expressing this view are now retired from NRI.  Current staff who were also involved at the time state 
that “this was not a criterion used for selecting partners”.  “In 1996 DFID decided not to shut down NRI (an 
organisation it fully owned) but to ‘sell it’ to the ‘highest bidder’ based on a predicted business plan.  The major 
feature of that plan was the future income NRI was likely to receive from the RNRRS. This was then greatly affected 
by [DFID] who untied aid with all the implications this had on flow of money to UK organisations.  NRI (and UoG) 
in good faith and with goodwill to the development process has had to deal with this” (A Westby, personal 
communication, 3 January 2006).   
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other British scientists have made to the CPH Programme is explored in subsequent 
chapters.  
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
                                                
 These early beginnings were traumatic for many of the people involved and this has 
cast a long shadow over the subsequent Programme, but the Programme has also 
undergone many other substantial changes over its history.  Some of these have been 
reactions to the changes in DFID policy already described and NR International’s 
interpretation of them, and instructions from DFID advisors.  Others resulted from internal 
Programme reviews and from changes in strategic thinking initiated by the Programme 
Advisory Committee, the Programme’s Managers and their consultants.   
 In the early stages of the CPH Programme’s funding, priorities were set out in the 
Yellow Brick and subsequently modified through a series of ‘country framework 
documents’ drawn up in line with national agricultural research and development policy 
and the results of needs assessments carried out by the Programme.  These set out research 
needs both in terms of a ‘production systems approach’ and for particular commodities 
(crops) described in the Yellow Brick.  Each production system had its own Production 
System Leader, who in all cases was an academic in a British University or NRI (or 
University of Greenwich from 1996).  It is suggested that the initial frameworks tried to 
balance the portfolio between strategic and adaptive research.  
 More recently, and following the creation of regional offices, priorities have been set 
according to Regional Strategies27, which locate new research in the institutional context 
of the countries in which they operate28.  Priority research themes were discussed with 
local stakeholders in 2002 and are documented in the 2002–2005 Regional Strategies.  
Furthermore, regional staff have been able to influence research policy through discussions 
at the national level.  For instance, the CPH Programme’s regional consultants have put the 
case for partnerships in the Uganda National Agricultural Research System (NARS) 
reforms and contributed text on institutional reforms in the final document.  Clearly, the 
existence of skilled staff in a country raises the possibility of extending this policy work 
within each Region to assist in mapping national CPH innovation systems and to propose 
actions for strengthening them29.   
 The East and West African Strategies give extensive and clear descriptions of the way 
the future research is to be managed – namely using the coalition approach – but say rather 
less on what needs to be researched, or how the national system of innovation relating to 
CPH might be strengthened.  The process followed by each Region is shown graphically in 
the figure on the following page from the CPH Programme’s Annual Report for 2002–03.  
 Since its inception in 1995, the CPH Programme became increasingly aware of the 
importance of the institutional context of its work and the need to engage effectively with a 
wider range of actors in project commissioning and implementation.  For the CPH 
Programme with its pro-poor focus, engaging with the institutional context of its work was 
 
27 See, for instance, The Regional Strategy for CPHP in West Africa 2002–2005, page 3.  
28 From time to time, CPH Programme Management has also commissioned thematic reviews to see whether further 
research in particular areas was required.   
29 The DFID Crop Post-Harvest Programme in East Africa Strategy for 2005–2006. 
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considered essential if the Programme was to bring about pro-poor Post-Harvest 
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Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of the development of the Partnerships for Innovation 
projects during 2002 in the four regions 
Source: CPH Programme’s Annual Report 2002–03, Figure 2.2 
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innovation30.   By 2002, the CPH Programme’s annual report stated “that the key to 
maximising the impact of [its] research on the livelihoods of poor households is 
investment in institutional change”31. 
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
                                                
 Interestingly, the recent RNRRS Evaluation came to similar views by concluding that 
“whilst being increasingly demand-led in its activities (paragraph 5.5, 5.2) [RNRRS 
programmes] can only adopt a supply–push approach to uptake.  This is neither effective 
nor efficient” (summary paragraph S19). 
 In 2001–2002, the CPH Programme negotiated a new “research management 
paradigm” with DFID.  The organisational and institutional context was seen as a key 
determinant of research impact, and not just an ‘assumption’.  In the language of Logical 
Frameworks, institutional development became the Programme’s Purpose, livelihood 
impacts became its Goal, and the contractual deliverables, the production and 
dissemination of new knowledge, remained unchanged32. 
 The CPH Programme does appear to have been the first of DFID’s research 
Programmes formally explicitly to change the way it manages the research process.  A 
recent ‘synthesis study’ looking across the whole RNRRS Programme found that, while all 
the Programmes had evolved in broadly similar ways, there was wide variation between 
the Programmes and it was largely an ad hoc process33.  
 This change in research management accelerated the shift in the proportion of funds 
that were spent in developing countries.  Simultaneously, there was a major shift in power 
relations, with more funds being controlled by developing countries themselves.  In 
particular, current CPH Programme’s projects require that “core partners can see all project 
management information (financial and other)”34.  Of the 16 projects commissioned in 
2002–03, one was entirely UK-led, 11 were overseas led and four were jointly led35.  The 
RNRRS Evaluation confirms the break with the past represented by the CPH Programme 
and suggests that it has “led to the research becoming more open to responding to local 
demand, with the CPH Programme acting as facilitators to the process” (see paragraph 
5.6.6). 
 It is suggested that the crop post-harvest systems necessitate this approach, possibly 
even more than other sectors, for two reasons.  First, the transformation of farm products to 
products in the market place involves systems that are themselves extremely varied and 
 
30 “The term ‘Institutions’ can be used in a number of different ways.  It covers two important elements:  
(a) organisations or agencies that operate within both the public and private sector; and  
(b) the mechanisms, rules and customs by which people and organisations interact with each other (i.e. the “rules of 
the game”).” 
There is often some controversy about the definition of institutions. “There are some situations in which 
organisations, (a), are excluded from the definition, with the definition being restricted to that provided by (b). 
However, in a number of domains organisations are often referred to as ‘institutions’ (e.g. financial institutions, 
charitable institutions etc)”.  See DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets, 
http://www.livelihoods.org/info/info_guidancesheets.html.  This source also provides examples of each type of 
‘institution’ and guidelines for ‘institutional analyses’. 
31 CPHP Annual Report 2002, page 1.2 
32 CPHP Annual Report, April 2004,  page 1.3. 
33 Rath, Amitav and Andrew Barnett, Innovations Systems: Concepts, Approaches and Lessons from RNRRS, 
RNRRS Synthesis Study No 10, The Policy Practice Limited, discussion draft, 23 November 2005. 
34 See CPHP web site. 
35 CPHP Annual Report, November 2004, page 6.1. 
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complex; and second, building profitable ventures in this area is likely to require 
complementing narrow sectoral- or commodity-based approaches with a wider 
understanding and management of the institutional context36.  
49.
50.
51.
                                                
 It is difficult to attribute change to particular individuals, as many people, including 
those in the Regional Offices, contributed to the process of change in the CPH Programme.  
However, in terms of documentation, it appears that Frank Almond, a member of the PAC 
and Partnership Advisor, circulated a note in July 2000 widening his brief from NGO 
partnerships to the wider institutional context, with particular reference to the private 
sector.  While he accepts these ideas derived from discussions with many other people, his 
notes of visits to Regional Offices in November 2000 contained all the essential elements 
of what was to become the ‘coalition approach’: including criticism of the ‘linear’ model, 
interaction between different participants, innovation mechanisms and institutional 
histories.  Part of these notes say that: 
Projects that move beyond scientific research and into questions of marketing and 
uptake will also start to encounter an even wider variety of partners.  Such a 
variety of partners – from civil society organisations, NGOs, private sector, public 
policy sector etc – will be extremely diverse, will have different languages, will 
have different sets of agendas, and will be looking at a project with different 
interests in mind.  The project setting represents an intersection of interests from 
all of these agendas. … It would seem that a solution would be for the Regional 
Coordinator to retain someone to both undertake that task and to encourage 
project partners to become more adept at doing it themselves.  Again, all the 
arguments are for that to be a locally-recruited skill37. 
 Dr Andy Hall, until recently regional co-ordinator in the Programme’s South Asian 
Regional Office38, also provided much of the intellectual underpinning and justification for 
the changes that took place39.  He came to the Programme with an extensive understanding 
of the literature on research systems, and the factors determining the success and failure of 
these systems to induce change40.  Dr Hall was able to utilise the resources of the 
Programme to investigate and demonstrate these ideas, and to pilot many of the approaches 
that were later incorporated into the CPH Programme’s approach in other countries41.   
 Andy Hall believes his own views were deeply influenced during his time in Uganda, 
where it became clear that scientists needed to partner with other organisations if they were 
 
36 Frank Almond,  CPHP Partnership Advisor, personal communication. 
37 Frank Almond, extracts from personal file notes,  personal communication, 22 November 2005. 
38 NRI has pointed out that “The ‘partnership for innovation’ approach was built upon concepts that an NRI staff 
member (Andy Hall) introduced to the CPHP.  It is in many ways an evolution of the way that NRI had in general 
been doing business.  It is an approach that NRI has promoted in post-harvest work funded by other donors e.g. Gates 
Foundation funded work on orange fleshed sweet potato processing and marketing”, personal communication Prof A 
Westby, 3 January 2006.  
39 Andy Hall’s first publication using the innovation systems idea was in 1998: Hall, A J, M V K Sivamohan, N 
Clark, S Taylor and G Bockett,  Institutional developments in Indian agricultural R&D systems: the emerging 
patterns of public and private sector activity, Science, Technology and Development, 16(3), 1998, pp. 51–76. 
40 Particularly the work of Professors Chris Freeman, and Norman Clarke during his PhD at the Science Policy 
Research Unit at Sussex University. 
41 Many of these documents and subsequent summaries are to be found on the website: 
http://www.cphpsouthasia.com/cphp.asp. 
 
  Chapter 3 A Brief History of the Programme 27 
 
to be effective42, but he regards as seminal the work on public–private partnerships in 
horticulture.  This was funded out of the CPH ‘programme development’ budget in 1998 
and published as “Horticultural R and D in India”43.  It was the first time he had used the 
IS concept.  This work, together with all the work in India, was strongly influenced by 
inputs from both Dr Rasheed Sulaiman and Professor Norman Clark.  This initial report 
resulted in the funding of a series of ‘case studies’ as the key to moving the argument 
forward and producing the evidence.  Some members of the PAC were said to be very 
supportive of this approach from its early stages. 
52.
53.
54.
                                                
 It now seems likely that these ideas that were circulating within the CPH Programme’s 
management and elsewhere were re-enforced by the recommendations of an independent 
review commissioned by the CPH Programme’s management that was carried out by 
Biggs and Underwood44.  This explicitly used the language of IS and advocated changing 
the Programme’s Logical Framework to reflect fully a commitment to a “systems 
approach”.  Probably the interaction with Andy Hall provided Biggs and Underwood with 
a language (the language of IS) in which they could express views that they (at least in the 
case of Biggs) had propagated for many years using somewhat different language45.  This 
resulted in the Programme developing its ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ strategy and a 
“coalition approach to post-harvest management and design”.   
 Biggs and Underwood’s recommendations were implemented through a significant 
shift in the Programme’s approach that took place in April 2002.  Central to the new 
approach was support for, and exploitation of, appropriate groupings of actors in its 
projects, seeking to do so in ways that fostered a pro-poor institutional environment for 
post-harvest innovation.  Above all else, the new policy required a far more interventionist 
role for NR International as Programme manager.  In addition to specifying the topics of 
future research (following guidance from DFID and the PAC), the Programme became 
involved in specifying the process by which the research would take place, and in 
supporting the teams to meet these new requirements.  
 Since 2002, some £8 million has been allocated to these ‘coalition projects’, which aim 
to go beyond ‘mere dissemination’ to “taking forward relevant outputs from [CPHP’s 
earlier] portfolio” (costing some £16 million) and developing relationships that will “live 
beyond CPHP” after 2006.  The new partnership approach is intended to enable project 
teams to identify and address those factors in the “enabling environment” that affect the 
uptake of research and the eventual impact on livelihoods.  Even if the Programme cannot 
address all the interventions that are identified, the coalitions are expected to be able to 
work with other stakeholders to assemble the resources and actions required46. 
 
42 This was published some four years after he left Uganda as Hall, A J and S Nahdy, New methods and old 
institutions: the “systems context” of farmer participatory research in national agricultural research systems. The Case 
of Uganda, ODI Agricultural Research and Extension Network(AgREN) Paper No 93, January 1999. 
43 This was published as the ODI Agricultural Research and Extension Paper No 111, 2001:  Hall, A J, N G Clark, 
Rasheed V Sulaiman and Sarah Taylor, Institutional learning through technical projects: horticultural technology 
R&D systems in India, ODI Agricultural Research and Extension Network (AgREN) Paper No 111, January 2001. 
44 Biggs, Stephen and Mary Underwood, Review of the crop post-harvest research programme: partnerships and 
innovation systems, September 2001. 
45 While Biggs and Underwood’s report addresses the ideas of ‘partnerships’, ‘innovation’ and ‘coalitions of 
partners’.  The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines coalitions as  “a temporary alliance for combined action”. 
46 CPHP Annual Report, 2002, page 1.2. 
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55.
                                                
 As IS theory has been derived from extensive empirical observation of ‘what works’, it 
is to be expected that many of the most successful research programmes and institutes 
already exhibit many of the key features described in the theory47.  The application of the 
insights gained from this international research is variously described as the National 
System of Innovation (NSI)48 or more broadly as a ‘knowledge systems’ approach.  This 
approach is summarised in the following chapter. 
 
47 For instance, the Central Leather Research Institute in India was one of the first in developing countries to form 
strong partnerships with the users of knowledge – for instance: “CLRI is one of the few research laboratories of the 
World to have a strong Academy–Research–Industry partnership linkage. Thus the Trinity – the University, R&D 
Laboratory and the Industry – linkages are not only strong, but it has been working effectively and profitably” . 
“CLRI … maintain[s] very close links with the industry – both decentralised and organised sectors. The Institute has 
taken the industry into confidence and working in tandem in all its phases of development”… 
http://www.clri.org/home.asp. 
48 See Freeman, Christopher, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, Frances Pinter, 
London, 1987; Lundvall, Bengt-Åke, National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and 
Interactive Learning, Pinter, London, 1992; Nelson, R R, National Innovation Systems, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1993. 
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4 The Innovation Systems Approach 
From ‘Research’ to ‘Innovation’ 
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
                                                
 In 2001–2002, the Crop Post-Harvest Programme set out to do something that was 
both exciting and ambitious.  The Programme’s management and the Programme 
Advisory Committee had explicitly chosen to shift from a traditional approach to funding 
‘research’ to one that focuses on the elements of the wider system that are required if the 
new knowledge generated by research is to have to a positive impact on economic systems 
– that is, to shift the emphasis from ‘research’ to ‘innovation’.  It was ambitious because at 
that time the Programme had a very few years still to run.  This meant that everything had 
to be done at great speed, with little time for the management team to internalise fully the 
approach and to bring all the many other players on side.  
 However, because of this ambitious initiative, the Crop Post-Harvest Programme 
provides a rare opportunity to reflect on this change and to see what lessons can be learned 
that might usefully guide future research funding and management.  The great advantage 
for the CPH Programme of adopting this approach was that it was based on a huge amount 
of experience in many countries and sectors that had been extensively summarised and 
synthesised.   
 This chapter provides a brief summary of the ideas that currently make up what has 
become known as the Innovation Systems (IS) approach.  The extent to which the CPH 
Programme and its many project managers fully adopted the approach will be considered 
in subsequent chapters. 
 The starting point for much of the relevant literature was the attempt to explain the 
differences in the role that science and technology plays in the economic performance of 
major industrial countries.  For some people, this was a simple question about why the UK 
was successful in producing Nobel Prize winners, but less successful than, say Japan, in 
harnessing new knowledge to increase international competitiveness.  The resulting 
literature – now labelled the National Systems Of Innovation (NSI) or the innovation 
systems (IS) approach – essentially provides a guide to ‘best practice’ on how to innovate 
successfully, and ultimately how to increase the impact of research. 
 In this context, the British Department for Trade and Industry has remarked: 
the concept of the ‘innovation system’ … is loosely defined as the interaction at 
local, national and international levels of the specific actors involved in innovation 
(enterprises, universities, the public sector), each of whom has an effect dependent 
on their individual innovation performance. …Strong similarities are emerging 
between innovation systems in different countries49. 
 The essential insight of the IS approach is to switch attention from ‘research’ to the 
‘processes of innovation’.  Research becomes just one element of a wider process of 
transforming ‘new knowledge’ into goods and services.  It emphasises the importance of 
both a large number of key actors and institutions involved with successful innovation, and 
the links among these actors that enable them to operate as an effective ‘system’.  This is in 
 
49   Science and Innovation Strategy Department of Trade and Industry 2001, Annex E. 
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sharp contrast to the more ‘linear model’, which characterises much current practice within 
the development community, where funds are typically allocated to researchers to do 
‘research’ and then, often in a separate exercise, the research results are handed to 
‘extension agents’, trainers, or ‘communications professionals’ to deliver them to ‘the 
target audience’.   
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
                                                
 The innovation process is thought to be better captured by biological analogies and 
reference to ‘evolutionary process’ than by Newtonian physics so favoured by economists 
and their reference to the movement of billiard balls!  The innovation process above all 
else is a system.  This means that the allocation of resources is most likely to result in 
innovation if it is guided by a ‘diagnosis’ of the strengths and weaknesses of the system as 
a whole, rather than focusing on one component such as research50.  The innovation 
process requires flexibility and adaptation, rather than blueprints and rigid frameworks. 
 The IS approach recognises that communications and extension will remain important 
parts of the innovation process, but suggests that much current practice is like pushing 
more knowledge down a hosepipe, in the hope that at least some of it will come out the 
other end, rather than investing in the quality and effectiveness of the pipe, worrying about 
where the knowledge needs to emerge and investing in the processes, mechanisms and 
institutions that will utilise the knowledge once it emerges from the end of the pipe51.  
 The message for governments that support research and wish to increase the impact of 
their expenditures – that is, to generate innovation – is that they should concentrate as 
much on the users of knowledge as they currently do on the suppliers of new knowledge. 
What is Innovation? 
 Much can be said about the nature and meaning of ‘innovation’, but in this context it 
means the use of new ideas, new technologies or new ways of doing things in a place or by 
people where they have not been used before.  The distinction between ‘invention’ 
(creation of new knowledge) and ‘innovation’ (in the sense of first commercial use) is 
crucial.  Experience over many years shows that “working with and re-working the stock 
of knowledge is the dominant activity in innovation”52.  Indeed the essence of innovation 
in most circumstances can be described as ‘creative imitation’.  
 Similarly, the term ‘research’ is itself open to a wide interpretation, but in so far as it is 
a generator of new knowledge, the IS approach makes an important distinction between 
two types of knowledge: ‘tacit knowledge’ and ‘codified knowledge’.  The former is 
 
50 One member of the Programme Advisory Committee said that he saw systems of innovation as being very similar 
in concept to the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP)  approach to identifying and controlling the 
potential risk that was developed for the US space programme but is now extensively used in food safety systems: Dr 
G R W Wint, personal communication, November 2005. 
51 The analogy of the hosepipe may be unacceptable to some readers who believe it implies a linear model.  A more 
appropriate analogy has been suggested by Erik Arnold: “we probably have to abandon the old images of armies led 
by generals via strategic plans and the attainment of objectives.  We should even give up the newer, more 
decentralised analogies with team sports such as football and the tutelage of efficient coaches.  We need a much 
messier image, with decentralised action, bounded rationality, and limits on the opportunities for optimisation and 
effective control.  Perhaps we should think of a flock of sheep, with its attendant sheepdogs and shepherds, zig-
zagging its way a little erratically up the mountain towards the summer pastures?”: see Arnold, Erik, Evaluating 
research and innovation policy:  a systems world needs systems evaluations, Research Evaluation, Beech Tree 
Publishing, Guildford, UK, ISSN (print) 0958-2029 E-ISSN (electronic) 1471-5449, forthcoming. 
52 Arnold, Erik and Martin Bell, Some new ideas about research for development, in Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Partnership at the Leading Edge: a Danish Vision for Knowledge, Research and Development, April 2001, p. 
288.  Download from http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/7CD8C2BC-9E5B-4920-929C-
D7AA978FEEB7/0/CMI_New_Ideas_R_for_D.pdf. 
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associated with human skills and experience, while the latter is documented, or in some 
other way systematised (for instance, in blueprints, manuals, instructional videos or 
computer programmes).  Innovation usually requires both types of knowledge: for 
instance, it would not be possible to build a jet engine solely using blueprints and other 
codified knowledge.  Similarly, farmers have been shown to contribute importantly to the 
innovation process with their tacit knowledge of local circumstances and years of farming 
experience.    
Technology and Knowledge 
67.
68.
highly simplified diagram of the major elements of a successful innovation system.  
69. The diagram is used to emphasise: 
                                                
 Improvements in technology provide the means for producing more (or better) goods 
and services with less resources and effort.  It is now widely accepted that the mastery of 
technology and the processes of innovation are major sources of international competitive 
advantage.  Furthermore, mainstream organisations such as the OECD now go as far as to 
argue that the capacity to manage these processes of technical change to advantage 
increasingly defines the huge divide between industrialised and developing countries53.   
National Systems of Innovation 
 The ideas associated with National Systems Of Innovation as they relate to developing 
countries are perhaps most effectively summarised by Arnold and Bell54.  They provide a 
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53 It has been recognised for many years that the capacity to manage technical change to their advantage increasingly 
defines the divide between industrialised and developing countries.  OECD, Managing Technological Change in 
Less-Advanced Developing Countries, document reference 43 91 03 1, OECD, Paris, 1991, pp. 7, 12 and 13.   The 
World Bank’s 1998 World Development Report starts from the premise that “poor countries – and poor people – 
differ from rich ones not only because they have less capital but because they have less knowledge” (page 1).  See 
also OECD, Technology and the Economy: the Key Relationships, ISBN 92-64-13622-3, 1992. 
54 See footnote 52. 
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• the importance of both the ‘supply–push’ of the research community and the 
 Indeed the successful system 
between the organisations and actors of the left of 
• 
• 
• 
70. It i
neglect
Nationa nnovation in any particular country operate in a world in which there 
are many other actors on the global stage and the stock of knowledge and expertise outside 
                                                
‘demand–pull’ of the users of new knowledge. 
requires a constant interaction 
the diagram – which for simplicity can be called the ‘users’ of knowledge – and 
those on the right – predominantly the ‘suppliers’ of codified knowledge.   
the importance to successful innovation of networks that provide effective 
communication channels linking the various organisations and individuals that 
make up the system.  Such networks can be both formal and informal, but 
informal links appear to be particularly important, especially where they foster 
trust between the various parties, and thereby lower the transaction costs of the 
interactions.  Trust relations result in both parties knowing each other’s needs 
and the nature and quality of the goods and services on offer, and may even 
obviate the need for legal contracts and reduce the risk of non-payment.  This 
need for successful innovation systems to establish low transaction cost trust 
relationships has been observed to lead to the ‘clustering’ of actors in the same 
location for certain types of innovation (such as Silicon Valley in California, the 
Cambridge Science Park, or even the surgical instrument cluster in Sialkot, 
Pakistan 55). 
the importance of intermediate organisations in finding out what producers (and 
their customers) want and searching through the range of options within the 
stocks of existing and new knowledge to find what best meets the need.  These 
tasks of intermediation can, in principle, be carried out by any of the 
organisations listed on the diagram, but they tend to be undertaken by consulting 
or design organisations, brokers (sometimes known as ‘technological 
midwives’), and even NGOs or applied research institutes and research 
associations (when operating in consulting or facilitating mode).  Arnold and 
Bell suggest that they “typically have low status compared with universities and 
basic science institutes” (page 296).  Increasingly, small and micro enterprise 
support organisations (those that supply ‘business development services’) are 
performing this role in successful economies, often with an element of 
government subsidy. 
the ‘framework conditions’ and the basic infrastructure of the system (shown at 
the top and bottom of the diagram).  These have also been seen to be crucial 
elements of the system.  Indeed, it is often the ways of working, aspects of 
culture, the social value placed on innovation and entrepreneurship, banking 
‘ethos’, that most effectively explain the difference between countries that 
innovate and those that do not.  Weaknesses in the infrastructure often form the 
major constraint to the effectiveness of much research in developing countries.  
In fact, in a number of countries, these capacities are actually deteriorating, 
further reducing the likelihood that research alone will result in poverty-reducing 
innovation.   
s important to log here some important factors that the simple diagram above 
s in achieving its simplicity.  One is the absence of the international dimension: the 
l Systems of I
 
55 See Schmitz, Hubert, Editor (with Khalid Nadvi), Industrial Clusters in Developing Countries, special issue of 
World Development, 1999.  
 
  Chapter 4 The Innovation Systems Approach 33 
 
a n
e periods than at others in the process of 
e.  These include: 
 interpret perfectly all they do know.  It has been 
recognised for a long time that “the whole life of policy is a chaos of purposes 
• 
any does not have the necessary 
• 
urse of action and modify it in the light of experience.  This learning, 
• 
tional learning refers to finding 
• 
es can often be represented by 
           
ational economy is both an asset to be drawn upon and a threat.  As we shall see, this is 
particularly important for developing countries. 
71. The second simplifying omission is that of time: certain activities in the innovation 
process, for instance, ‘the creation of new knowledge’ (including agenda setting), may 
need to be given greater emphasis at some tim
innovation. 
72. The National Systems of Innovation literature provides a great deal of insight into the 
way ‘learning’ takes place, how decisions about innovation are made, and the capabilities 
required to innovat
• Bounded rationality.  Although much of economic theory assumes optimal and 
rational behaviour, NSI accepts that in practice decisions makers do not (cannot) 
know everything and do not
and accidents, it is not at all a matter of the rational implementation of the so-
called decisions through selected strategies”56. 
Path dependence.  “What a company or institution can do today depends on 
what it could do yesterday, and what it has learnt in the meantime”57.  This is 
particularly important for developing countries or those companies wishing to 
break into a new area of activity.  If the comp
tacit knowledge it must invest to acquire it, or hire people who bring it with 
them. 
Organisational learning.  Bounded rationality and path dependence mean that 
innovators must continuously learn.  They continuously test the environment 
within which they operate by adopting an iterative process in which they embark 
on a co
though, is not a passive process, but one that requires purposive action and 
investment in the necessary time and resources. 
Institutional learning.  A distinction is made between organisations and 
institutions: in this context, institutions refer to the “the mechanisms, rules and 
customs by which people and organisations interact with each other (i.e. the 
‘rules of the game’)” 58.  The concept of institu
ways to do things in new ways.  It may be the result of analysis and conscious 
efforts to change the rules of the game (including rules and regulations), but can 
also include the behavioural changes that occur spontaneously as people try to 
solve problems and learn from their experience.   
Technological capacity.  Organisations can build up these capacities through 
learning, experience, training, recruiting skilled staff and investing in new 
equipment or systems.  “Crudely, the ability of companies to learn depends on 
their internal capabilities, and that these capabiliti
the number and level of scientifically and technologically qualified staff in an 
organisation”59. 
                                      
56  Clay, Edward and Bernard Schaffer,  Room for Manoeuvre: an Exploration of Public Policy in Agricultural and 
ra
ridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976. 
heets.html.   
Ru l Development, Institute of Development Studies, 1984. 
57  See Rosenberg, Nathan, Perspectives on Technology, Camb
58  See DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets: http://www.livelihoods.org/info/info_guidances
59 See Arnold and Bell (footnote 52), p. 293. 
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• 
ut its own related R and D programme”60.  
Wha is
73. Ma erature for the first 
time recognise some of its elements from their own discourse.  These include: 
rchers’, and 
increasing the ‘voice’ of the users, clients etc); 
• 
74. i st practice in development 
thin st practice in innovation thinking.  Yet it is 
perhaps a measur search community that these ideas have not 
yet
ake up the 
‘Inn
erived from the experience of 
technologically advanced industrial countries, it is not applicable to the very different 
empirical matter, but a number of insights 
abo
uch of the policy intervention 
focuses on the more obvious weaknesses in the ‘supply’ system.  In industrialised 
Absorptive capacity.  “Information only becomes knowledge if the receiver 
perceives it to be so … [T]echnology transfer … only works well where the 
recipient carries o
t  new? 
ny people confronting the National Systems of Innovation lit
• Participation (understanding user needs); 
• Partnership (changing power relations, reducing dominance of ‘resea
• Capacity building; 
• Trust relations and the reduction of transaction costs; 
Informal networks and social capital. 
 Th s is hardly surprising as many elements of current be
king address some of the same issues as be
e of the dominance of the re
 been applied to their own research work, probably because of a fear of loss of status, 
and the shift of power from the suppliers of knowledge to the users of knowledge, and the 
resultant change in the type of research that is needed for effective innovation. 
75. The recent RNRRS ‘synthesis study’ on innovation attempts to address this question, 
examining the extent to which elements of the innovation approach can be found in other 
RNRRS Programmes61.  This showed that many of the elements that m
ovation Systems approach’ have been increasingly incorporated within the different 
RNRRS Programmes as the emphasis on ‘poverty impact’ has strengthened in recent 
years.  These include elements of innovation system capacity development, two-way 
communications, participatory and action research.  However, this report suggests that the 
development of these elements has been unsystematic and that the IS framework provides 
valuable additional insights as to why innovation does and does not occur, and indicates 
those actions that managers of research programmes can take that are most likely to be 
effective in bringing new ideas and technologies into use. 
The IS Perspective and Developing Countries 
76. It may be argued that, since the IS approach is d
conditions in developing countries.  This is an 
ut improving the effectiveness of both research and development can be obtained from 
applying the IS approach to developing countries. 
77. Certainly there are big differences between the innovation systems of developed and 
developing countries.  One of the main ones is that the ’demand’ side of the system is 
particularly weak in developing countries – even though m
                                                 
60 Clark, Norman, Innovation systems, technology assessment and the new knowledge market: implication for third 
world development, Journal of the Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 11(4–5), 2002, pp. 353–368. 
61 Rath, Amitav and Andrew Barnett,  Innovations Systems: Concepts, Approaches and Lessons from RNRRS, 
RNRRS Synthesis Study No 10, The Policy Practice Limited, discussion draft, 23 November 2005. 
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cou
provide the insights from which researchers and innovative organisations can learn.  The 
key
ditions’ and 
cts, can 
buc
 the IS approach to other sectors in developing countries, particularly in 
agriculture.  In the agricultural sector, research is often location-specific and often involves 
edge to local conditions.  Furthermore, the mechanisms by 
wh
reasons for donors to fund 
scie
 agriculture, as 
it h
                                                
ntries, most research is carried out by and within private companies62.  This means that 
productive enterprises can articulate what they need from the rest of the innovation system.  
In developing countries, almost all research is funded by the state in public institutions.  In 
such circumstances, the ‘demand’ placed on research organisations by actual or potential 
users of knowledge is often weak.  Furthermore, whatever demand there is, often ‘leaks’ 
abroad to industrialised countries.  Unlike in industrialised countries, it is often difficult to 
involve ‘the demand side’ in the governance of research organisations working in or on 
developing countries.  More generally, the productive sector, and poor producers in 
particular, have great difficulty in specifying their needs for new knowledge (and, indeed, 
in paying for it).  In developing countries, mechanisms have to be found that can translate 
the ‘needs’ of poor people into ‘effective demand’.   
78. Despite these differences, all research inevitably takes place within an innovation 
system whether or not it is described as such – the main difference is that in some countries 
these systems work well and in others they do not!  It is precisely these differences that 
 insight is that, if research is to have an impact, it needs to be carried out in close 
proximity to the users of the resulting knowledge, their clients and customers. 
79. The innovation systems literature also gives a serious warning to both the naïve and the 
faint-hearted.  It tells us that innovation of any kind is going to be difficult in the weaker 
developing countries with their poor, and often deteriorating, ‘framework con
lack of infrastructure63.  It is unlikely that individual programmes, let alone proje
k international trends that are operating against poor people in renewable natural 
resource systems. 
Does it Work for Agriculture? 
80. Given its origins in northern industrialised countries, the question inevitably arises as 
to the relevance of
the adaptation of generic knowl
ich potential users (particularly smaller farmers, small and micro-enterprises, small 
traders etc) gain access to new knowledge are weak.  
81. Furthermore, individual developing countries are – and need to be – close to the 
science/technology frontier in fields such as agriculture and health care, where problems 
are likely to be specific to a country or a region.  In these cases, there may be fewer 
opportunities for ‘creative imitation’, and there are good 
ntific research, in addition to supporting the application of knowledge.   
82. In part, it is the purpose of this report to see whether the IS approach can be applied 
usefully to the CPH system.  Yet it is precisely because of these weaknesses in the 
framework conditions facing developing countries that it is believed that there are strong a 
priori reasons to suggest that the IS approach is likely to be of relevance to
ighlights the importance of researchers working in close partnership with farmers, 
strengthening the mechanism by which ‘user needs’ can be articulated and understood, and 
 
62 For instance, the major life science companies invested some $2.6 billion in agricultural R and D in 1998: 
Accessing modern science: policy and institutional options for agricultural biotechnology in developing countries, 
World Development, 30(6), p. 932. 
63. See reference in footnote 53. 
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active collaboration with those organisations that make and sell (or in other ways make 
available) the goods and services that embody the results of new knowledge.  
83. At the empirical level, the CPH Programme has explicitly examined this question.  In 
particular, the Programme in India led the way with project R7502, which looked at 
“Optimising institutional arrangements for demand driven Post-Harvest resear
uptake and impact on the livelihoods of the poor through public and priva
ch, delivery, 
te sector 
par
rtunities for creative imitation may be similarly limited.  Here again, 
though, the IS approach provides a number of guidelines for the way such activities are 
change and other forms of innovation.  This issue is the 
sub
moments in the innovation process 
wh
                                                
tnerships”.  This was started in 1999 and resulted in the important book Post-Harvest 
Innovations in Innovation: reflections on partnership and learning, edited by A J Hall, B 
Yoganand, R V Sulaiman, and N G Clark64).   
84. There is similarly a growing body of evidence from other sources.  The CGIAR’s own 
work in this area is conducted in part through the Institutional Learning and Change 
Initiative (ILAC) that is hosted by the International Plant Genetic Resource Institute 
(IPGRI) in Italy65.  
What about Policy Research? 
85. It might also be argued that ‘policy research’ similarly deals with unique local 
problems, and oppo
likely to result in behavioural 
ject of a number of ongoing studies66.  Many of the conclusions from that work find 
echoes in the conclusions and insights provided by the IS approach.  For instance, the 
importance of forming alliances or temporary coalitions, the need to work in close 
collaboration with the users of the policy analysis and to fashion the outputs so that they 
are timely, are from sources that the audience regards as credible, and are in a narrative 
form that is adapted to the needs of the user.   
86. The extreme case is clearly where researchers are trying to set a new intellectual 
agenda – that is, that, by definition, they are ‘ahead’ of what the users say they want to 
know.  This may be resolved by a clearer understanding of what the Innovation Systems 
approach is saying.  Certainly there are likely to be 
en ‘science push’ is critically important, but, if the resulting agenda is to influence 
policy, then interaction with, and understanding of, the needs of other parts of the system 
are likely to be vital.  Equally, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, there are a number 
of cases where the inclusion of regulatory and other government agencies in the 
‘coalitions’ had a significant effect on the degree and speed of the ‘ownership’ of policy 
change resulting from research. 
87. More generally, DFID staff have asked whether a typology could be constructed of 
knowledge-generating activities for which the Innovation Systems approach seems more 
applicable than others67.  Certainly it might be expected that the IS approach is most 
 
64 http://www.cphpsouthasia.com/cphp.asp. 
r-center initiative hosted by IPGRI”.  Its web site states that it is being 
PID/index.html   Also 
05. 
65 ILAC describes itself as “a grass roots inte
supported by funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS), 
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD). Contact: Jamie Watts Project Leader IPGRI, E-mail: j.watts@cgiar.org. 
66 In particular, in the DFID-funded RAPID programme at ODI: see: http://www.odi.org.uk/RA
see: Duncan, Alex, How can research based development interventions be more effective in influencing policy, 
November 2005, paper prepared under the Making Markets Systems Work Better for the Poor (M4P), Hanoi, 2005. 
See: http://www.thepolicypractice.com/projects.htm. 
67 Paul Spray, personal communication, 7 February 20
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app
sub-national, sectoral or even project level, given that the approach was initially focused 
und that impacts at 
the
nding of the innovation system 
and
Imp
tion for developing countries (and indeed the donors that assist them) 
is the shift of focus from ‘research’ to ‘innovation’.  This, in turn, requires investing in 
ns that make up the systems necessary for 
effe
• Mechanisms necessary to increase the demand side of the innovation equation 
and find ways the users of new knowledge can develop the ability to pay for it.  
licable to new knowledge that is embodied in a new machine.  A great many research 
programmes in developing countries find it difficult or impossible to progress past the 
prototype stage.  Yet, even in the case of knowledge about new ways of doing things, such 
as improved processes for storing crops or ways of improving hygiene in informally 
vended food, the Innovation Systems approach provides considerable insight into how 
such innovations can be effectively introduced.  This is discussed further at paragraph 
330). 
Is the IS Approach Applicable only at the Level of National Systems? 
88. A more fundamental question is whether the IS approach provides useful insights at the 
on National Systems of Innovation.  Certainly many researchers have fo
 project level are often overwhelmed by weaknesses in a country’s infrastructure and 
framework conditions.  However, there is a growing sense that the innovation approach 
has its greatest policy relevance at the sectoral or product level, precisely because the 
problems are often so sector specific.  One of the more surprising conclusions of this 
review is just how effective the IS approach was, even at the project level and even in very 
hostile environments.  It may well be that, as this environment deteriorates, projects have 
to do much more themselves if change is to be successful.  
89. Nevertheless, even in industrialised countries, government action can only operate on 
part of the innovation system at any one time, but the key issue is that all interventions 
(however small) take place in the context of a clear understa
 how it can be strengthened.   
90. Whether the IS approach provides useful insights at the Programme level is again an 
empirical question.   
lications – for Developing Countries 
91. The main implica
those people, organisations and institutio
ctive innovation, rather than for ‘research’ per se.  There are well-rehearsed arguments 
justifying state investment in ‘public-good’ research on the grounds that the private sector 
will always invest at levels that are socially sub-optimal68.  There are even stronger 
arguments suggesting that there is a legitimate role for the state to help the NSI to work 
effectively69.  In most countries, this will require investments that go beyond science70, 
universities and the state sector.  It is likely to require a diagnostic mapping of the various 
‘innovation systems’ to establish where the main weaknesses and bottlenecks are located 
so as to guide the most appropriate investment in the:  
                                                 
68 This is discussed at length in Surr, Martin (team leader), Andrew Barnett, Alex Duncan, Melanie Speight, with 
David Bradley, Alan Rew and John Toye, Research For Poverty Reduction, DFID Research Policy Paper, paragraph 
240. See: http://www.DFID.gov.uk/Pubs/files/pov_red_pol_paper.pdf. 
69 Arnold, Erik,  Research evaluation: evaluating research and innovation policy:  a systems world needs systems 
evaluations, a paper originally given at the EVA conference of Nordic evaluators at Håholmen, Norway in September 
2001, forthcoming. Erik Arnold works for Technopolis Ltd,  3 Pavilion Buildings, Brighton BN1 1EE, UK; +44 1273 
204320; erik.arnold@technopolis-group.com and  www.technopolis-group.com. 
70 Although it is important to note that experience in OECD countries suggests that investment in science is 
particularly important for producing the skilled people necessary for certain types of innovation. 
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As a first step, this will probably involve the users of new knowledge more 
effectively in the governance of R and D expenditure.  
•
The e
92. Thi
phrase 
approac e explored in the 
subsequent chapters, but it is clear that the language of the new Programme documentation 
eference to the key ideas of involving key stakeholders, 
inst
 Capacities in firms and on farms to absorb and utilise new knowledge to 
improve productivity, and the range and quality of goods and services.  OECD 
countries found it particularly effective to encourage the efforts of firms 
themselves and to stimulate groups of firms to work together. 
 R maining Questions 
s then summarises the IS approach.  An immediate question arises as to whether the 
‘Partnerships for Innovation’ used by the CPH Programme to describe its new 
h is essentially the same as the IS approach.  This will b
and practice does make r
itutional learning and partnerships.  What is less clear, and the subject of subsequent 
chapters, is just how well these ideas were understood by both the Programme managers 
and the project participants, and whether the relative success and failure of past projects of 
the CPH Programme can be explained in terms of the IS approach, whether or not the 
participants used this particular language.  This again will be explored in the following 
chapters.  
 
 Chapter 5 National Innovation Systems in Practice 39 
 
5 National Innovation Systems in Practice 
93.
94.
95.
                                                
 While it was not the purpose of the study to examine the research and innovation 
systems in the countries visited, it is important to set the CPH Programme in a wider 
context, even if superficially.  In this chapter, the situation in four countries is considered: 
India, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania71.  The huge variation between these countries raised 
a number of interesting issues, and suggests an important conclusion, namely, that 
whatever strategy DFID might adopt in the future it will need to be sufficiently flexible to 
deal with the very different circumstances and institutional arrangements in each country.   
 Generally, it seems as if the environment for doing research in Africa was 
deteriorating.  Many of the earlier investments in universities, research institutions and 
extension services have been undermined over many years.  Even the effectiveness of the 
traditional national agricultural research system model is breaking down with the 
continued underfunding of extension agents that were expected to transfer new knowledge 
to farmers.  In some cases, NGOs are taking on the role of extension agents, or providing 
funding to extension agents to visit particular areas, but their coverage is often limited  
and piecemeal, and it is difficult to believe that such interventions can be anything more 
than a short-term palliative.  It seems likely that there would be less interest in the 
innovation approach if there were an extremely effective extension service that was highly 
interactive. 
 A recent survey of agricultural scientific and technological capacities in Africa for the 
NEPAD provides a useful summary of some of the rapid and complex changes that are 
facing Africa’s agricultural innovation systems72:   
First, scientific advances, related technological innovations, and accompanying 
institutional changes are changing the focus and conduct of agricultural research 
in very profound ways [eg biotechnology]. 
Second, the private sector is becoming a major investor in agricultural R&D [in 
part because of globalisation, and] the opening up and integration of national 
economic systems as well as liberalization of trade, which is changing the locus of 
agricultural research.  [Policy makers need to] “ensure that commercial interests 
and goals do not overshadow the need to address public needs” [as they face 
increasing] “pressure to identify strategic ways of partnering with private industry 
without losing sight of their responsibility to address problems of the poor and 
generate public goods.”  However, there are also pressures towards privatisation 
within developing countries simply due to national macroeconomic reform and 
new entrepreneurial opportunities that have begun to present themselves.  
Third, public agricultural research organizations are faced with fundamental 
questions about their relevance, performance and accountability.  There is 
increasing evidence and consensus that current configurations of public 
 
71 Although Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe were also visited briefly, there was no time to interview the main actors in 
the agricultural systems of these countries.   
72 Clark, Norman, Science policy and agricultural research in Africa: a capacity building needs assessment, NEPAD’s 
Office of Science and Technology and the African Ministerial Council for Science and Technology, January 2005. 
Text in italics are direct quotes.  However, to shorten the quotation, some descriptions have been deleted and 
summarised in much shorter statements placed in square brackets. 
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agricultural research are not responsive to growing demand for new knowledge 
and innovations, and that they are not changing fast enough to respond to 
technological and geo-economic developments. 
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
 This difficult situation is compounded for DFID-financed researchers by the 
withdrawal by DFID from the uptake and capacity-building components of the innovation 
systems in many of these countries (as was noted by the RNRRS Evaluation quoted in 
paragraph 26 above.).  
 If poverty-reducing innovation is the main objective, all this points to the importance 
of allocating resources according to a view of the strengths and weaknesses of the whole 
system (see paragraph 62).  As will become clear from the examination of the situation in 
individual countries, the ‘research project’ mode of intervention is unlikely to be the most 
appropriate instrument to bring science and technology to bear more effectively on poverty 
reduction.  In India in particular, lack of research-project funding did not appear to be the 
binding constraint.  The problem appeared to be more about finding ways of unleashing 
the huge scientific and technological capabilities that already exist, but that appear to be 
currently constrained by bureaucratic rules and unproductive incentives.  
Ghana 
 In relation to the countries visited, Ghana appeared to be facing the most difficult 
situation.  Many interviewees noted the poor (and probably) deteriorating environment in 
which CPH research (and probably most other research) is going on in Ghana.  Even so, 
there are signs of investment in the research system, with the Food Research Institute’s 
new building now under construction.  
 A great deal is already known about the shortcomings of the system and a number of 
consultancies have been undertaken to advise on possible reforms (including one by NR 
International itself, although its report is not in the public domain). 
 The web site of Ghana’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research  
(CSIR) suggests that two organisations have crop post-harvest responsibilities: the Crop  
Research Institute (CRI) and the Food Research Institute (FRI).  The CRI’s mission  
statement includes “post-harvest – varieties with post-harvest attributes.  Management of  
harvesting, drying, storage, processing and utilisation; Socio-economics” 
(http://www.csir.org.gh/cri.html).  FRI’s mission includes the similar aim “To provide 
appropriate technology packages for processing and storage of raw agricultural produce to 
facilitate curtailment of post-harvest losses and promote value addition for local and export 
markets” (http://www.csir.org.gh/fri.html).  
 The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) works to an Accelerated Agricultural 
Growth and Development Strategy designed to increase the sector’s annual growth rate 
based on the long-term strategic Programme for Ghana ‘Vision 2020’.  This strategy is 
assisted by The Agriculture Services Sector Investment Programme (AgSSIP), which is 
intended to empower grassroots organisations to negotiate better with actors responsible 
for the delivery of services.  It also aims to strengthen producer organisations, such as co-
operatives and farmer groups, to provide better services to their members to facilitate 
technology adoption, by improving access to inputs and facilitating marketing.  
 It was openly accepted by all parties that effective research could not be carried on at 
the universities or CSIR institutes without additional resources either from international 
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donors or the local private sector73.  Between 1999 and 2002, aid income for the Food 
Research Institute was equal to 51.7% of the amount provided by the Government of 
Ghana (“the Subvention”)74. 
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
                                                
 Interviewees suggested that the government wants organisations such as FRI to move 
from research to commercialisation, but it was argued that “this is not really FRI’s core 
competence … Scientists should do research and others should do the commercialisation”.  
As in many poorly performing innovation systems, it was also argued that private 
companies do not really have the competence to make demands on organisations such as 
FRI.  In the three years to 2002, only 3% of FRI total income came from local private-
sector commercial contracts.   
 At the time of the interviews in October 2003, the FRI had five projects from the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture’s AgSSIP.  Some are competitively tendered and others 
are described as “normal research” where they select topics from a list.  When bidding for 
research contracts, the FRI forms partnerships with others, submits concept documents and 
then full proposals.  It was suggested that FRI probably had too narrow a skill base in the 
past, but now includes marketing and socio-economists.  The FRI had 37 professional 
staff, 90% of which have PhDs.  The total staff is said to be 180.  The capacity was 
described as improving, in part because of a grant from the Netherlands.  Externally 
funded projects have enabled them to get training, to buy vehicles and other equipment.   
 Universities also undertake crop post-harvest activities, but tend not to compete with 
the research institutes, which undertake more applied research.  
 It was suggested by some interviewees that the impact of past research had been 
limited because of weaknesses in extension.  It also meant that they often “did the same 
research again”.   
 The situation in Ghana brings into high relief the strategic questions facing donors, in 
particular, whether, in such circumstances, it is most appropriate to be supporting 
‘research’ projects, or more generally seeking to leverage reform and ‘build capacity’.  
Particularly contentious were the policies towards, and levels of, ‘topping up fees’.  The 
way external support is provided becomes critical both to keeping staff in the country and 
in research, but also for determining the direction and priorities for future research. 
 The dire state of funding for Ghanaian organisations meant the resentment felt by 
Ghanaians was particularly acute about the large amount of donor finance (by DFID and 
others) that had been spent in the past on nationals of developed countries.  A number of 
people speculated that the cost of keeping one of the CPH Programme’s expatriate 
researchers in Ghana was probably larger than the whole government budget of the Food 
Research Institute.  On the other hand, some people doubted that donors would be willing to 
provide any funds to Ghana unless nationals from the donor country were heavily involved.   
 
73 FRI staff rates are said to be £70 per month (1 million cedis) but at least some staff also receive income in kind in 
the form of housing, free health care and assistance in maintaining their private cars.  It was suggested that a senior 
staff member might get about 2.2 million cedis a month plus housing etc.  NRI currently apparently buy the time of 
FRI staff at the rate of $150 to $250 per day.  These rates are set by CSIR, but it was not stated how much of this fee 
is given to the staff.  However, rates were much lower in earlier projects where NRI merely bought in the services of 
FRI staff. 
74 In 2002, the government subvention was 2,600 million cedis, and aid was approximately 1,000m cedis.  That is, aid 
was 38% of the subvention or 28% of the income from the government and from aid.  Data supplied in graphs by 
FRI. 
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110.
111.
112.
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 DFID appeared to be one of the major sources of donor finance for crop post-harvest 
research, although there had previously been programmes funded by the German aid 
programme, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria, and there 
was news that there was soon to be a new EU-funded project (with NRI).   
 However, there was a strong impression that the large proportion of CPH 
Programme’s funds allocated to Ghanaian problems benefited from NRI’s long-term 
association with Ghana (going back into the early 1990s if not before) and Ghana’s relative 
stability and hospitality to foreign researchers75.  Only five out of 50 of the CPH 
Programme’s projects did not involve NRI.  A personal communication from an NRI 
scientist described the situation as follows: “By and large CPHP projects were viewed as 
NRI projects – as indeed they had been prior to the RNRRS.  This had persistent 
implications for a sense of ownership of the projects.  Quite often the main role of the 
Ghanaian scientists was to gather data (or samples) for analysis by NRI scientists in the 
UK.  A number of Ghanaian collaborators described their role as that of technicians.  
Ghanaian scientists often received overseas training as part of their collaboration in the 
CPH Programme.  In at least one case the UK project leader was also the Ghanaian PhD 
supervisor”76.  However, the first project to be designed and led by a Ghanaian scientist 
started in 1999 (Project R7581 led by Dr Plahar, Director of the Food Research Institute).   
 Contact between the CPH Programme and the staff in DFID’s local office was said to 
be highly variable and appeared to depend on the personality of the people involved.  
Interviews at DFID’s office suggested that the current staff felt that communication 
between central research and country offices could be improved and there was often no 
‘ownership’ of research by the DFID office.   
 The work of DFID Ghana was said to have changed radically with the shift to Multi-
Donor Budget Support (MDBS).  Some nine donors, representing one third of Ghana’s 
official development assistance, now come under this initiative.  Some five percent of this 
budget goes into an untied technical assistance fund from which Ghanaians can hire such 
assistance as they need from anywhere in the world. 
 The DFID office certainly believed that certain policy areas could be “unblocked” by 
more research.  They believed in particular that there needed to be more “political analysis” 
to understand why progress is so limited.  When DFID Ghana commissioned such research 
it was called “consultancy”, and was probably not put into the public domain.  They were 
now developing an in-country Advisors’ Research Committee and it was likely that it would 
focus on topics driven by the Country Assistance Programme (CAP). 
 A key element of DFID’s multi-donor budget support was the idea that civil society 
was the key to monitoring.  In order to enable civil society to understand what was going 
on, DFID had taken the lead in creating a Ghana Research and Advocacy Programme  
(G-RAP) to provide long-term core funding to a number of independent research institutes.  
At the moment, the independence of Ghanaian institutes was said to be undermined by the 
dominance in their budgets of particular donors (particular “Donor’s Darlings”).  By 
 
75 It needs to be stressed that this was not a decision of NRI but rather of Programme Management to have Ghana as a 
focus country.  The Country Framework Documents were documents of the Crop Post-Harvest Programme, managed 
by NR International and agreed by the independent Programme Advisory Committee.  The projects in Ghana were 
won competitively and selected by the independent Programme Advisory Committee (A Westby, personal 
communication, 3 January 2006). 
76 The Crop Post-harvest Programme in Ghana,  personal communication, (draft) no date. 
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working together (DFID, Dutch, Danes and USAID) and giving core, rather than project, 
money, they hoped to improve independence and public scrutiny of aid-induced reforms.  
Apparently this approach was driven by DFID Ghana’s Governance programme, based on 
similar work piloted in Kenya.  It would have a ‘donors’ Committee’, which would include 
two local MPs as observers.  There would be strict criteria for membership.  Those 
institutes that do not meet the criteria could get technical assistance for capacity building.  
The consortium would contract out the administration of the Programme.  It would appear 
that this was a useful institutional innovation and one that could be considered for 
scientific and technical research too.  
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 The DFID office felt that, even with MDBS, there was an important role for centrally 
funded research to alert individual countries to “tricks they may be missing” by their country 
focus.  Interestingly, although DFID Ghana was supporting a Fair Trade Initiative relating to 
the British Co-op buying cocoa by providing a loan guarantee to the local banks, the office 
was not aware of the CPH Programme’s research in Ghana on Ethical Trade.  
 Despite all these problems, as will become clearer in later chapters, some very 
effective research work is being carried out in Ghana by energetic, dedicated and highly 
skilled people.  Furthermore, Ghanaian researchers seemed to be particularly enthusiastic 
about the idea of the coalition approach, and being more in control of their research funded 
by DFID.  It seems likely, for instance, that the Food Research Institute will try to continue 
to work in ‘coalitions’ with other stakeholders in its future research. 
India 
 The innovation system in India was at the other end of the spectrum.  It has an 
extensive system of agricultural and other research institutes, many having been in 
existence for decades77.  The director of one of these institutes appeared to voice the 
sentiments of many Indian researchers based at these institutes when he said: “I can get all 
the money I need from the Government … money is not the constraint.   ICAR is not 
limited by money”.  The Government of India has apparently now ruled that the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) should not accept foreign funds amounting to 
less than $200,000, as the transactions costs were too high.   
 Crop post-harvest is dealt with in two parts of the Indian government’s research 
system: on the one hand, there is The Central Food Technology Research Institute (and 
Regional Research Labs), which is part of the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research System (CSIR) and was described as being output-orientated and links 
effectively to industry.  On the other hand, there is crop post-harvest work undertaken 
within The Indian Council for Agricultural Research System and, in particular, at the 
Central Institute for Post-Harvest Engineering (and its large network called the All India 
Co-ordinated Research Projects78) and the Indian Grain Storage Management and 
 
77 Typical of the wide range and longevity of the research institutions is the Indian Lac Research Institute.  It is part 
of the ICAR system and has been in operation since 1924!  Lac is a hardened resin secreted by the tiny lac insect 
Kerria Lac Kerr (Tachardiidae: Homoptera).  The resulting product has many uses including varnishes, printers’ ink, 
cosmetics, food processing, waxes and polishes (see R8262). 
78 The All India Coordinated Research Projects (AICRPs) on Post-Harvest Technology was started in 1972.  The 
Project is operating at 33 centres (three new centres approved during IX plan) spread all over the country. The 
Project, while addressing location-specific post-harvest technological problems also conducts multi-location trials of 
developed technologies for assessment, adoption and refinement. About 130 need-based technologies have been 
developed under the Project. 
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Research Institute (IGMRI)79.  This system was described as being input-orientated and 
aimed at meeting farmers’ needs. 
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  The IGMRI’s Hyderabad site is in effect a field station as the head office is in 
Delhi80.  They implement their work through the ‘save grain campaign’ (SGS) set up 
within the Ministry of Food in every state.  The staff believed that there was good two-way 
communication between the IGMRI and SGS: “we solve the problems identified by the 
farmers and communicated through the SGS”.  They also are responsible for all the 
technical work at the commercial scale related to all grain stored by government agencies, 
including screening the chemicals used.  They had designed a number of grain driers and 
threshers which were then ‘given’ to manufacturers, who were free to copy and sell them.  
The institute propagated its ideas by undertaking ‘exposure visits’ for local farmers and 
manufacturers.  There appeared to be no assistance for business development nor a quality 
assurance mechanism on the finished products.   
 In the context of giving away machinery designs it has been pointed out by Arnold that: 
The key is whether the economic incentives have been understood.  First, if 
everyone gets the machine design, you get a Nelson-Arrow type market failure: no-
one invests in the research results because no-one can get enough of a monopoly to 
extract a rent.  On the other hand, if only one producer gets the drying machine 
design, she will extract monopoly rents and thereby reduce the benefits farmers get 
from drying their grain.  So giving away designs sounds attractive but is 
problematic: you might want to give the designs to a duopoly for a limited period, 
so that there is price competition and so that price reductions over time will enable 
trickle-down to increasingly marginal farmers (at the start, only rich farmers will 
be able to buy the machines)81. 
 However, despite the huge investments in research infrastructure, there is a 
widespread exasperation that it does not have a commensurate impact82.  This leads to the 
widespread view that, although ICAR may be adequately funded (say in contrast to 
Ghana), it is probably “doing the wrong sort of research”.  Many people interviewed stated 
that the crisis in the system was “well acknowledged” and expressed an overwhelming 
desire to reform the system and to liberate the very able people it contains to enable them 
to innovate rather than ‘merely’ do research. 
 Interviews with staff at the IGMRI and the National Research Centre for Sorghum 
laid bare the huge number of administrative arrangements that constrain their work.  For 
 
79 In order to develop facilities for applied research and apex-level training in the field of food-grain storage and 
preservation, a Grain Storage Research and Training Centre was established at Hapur in 1958, which was later 
expanded into Indian Grain Storage Institute (IGSI) with two field stations at Ludhiana and Bapatla (later shifted to 
Hyderabad) with financial assistance from UNDP in 1968. Three field stations at Jabalpur, Jorhat and Udaipur were 
subsequently established in 1981. In 1996, the IGSI was renamed as Indian Grain Storage Management and Research 
Institute (IGMRI).  Field stations at Jabalpur and Udaipur have, however, been closed with effect from October  
2002.  While the Research and Development and Training activities are undertaken by IGMRI, the work of 
popularising scientific methods of food-grain storage developed by IGMRI among the farming community is 
implemented through the Save Grain Campaign teams (http://fcamin.nic.in/storage.htm). 
80 It was estimated that the total annual operating budget of the Hyderabad site was now probably 80 lakhs.  This is 
equivalent to about £105,000, or the cost of keeping one expatriate in the country. 
81 Erik Arnold, personal communication, 2004.   
82 This view is confirmed by a recent parliamentary audit of India’s research institutions.  In an article in the Indian 
Express a former principal scientist at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute suggests that Indian institutions and 
laboratories created to boost science have squandered billions of rupees through poor management and financial 
ineptitude: see http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=55635# . 
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instance, all financial transactions undertaken by IGMRI had to be approved by an 
accounting office in Madras (Chennai) via the postal system.  Similarly, the National 
Research Centre for Sorghum suggested that the restrictive nature of the regulations makes 
it difficult for them to spend the money granted to them by foreign donors and often there 
is a lot left over.  The regulations in relation to using foreign funds were so onerous that the 
transaction costs meant that it was probably not worth it.  
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 Again the question for DFID and other donors is whether they can best help this 
reform process by more centrally funded research projects or through more locally based 
‘governance reform’ programmes.   
 One view was that, through project-related ‘experimental learning’, the system can be 
induced to reform and evolve.  This enables people within the system to learn from what 
works and to learn from experiment.  Certainly the DFID-supported CPH Programme did 
this and allowed research institutes to work in new and much more flexible ways.  
Coalition-type grants meant that they could route the funds through local NGOs and 
thereby circumvent the time-consuming regulations about financial control, decisions 
could be made quickly and field trips could be arranged more effectively.  A number of 
CPH Programme projects in India took this approach, for instance, R7828, 
Decentralisation of food grain storage and distribution, the case study of reform within the 
Central Institute for Post-Harvest Engineering and Technology (CIPHET), and R8266, the 
management system for linking tribal communities to markets through ‘value addition’ in 
Orissa.  It was suggested that there were many self-help groups (presumably NGOs) that 
could be a powerful force for this type of change if they worked together.   
 A contrary, or parallel view, was that reform should be approached more directly 
through more direct analysis and lobbying to change the rules and procedures that govern 
research.  Such a strategy is similar to DFID’s governance programmes’ “drivers of 
change” approach83.  The CPH Programme’s South Asia Regional Office has started along 
this route by setting up the Innovation Policy Working Group (RIPWIG).  The Group 
initially comprised “members in policy making and donor agencies (Planning Commission 
and Department of Science and Technology), R&D policy making in Research Councils 
(CSIR and ICAR), leading NGOs (Development Alternatives – DA, Centre for 
Technology & Development – CTD), rural technology and employment divisions in the 
Government (Ministry of Agriculture, Council for Advancement of People’s Action and 
Rural Technology – CAPART, etc)”.  This activity offers the opportunity to influence 
important policy makers at the Centre.  It is funded by a number of interconnected projects 
funded by the CPH Programme, other parts of DFID and the World Bank84.   
 Other interviewees noted that there was generally a lack of demand for change from 
within the agricultural research system or from the government more generally.  Other 
donors had tried to encourage reform.  The World Bank was said to have tried to reform 
the forestry research system, but found it “very hard”.   
 
83 This is described at http://www.grc-exchange.org/g_themes/politicalsystems_drivers.html. 
84 The project was described in Raina, Rajeswari, Institutions for Poverty Reduction, the CPHP PMF: 04-17.  In 
addition, the UNU-Intech web site states that “The first meeting of the Rural Innovation Policy Working Group, 
jointly convened by UNU-INTECH and the Centre for Research on Innovation and Science Policy (CRISP) took 
place in September 2004 in New Delhi, India … The Working Group, which will meet four times a year, aims to link 
research more closely to policy processes. The initiative is an integral part of a UNU–INTECH research project  
co-ordinated by Dr Andy Hall, which is investigating innovation processes in civil society initiatives, and drawing 
lessons for policy-making.” 
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 More generally, the National Agricultural Technology Project (NATP) is an 
instrument for introducing major changes in the Agricultural Research and Extension 
systems of the country.  The project was initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Government of India, originally from a massive grant from the Japanese Government, 
which was handed over to the World Bank to administer.  It was to be implemented in 28 
districts covering seven states, viz. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Himachal Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Orissa and Punjab over a period of five years (1998–2003).   
 Essentially the money represents a major incentive for the ICAR to reform.  It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate how effective it has been, but the reference to 
the recent parliamentary audit suggests that progress has been slow85.   
 However, it is important to note that, in the current negotiations with the World Bank 
about the next round of funding for the NATP, the new programme is to be refocused and 
renamed as the National Agricultural Innovation Project (NAIP)86.  The shift in focus and 
the addition of the term innovation in its title is said to be due in large part to the initiative 
of the new director Dr Mruthyunjaya who joined as National Director on 24 March 2005.  
He was previously the Director of the National Centre for Agricultural Economics and 
Policy Research (NCAP), which has been one of the major sources of thinking in India on 
the application of innovation systems ideas in agriculture associated with the work of Dr 
Rasheed Sulaiman who has been significantly funded by the CPH Programme.  While 
great care must be taken in attributing causation, the CPH Programme in India may 
legitimately claim some part in the reorientation of this driver for change in the Indian 
agricultural research system. 
 At the time of the review visit in November 2003, DFID’s new Country Assistance 
Programme (CAP) was just about to be published and it was suggested that the text would 
include something about research.  It was thought that the CAP will argue that poverty 
reduction will depend on agriculture and rural growth, and a “basket of strategies” will be 
provided both in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, focusing largely on budgetary support and 
sector reform.  In so far as DFID will attempt to aid reform of the agricultural research 
system, it is likely to be through programmes such as the Andhra Pradesh Rural 
Livelihoods Project (APRLP)87.  It was stated that DFID’s concern to assist the reform of 
the extension system was currently on the ‘back burner’.  It seems that, as there was so 
much political change, there was no point in trying for reform until things settled down.  
 Yet not all change involves aid programmes.  A number of interviewees note that 
institutional changes are occurring in India as a result both of opening up the economy and 
of the private sector forming its own links with suppliers of new knowledge (possibly 
 
85 See reference in footnote 82. 
86 “The charter of NAIP is to facilitate the accelerated and sustainable transformation of Indian agriculture for poverty 
alleviation and income generation by collaborative development and application of agriculture technologies by the 
public research organisations in partnership with farmers’ groups, Panchayati Raj Institutions, private sector and 
other stakeholders. As one can see from the charter, the innovativeness of the project lies in its emphasis on holism 
(plough to plate), integration of basic, strategic, applied and action research, social re-engineering in terms of 
consortia formation and management and combining social, economic, ecological and participatory governance 
features”: see http://www.icar.org.in/naipdir/index.htm. 
87 “The Andhra Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Project provides critical support to the ongoing watershed movement in 
five drought-prone districts in Andhra Pradesh. The mandate is to position livelihood concerns strategically in 
watersheds for the inclusion of women, the poor and the landless.  The project advocates innovation, lesson learning, 
convergent actions and policy influence.  APRLP will invest in a new stream of approaches and ideas for bringing 
about a positive change in the well-being of the rural populace”: see http://www.aplivelihoods.org/introduction.html.  
 
 Chapter 5 National Innovation Systems in Practice 47 
 
bypassing the ICAR).  ICAR apparently started discussions about public/private deals in 
mid-1995. 
Tanzania 
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 Of all the countries visited, Tanzania’s researchers seemed to be the most satisfied 
(complacent?) with the current organisational and funding situation.  This is not to say that 
the system was working particularly well or was well funded. 
 An important element of the crop post-harvest research system is the Tanzania Food 
and Nutrition Centre (TFNC), which is part of the Ministry of Health.  However, the 
Ministry of Agriculture controls the research process but does not yet have staff qualified 
in crop post-harvest areas.  At the time of the visit, the Ministry had recently set up a new 
Post-Harvest Unit, but had yet to recruit qualified staff.  Publishing was said to be key to 
promotion decisions for researchers in TFNC, whereas in the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
research institutes “salaries are a function of time served” (according to a staff member at 
the Lake Zone Agricultural Research Institute Ukiriguru). 
 The national co-ordinator for Roots and Tubers Research is now located within the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s Sugar Research Institute, Kibaha.  Funding comes from many 
sources (including IITA, DFID, CIP, NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Co-
operation)).  The role of national co-ordinator was said to have diminished with the move 
to ‘competitive grants’.  
 Research at Sokione University of Agriculture is not controlled by the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  The university applies directly to donors and is currently substantially 
supported by NORAD. 
 In contrast to Ghana, Tanzania appears to have considerable donor activity in support 
of crop post-harvest research.  DFID’s CPH Programme provides only part of the external 
funding from TFNC.  Other donors include the Swedes, the World Bank and UNICEF 
(United Nations Children’s Fund, which funds a major Vitamin A programme). 
 In recent years, there have been efforts to make agricultural research more ‘demand-
driven’.  Research priorities are now set at the zonal level.  Each institute has an annual 
Internal Programme Review (known as an IPR).  A zonal technical meeting reviews the 
work of research institutes and their IPR.  Zonal executive committees then manage the 
programme.  However, no research priorities have yet been set at the national level.  All 
submissions for competitive research grants have to be cleared by the zonal and regional 
co-ordinators.   
 It seems that the largest effort to fund and reform the agricultural research system is 
through the Tanzania Agricultural Research Project (TARP).  A number of donors 
currently contribute to research under the framework set by TARP II.  The Ministry of 
Agriculture said that the donors include the Swedes, NORAD, the Netherlands and DFID 
(though it was not known which DFID Programme).   
 The second phase of this Programme ended in June 2004 and appears likely to be 
succeeded by a Tanzania Agricultural Research Endowment Fund (TAGREF) to provide 
funds for research, as well as grants to rural producers; it will have a provisional capital 
budget of $25 million.  It is suggested that a number of donors, including the World Bank, 
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have shown interest in supporting this initiative.  It will be administered by an autonomous 
body based in Dar es Salaam.  
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
  Research on cash crops is substantially better funded than non-cash crops.  Extra 
funds are provided by a ‘cess’ or tax on exports and this is used to top up the fees 
necessary to keep staff in government research organisations.  Irregular bonus payments 
are made annually to all staff (including drivers) in institutions working on cash crops.  
The bonus amounts to approximately 60% above normal salary rates.  This implies that the 
salaries of researchers working on subsistence products are far too low.  It is understood 
that current rules prevent top-up salaries being paid by external donors to staff researching 
subsistence crops.  However, funds from externally funded projects to fund travel from the 
research station is regarded as very attractive. 
 Unlike Ghana, the British aid programme (principally through the Natural Resources 
Institute) did not have a long-standing research relationship on post-harvest research in 
Tanzania.  NRI’s Nigel Poulter provided the first contact and Andrew Westby did an initial 
needs assessment for the CPH Programme.  This resulted in a memorandum of 
understanding and a workshop to prioritise the issues.  Tanzanians said “we met as equals” 
and NRI ideas “complemented” Tanzania’s ongoing work on roots and tubers.  
 A Tanzania Steering Committee, CPHP for Tanzania, was created and included the 
National Roots and Tubers Director, Sokoine Agricultural University and the Sorghum 
National programme leader.  The TFNC acted as the Secretariat.  A key Tanzanian 
informant said that the CPH Programme Committee worked well as it brought people and 
organisations together.  However, they did not know if it would ever meet again.  There is 
a suggestion that the committee may not have been really ‘owned’ by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and that efforts are now underway to get the Ministry to run it on a permanent 
basis. 
 In the traditional (so-called ‘linear’) model of agricultural research, the impact of 
research is greatly influenced by the effectiveness of the extension system.  In Tanzania, as 
in many other countries, the extension system has deteriorated in recent years.  Under 
systems of decentralisation, management of extension services has now been taken away 
from the District Agricultural Officers in the Ministry of Agriculture and given to the 
District Executive at the District Councils, as the latter are said to be better suited to 
interpreting what farmers want.  Ministry of Agriculture officials complained that “the 
Ministry of Agriculture can no longer tell extension people what to do”, they “lose control 
and it weakens the process”.  They said that the links between “extension agents and 
research were OK”, but they are underfunded, and do not have funds for transport.  NGOs 
help with extension but are very unevenly distributed throughout the country and their 
impact is very localised.  Some interviewees said that the extension system was very 
“over-committed”, and they are sometimes seen as “tax collectors”.   
 It was argued that reform of the extension has been driven by “foreigners”: the “visit 
and training approach” had been replaced by the “farmer field school approach”, which 
had now been displaced by “participatory research”.  Only now are people said to be 
comparing the effectiveness of these various approaches. 
Uganda 
 The overwhelming impression in Uganda, unlike in any of the other countries visited, 
was of a research system bent on reform.  While it may be argued that the system had 
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deteriorated badly in previous years, and was therefore in dire need of reform, there was a 
strong sense of optimism and dynamism.  There appeared to be a great deal of donor 
activity, including large World Bank programmes and a number of bilateral programmes 
often working through (overlapping?) networks.   
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 Currently the National Agricultural Research system is controlled by a single central 
organisation, namely the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) created in 
1993.  This has a number of ‘operational arms’ in the form of the national research 
institutes.   NARO determines the level of participation and collaboration of other players 
(farmers, universities, NGOs, Community Based Organisations (CBOs), extension, private 
sector) in the setting of the agenda, formulation of programmes and implementation.  The 
Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industries and Fisheries (MAAIF) provides guidance to 
NARO through a Board.  All funding for research, whether from government or overseas 
donors, is routed through NARO.  Major funding came from the World Bank Agricultural 
Research and Training Project (ARTP): other donors, including DFID (plus USAID and 
the EU), supported the attempt to increase the efficiency of the system. 
 Unofficial discussions suggested that NARO did not work well: researchers were paid 
badly (even when the salaries were paid by the World Bank project).  NARO stopped the 
system of donor salary top-up arrangements.  Conditions of service were poor and many 
people left.  It was recognised that, to achieve reform (as in the other countries visited), 
there was a need to decouple researchers from the Civil Service conditions of service and 
to create more flexibility. 
 The principles guiding the Ugandan reform can be said to be allied with international 
thinking on National Systems of Innovation88.  In particular, there is an attempt to shift 
control over funds to the ‘users’ of new knowledge and away from the suppliers of new 
knowledge, namely the research institutes.  What are called ‘consumer organs’ are tasked 
with setting the agenda in terms of programmes and projects: this process is decentralised.  
Many types of organisation from the public, private and NGO sectors were encouraged to 
form partnerships to compete in providing research services.  The idea of research through 
‘partnership’ was said to be a key concept of the reform.  However, some public-sector 
research institutes would be provided with core funding to undertake research of national 
strategic interest.  
 It is proposed to replace NARO with an overall umbrella organisation called the 
National Agricultural Research Council (NARC).  NARC is tasked with forming a strategy 
for co-ordination, institutional development and networking of Research Service 
Providers.  NARC would also provide grant support to facilitate the start-up of such 
groupings and associations. 
 The extension system is also being reformed and decentralised.  Funding is being 
moved out of the Ministry of Agriculture and is to be directed by the Ministry of Finance 
directly to the local government level at which Farmers’ Fora (FF) are located.  The 
Farmers’ Fora then instruct the local governments to issue service provision contracts, but 
the Farmers Fora are not part of the local governments. 
 
88 Proceedings of the Workshop on Reflection and Lesson Learning on Partnerships for Innovation, 17–18 February 
2004, Kampala, Uganda, compiled by Agnes Nayiga on the basis of the presentations made, particularly by  Dr 
Clesensio Tizikara, Reform of the Uganda National Agricultural Research System: implications for partnerships:   
DFID Crop Post-Harvest Programme in East Africa 
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 The National Agricultural Advisory Service’s (NAADS) mission is to “To increase 
farmer access to information, knowledge and technology for profitable agricultural 
production”.  It is envisioned that NAADS is to “become a decentralized, farmer owned 
and private sector serviced extension system contributing to the realization of the 
agricultural sector development objectives”.  It was started in 2001 and involved a novel 
‘basket’ funding arrangement, in which both government funds and earmarked budget 
support from the co-operating donors follow a Common Flow of Funds Mechanism, where 
the funds are pooled into a common ‘basket’ under the Government Consolidated Fund.  
The co-operating partners include the World Bank (International Development 
Association), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the European 
Union, DFID, the Netherlands and Irish aid. 
 In other countries, NGOs were looked on favourably as instruments to compensate 
for the failure of the extension system.  In Uganda, however, it was suggested that there 
was really no alternative to a national agricultural extension service, even if it were largely 
in the private sector.  It was suggested that “NGOs come and go: strong today and no trace 
tomorrow”.  This was to some extent supported by the evidence of the legumes project 
R7442, where the Matilong NGO was highly successful initially but subsequently suffered 
severe financial and other management problems. 
 Relations between the CPH Programme and the DFID office in Uganda have varied 
widely, largely on the basis of the individuals involved.  In particular, many respondents 
referred to the work of Donal Brown, who created the Client Orientated Agricultural 
Research and Development Scheme, presumably through the DFID country budget. 
 The presence of a large number of overlapping (and possibly duplicative) research 
networks in the area of crop post-harvest was a major feature of the innovation system in 
Uganda.  These include ASARECA (The Association for Strengthening Agricultural 
Research in Eastern and Central Africa).  This is described as a non-political organisation 
of the National Agricultural Research Institutes (NARIs) of ten countries: Burundi, D. R. 
Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.  It 
aims to increase the efficiency of agricultural research in the region so as to facilitate 
economic growth, food security and export competitiveness through productive and 
sustainable agriculture. 
 Foodnet might also be thought of as a network but describes itself as “an Agro-
Enterprise project linking ASARECA commodity networks in market oriented research”.  
It is a project on post-harvest and marketing research for Eastern and Central Africa co-
ordinated by the IITA, a member of the CGIAR.  “The project is a new type of regional 
agricultural research and development network focusing on market-oriented research and 
sales of value added agricultural products”.  It seems to be largely/wholly funded by 
USAID through its Regional Economic Development Services Office.  It is hosted by 
ASARECA.   
 It seems likely that the government will require all donors wishing to support research 
to put their contributions into a common ‘basket’.  These research networks provide a 
mechanism by which bilateral aid donors may be able to bypass such control.  Membership 
of the ASARECA network is drawn from the national co-ordinators for research, as well as 
the scientists from the international research centres.   
 The CPH Programme has worked in collaboration with both Foodnet and 
ASARECA.   
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Lessons Learned 
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 What lessons can be drawn from this review of the national systems in which the 
CPH Programme’s projects are located?  Clearly the institutional and organisational 
context of research matters.  It determines the choice, execution and impact of research.  
Comparing the situation in different countries highlights the similarities and differences 
and suggests areas in which intervention is likely to be most effective.  Many of these will 
be explored in subsequent chapters. 
 Even this cursory review suggests that understanding these local contexts is crucial in 
determining the type and location of the most appropriate interventions, either at the 
project level, or in terms of building capacities and coalitions.  Indeed, such a review 
points to the high potential impact of more explicit attempts to diagnose or ‘map’ the local 
systems of innovation, identify who else is trying to contribute, and to find the best niche 
for DFID’s intervention.  The CPH Programme’s move to Regional Offices was 
presumably justified in terms of improving knowledge of the context in which project 
funding could take place89.   
 The CPH Programme is currently supporting a number of system or sub-system 
‘diagnoses’ in India, Ghana and Uganda90.   
 Looking at systems of innovation, rather than research, suggests that a wider range of 
instruments is needed to support users of new knowledge, rather than a concentration on 
relatively small ‘research projects’.  There is a need to use what limited resources there are 
to leverage reform, strengthen the demand for new knowledge, and widen the range and 
type of participants in the process.  Even in difficult research environments, the CPH 
Programme shows that it is possible to use project funding to induce change, and to 
encourage different people to work together.  
 The review also suggests important trends towards both ‘budgetary support’ rather 
than projects and programmes, and donor co-operation (or control), in which funds are 
pooled into a single funding basket.  At one level, this demonstrates recipient governments 
trying to reduce transaction costs and to use donor funds in a more co-ordinated way.  At 
another, it might be thought to limit the diversity of funding. 
 Perhaps the most unexpected impression from the country visits was just what a 
difference the internet and mobile phones can make.  Some research partners, particularly 
the NGOs, were connected to fast internet connections and used them extensively to find 
information, to seek finance, and to network with other like-minded people.  Others did not 
have this facility and appeared to be increasingly isolated intellectually.  At one extreme, 
International Development Enterprises (IDE) in India was able to use the internet to find 
technical information, to identify potential coalition partners and even to raise funds.  At 
the other extreme, was a government research institute in Africa that had the equipment for 
fast internet connection, but did not have a budget to cover the tiny monthly subscription to 
connect the system to an internet provider.  In this case, staff members would drive into 
town from time to time to send and receive e-mail messages at their own expense, but 
 
89 See paragraph 374. 
90 The system diagnosis in Ghana may well be too sensitive to publish, while the field work for the diagnosis in 
Uganda was completed in October 2005. 
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rarely, if ever, were they able to search the internet for scientific information or funding 
opportunities. 
164. The mobile phone was ubiquitous, even among farmers’ groups in villages with no 
electricity.  While such technology will not overcome the huge forces that keep people 
poor, it does make a difference.  At the least, the range of information and communication 
technology enables the networks to function more easily and this is an essential feature of 
effective innovation systems.  It should also form an essential part of future DFID support 
to innovation. 
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6 Evidence from the Crop Post-Harvest 
Programme 
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 The purpose of this chapter is to review the experience of the Crop Post-Harvest 
Programme both in terms of a range of impacts and the extent to which the Programme 
adopted the IS approach.  This will provide the basis for understanding whether, and in 
what sense, the IS ‘worked’ and what lessons can be learned from the experience. 
 When it comes to finding evidence of impact, researchers and those that fund them 
are faced with a well-known dilemma.  On the one hand, there are persuasive arguments in 
the literature about why it is unrealistic to expect a one-to-one correlation between 
expenditure on a piece of research and a particular favourable impact91.  Furthermore, 
there are numerous examples of research having unintended impacts, or impacts that 
resulted many years after the research was completed, usually as a result of their 
combination with knowledge from other sources.  Even for the most famous cases of 
innovation, such as with transistors or vaccines, the time between new knowledge being 
created by research and the widespread use of the innovation can be 30 to 50 years.  On the 
other hand, few researchers would want to argue that it was not possible to anticipate the 
impact of any research.  For, if this were the case, there would be no rational way of 
deciding whether one research activity was to be preferred to any other.  Certainly it is 
widely believed that research proposals can be appraised on the basis of past experience of 
the factors that increase the chances of success. 
 This review, together with the much larger study involved with the RNRRS 
Evaluation faced considerable difficulty in quantifying the impact of DFID-funded 
research, particularly in the area of poverty reduction92.  The RNRRS Evaluation stated 
that: 
Direct evidence of the impact of RNRRS programmes on poverty is limited. (5.5.1).  
This evaluation can only repeat the findings of the earlier study – that at present 
the systematic evidence on impact is limited, but that this does not mean that there 
has not been, nor will there not be, real and significant benefits from these 
research programmes.  Many of these project level assessments show real benefits 
at local level, but there is little, though increasing, information on the speed, and 
extent of uptake (5.5.10). 
 This issue is discussed at some length in DFID’s own 2002 Research Policy Paper.  
This concluded that, while the impact of research on economic performance appeared very 
significant at the macro level93, it may not be possible in principle to establish impacts at 
the level of individual projects.  It argues that “managers not aware of this evidence tend to 
 
91 See, for instance, Raina, Rajeswari S, Disciplines, institutions and organizations: impact assessments in context, 
Agricultural Systems, 78, November 2003.  This is described as the definitive critique of internal rate of return as a 
measure of agricultural research and the  “futility of econometrics” (NISTADS, India). 
92 This was also the experience of the very focused impact review carried out for CPHP in Ghana by Michael Flint 
and Mary Underwood in November 2005 (forthcoming).  
93 One recent study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) suggests that additional investments 
in agricultural research (in China, India, Vietnam and Uganda) reduce poverty more than any other investment in 
rural areas, including roads, education and health.  Meinzen-Dick, R, M Adato,  L Haddad, and P Hazell, Impacts of 
agricultural research on poverty: findings of an integrated economic and social analysis, Environment and Production 
Technology Paper No 111, International Food Policy Research Institute, 2003. 
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have unrealistic expectations of the ‘impact’ that a particular piece of ‘research’ should 
have” (paragraph 16), and that “the estimation of the impact of research is probably less 
about finding appropriate indicators than in understanding and improving the processes of 
‘institutional learning’ and the degree to which research-based knowledge is incorporated 
into decision making, or (in the case of technology) is extensively applied” (paragraph 60).  
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
                                                
 This is probably all beyond the point.  For one of the implications of the innovation 
systems literature is that the impact of research is the result of many factors, most of which 
are outside the control of individual researchers. 
 The important conclusion for this study is that, without this kind of evidence of 
impact at the project level, it is particularly difficult to demonstrate that one approach has 
more impact than another.  Yet, as the RNRRS Evaluation states, this is not to say that 
there were no impacts, merely that these impacts are often qualitative, diffuse, cumulative 
over long periods of time, and difficult to attribute to particular research inputs.  This 
means much has therefore to be inferred or interpolated.   
 However, all is not lost.  Despite the lack of quantitative evidence of impact, there 
was much qualitative evidence of a wide range of impacts.  In addition, almost all the 
people interviewed believed that the new approach is more likely to lead to innovation 
(and thereby poverty impact) than the previous more conventional research funding 
mode94.  This support is not surprising, given that the approach itself is based on the 
experience of achieving innovation in a wide range of countries and sectors.  What is 
surprising is just how many ‘obvious’ partnerships had not been formed before, even if the 
parties knew each other well.   
An Attempt at an Impact Matrix 
 Despite these well-known methodological problems, the initial idea was to compare 
two sets of indicators for a large sample of the CPH Programme’s old and new projects.  
The first set of indicators was based on the ‘normal’ impact indicators used in the CPH 
Programme’s Final Technical Reports (see Annex 3).  The second set was indicators of the 
extent to which each project contains the elements of ‘best practice’ defined by the 
National Systems of Innovation literature – that is, its ‘NSI-ness’95.  It was hoped that, by 
comparing the two sets of indicators across a large sample of projects, it would be possible 
to provide insights into the key task of the study as to whether the new approach is in some 
sense more effective than the previous, more traditional one. 
 The NSI scores were designed to be cumulative, in the sense that those projects that 
exhibit more indicators could be said to have the greatest chance of achieving innovation.  
They were sequential, in the sense that that each indicator is easier to achieve than the 
indicator that follows.  
 The application of these two sets of indicators to the sample of projects proved 
difficult.  It turned out that the impact indicators were far more difficult to define and apply 
 
94 Almost all the critical voices came from people based in UK institutions.  However, their criticisms appear to be 
more about the way the approach was applied than the approach itself.  This is confirmed by the evidence cited by the 
RNRRS Evaluation, page 371. 
95 Initially, the term National Systems of Innovation (NSI) was used since it was used in the literature, but this was 
changed to Innovation Systems (IS) as the study progressed, because this better reflected innovation systems at the 
sub-national and project level, hence ‘NSI Scores’. 
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than the IS indicators.  Furthermore, it proved very difficult to apply the criteria 
consistently.  For instance, it became clear that, although a small project might have been 
described as having a considerable effect, relative to the size of the project, it was 
misleading to give this the same score as a large project that had helped many more people, 
but was judged to have had only a moderate effect96.   
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 It also became clear that the passage of time was a major complicating factor in 
classifying the portfolio.  Recent projects may well not have sufficient time to demonstrate 
significant change of any sort.  This complication was compounded in practice by the fact 
that it was not possible to separate out the projects in terms of whether they were, or were 
not, ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ that were started after the watershed year of 2002.  This 
was because many projects were part of a sequence of projects or project clusters that 
started before 2002 and ran on to the end of the Programme.  In practice, the post-2002 
projects were almost entirely continuations of earlier projects funded by the CPH 
Programme. 
 Although there are very obvious weaknesses in the approach, initial analyses of the 
Ghana data did find a moderately strong correlation (0.66) between impacts and IS scores.  
However, the analysis exposed the subjectivity of the scores and a significant degree of 
autocorrelation (both scales, for instance, include poverty measures). 
 By far the biggest problem was the difficulty of establishing impact scores, and the 
relatively low scores of those that could be scored.  Most of the direct poverty-reducing 
impacts occurred to those (often farmers and traders) who were directly involved in the 
research, usually a few hundred people or less97.   
 As suggested earlier, this lack of measurable impacts has been experienced by all 
other attempts to measure the impacts of RNRRS research at the project level.  In one 
sense, this does not matter, as we know that even the most effective research takes time for 
the full impact to work through the economy.  In another sense, it does matter, as it is 
likely that future funding will be influenced by, if not determined by, those types of 
activity that can credibly argue that an extensive impact is likely – and there will be some 
projects of this type.  What it did mean was that the Impact Matrix could not be 
implemented, and was therefore abandoned.  However, the indicators do provide a useful 
heuristic device. 
Innovation Systems in Practice 
 Despite the difficulties of measuring impact, the CPH Programme’s projects had 
substantial and varied impacts.  These include policy change, institutional learning, 
changes in practice, and scientific knowledge of relevance to the scientific community, 
extension services and NGOs.  However, some project impacts were difficult to classify.  
For instance, the yam projects in Ghana98 did add to knowledge and enabled the Ministry 
 
96 Attempts were made to overcome this by amending the scoring system to involve absolute values, for instance, 
score 0 if between 0 and 100 people are impacted, score 1 if between 101 and 1000, score 2 if between 1001 and 
500,000 and score 3 if more than 500,000. 
97 A number of projects did record impact.  For instance, the project in Mozambique undertook 77 training sessions, 
and 2000 farmers were trained.  This was said to have improved the lives of 6775 households and the FTR asserts 
that 481 households had raised incomes.  Care International was said to be about to do an evaluation of its whole 
scheme, but this is not yet available.  The Sweet Potato project in Uganda (R8273) says that it trained 17,030 farmers, 
though there is no evidence of whether the training increased incomes. 
98 R7582 Development of integrated protocols to safeguard the quality of fresh yams – Ghana. 
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of Food and Agriculture to understand the yam market and farmers’ needs much better. 
Nevertheless, the project failed in its attempt to find a way to ‘cure’ the yams to thicken 
their skins, heal wounds and stop deterioration (the research proved a negative).  Similarly, 
the fumigation of roots and tubers stored in sacks in Ghana99 was shown not to work.  In 
this case, the negative results were particularly important to help stop a practice that was 
highly toxic to humans. 
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 Length and clarity in this report do not permit a description of all the projects that 
were reviewed.  What follows is therefore an attempt to select the CPH Programme’s 
projects that best exemplify both the types of impact encountered and the lessons learned 
for the Innovation Systems approach.   
Early CPH Programme Projects that had Impact and Contain Many Elements of the IS 
Approach 
 The analysis was able to confirm an important initial hypothesis, that some of the 
early projects that did not consciously adopt the ‘coalition’ or IS approach were successful 
and did involve many of the characteristics of an effective innovation system.  These 
projects also appeared to be self-sustaining and to have a number of impacts, including on 
poverty reduction.  This evidence provides initial support to the view that conscious efforts 
to design projects to include elements of best practice in innovation are likely to have 
greater impact than those that do not. 
 Perhaps the most extreme example of this phenomenon was the interaction between 
the Fruits of the Nile Company in Uganda and NRI.  Unlike many traditional research 
projects, which are largely supply-driven, this Uganda-based small enterprise requested 
technical advice from NRI for improving the drying of fruit for export to the UK.  This 
case exemplifies the ‘demand-driven’ innovation process.  The company broadly knew 
what help it wanted, and had existed as a business for some time.  There had been an 
ongoing research project that addressed these issues and the enterprise was able to 
respond100.  This intervention was said to be critical in enabling the Fruits of the Nile 
company to thrive101.  However, the company has many unique features that has enabled it 
to break into the UK market and that make this particular scheme difficult to replicate (not 
least because of strong trust relations between the British and Ugandan partners and 
consequently low transaction costs).  The company has also sought and received technical 
and other inputs from many other sources (particularly associated with the Fair Trade 
movement)102.  It is interesting that, while this NRI project also worked in Ghana at the 
same time, it was reported that the technology was not taken up there103.  This suggests the 
importance of the ‘demand’ for new knowledge that needs to be matched by the supply. 
 
99 Taylor, R W D, Mud-based silos: farm stores for silos (Ghana), Natural Resources Institute (NRI) UK, R6502, 
March 1996–July 1999. 
100 Orchard, J, Low-cost fruit and vegetable drying technologies (Ghana, Uganda, Pakistan), Natural Resources 
Institute (NRI) UK, R5539CB, October 1992–March 1996. 
101 In January 1995, Fruits of the Nile held a series of seminars on Running Solar Drying Businesses in association 
with the Natural Resources Institute (NRI) of the UK, and the Kawanda Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) in 
District Farm Institutes in Uganda. A mixture of hands-on practical training in the construction of solar driers, and the 
processing of the fresh fruits as well as in business management, these seminars were well attended and have led to 
the publication of a manual on Solar Drying Businesses (July, 1996). 
102 http://www.fmfoods.co.uk/tw/partner_uganda.htm. 
103 West Africa Regional Office, personal communication. 
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 Other examples of successful innovation were found in India.  As suggested earlier, 
India’s huge scientific and technological capability make it well suited to an innovation 
approach that unlocks this knowledge into profitable goods and services.  Furthermore, the 
South East Asia Regional Office had a clear idea about what was involved in innovation 
thinking and were therefore able to identify and record successful innovation processes104.  
 One of the most interesting ‘innovation’ projects that was identified by the 
Programme and written up to learn the innovation lessons was the Kerala Horticultural 
Development Programme (KHDP)105.  This was a project funded by the EU with the 
objective of improving the overall situation of vegetable and fruit farmers of Kerala.  In 
this case, either by chance or intention, the Programme in effect followed one of the tenets 
of best practice in innovation by strengthening the ‘demand side’ of the knowledge 
equation.  The EU made its funding available to what was essentially the user of 
knowledge, KHDP, rather than directly to the research institute, the Kerala Agricultural 
University (KAU).  KHDP was a new organisation set up to manage the funds and to 
provide many services, including research and development (R&D), provision of planting 
materials, extension service and demonstration plots, training, credit packages, marketing 
support, and a processing unit.   
 A key to KHDP’s strategy was to establish partnerships with key stakeholders, such 
as farmers, through Self-Help Groups, banks through innovative credit plans, and traders 
through repeated negotiations on the value of co-operating with farmers’ markets. 
 The KHDP model was said to have “faced many challenges and ultimately failed”.  
However, by giving the research funds to the user of new knowledge rather than the 
supplier, there appears to have been a profound effect on the way the research was carried 
out (including topics, timing and types of output), but it also meant that the research was 
rapidly taken up and used. 
 The second Indian case formed part of the CPH Programme’s project portfolio.  This 
project contained many elements of the innovation approach, even though it started well 
before the formal shift to the coalition approach.  This was concerned with the sustainable 
retailing of post-harvest technology to the poor and explored alternative institutional 
mechanisms for developing and transferring technology106.  This ran from July 2001 to 
December 2002 and was undertaken by the international NGO International Development 
Enterprises, India (IDE-I).   
 IDE is best known for its very commercial approach to the supply of millions of 
treadle pumps in India.  In the CPH Programme’s project, it acted as an ‘intermediary’ to 
facilitate the interaction between the many actors necessary to innovate in crop post-
harvest systems, in ways that benefited relatively poor farmers.  Through a form of 
systems diagnosis that focused on a particular group of farmers, IDE came to understand 
that a major bottleneck in the marketing of tomatoes was the lack of appropriate 
 
104 Hall, A, Optimising institutional arrangements for demand driven post-harvest research, delivery, uptake and 
impact on the livelihoods of the poor through public and private sector partnerships (India), Natural Resources 
Institute (NRI) UK, R7502, October 1999–March 2003. 
105 Sulaiman, R V and M Pillai, Kerala Horticultural Development Programme: a learning-based approach to 
technology development, promotion and rural innovation, in Post-Harvest Innovations in Innovation: reflections on 
partnership and learning, eds. A J  Hall, B Yoganand, R V Sulaiman and N G Clark, pp. 19–31, DFID Crop Post-
Harvest Programme, South Asia and Natural Resources International Limited, 2003. 
106 R7551. 
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packaging.  The government had been provoked to stop the use of wooden tomato crates 
(as these were having a harmful effect on the trees in the Punjab) following the massive 
growth in off-season tomatoes in the mid-hill region107.   
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 Staff at IDE said that they “do not do research as such”, but proved to be really 
effective networkers, conforming almost perfectly to the model of an ‘intermediary 
organisation’.  They knew what they did not know, searched and found a key player (at the 
Institute of Management) and then brought it all together in a financially sustainable 
delivery system.  This project had substantial impacts and was said to have involved the 
commercial supply of up to 200,000 cardboard boxes in the project area in the two key 
months108.  This approach, and the evidence supporting it, have apparently been widely 
disseminated.  Another impact claimed for the project is that the long-standing work on 
packaging at the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad (IIM(A)) now works in a 
different and more effective way and IIM(A) is more generally said to be more outward 
looking. 
 Even some of the older projects that appeared to be in the traditional linear mould 
could often interact strongly with other players in the innovation system.  For instance, the 
documentation associated with the peanut butter work in Zimbabwe appears to be very 
‘linear’ by offering some very general ‘recommendations’, with the expectation that some 
other agency will disseminate them to a target audience109.  In practice, though, the project 
was far more ‘interactive’ and with strong ‘coalitions’ among the university, the machinery 
manufacturer and the standards authority.  Particularly interesting was the role of the 
private-sector company in making and selling the machine for profit.  This company, 
Tanroy, provides training to all buyers of their machines not only on the operation of the 
machine but also on business development of the users.   
 Lack of hygiene was identified (by the researchers) as a major constraint to selling to 
higher-value outlets such as supermarkets and the “key to accessing these markets was to 
meet the food laws and Standards Association of Zimbabwe certification” (p2, FTR)110.  It 
also appeared that there was a complex market structure that resulted in an active demand 
for the peanut butter processing machines despite a cost–benefit analysis carried out for the 
project concluding that they were not profitable. 
Pre-2002 Projects that Evolved into Effective Coalition Partnerships 
 The industrial uses of cassava starch in Ghana also showed many of the 
characteristics of innovation best practice from an early stage, and increasingly worked 
 
107 Early drafts of the project documentation apparently did not even mention the word tomato, nor did it mention the 
names of project partners.  Indeed the project was said to have been turned down initially by the PAC on the grounds 
there was “no technical constraint”.   However, as the project leader said: “The project is not about boxes it is about a 
process”. 
108 In the following year, there was a drought (expected only once in ten years) and no boxes were used at all.  The 
project impact is no longer monitored and so no information is currently available. 
109 Rukuni, T. Raising rural family incomes through improved peanut butter processing (Zambia, Zimbabwe), 
Development Technology Centre (DTC), University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe, R7419, October 1999–September 
2002. 
110 The major finding of the research was that the aflatoxin levels of small-scale production were no worse (actually 
better) than commercially produced peanut butter.  However, there were higher levels of E-coli and salmonella.  
Significant institutional change was said to have occurred in relation to the standards authority.  “Of special mention 
is the willingness of Standards Association of Zimbabwe to assist rural entrepreneurs attain their license and 
certification” (page 145 of report cited in footnote 109).  Nevertheless, no information was available on the number 
of peanut butter producers who have been registered by the standards authority since the project started. 
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with industry partners (often on their premises) to explore product options111.  The 
principal Ghanaian researcher commented that “industrial trials strongly influence the 
nature of the research, because the industrialists have already tried many things and know a 
great deal already.  So the research must respond to what they need to know”112. 
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 This cluster of projects also illustrates a number of issues concerning the innovation 
approach.  Many of the products that were initially identified by the researchers were 
found to have only limited commercial application.  These are important findings.  For 
instance, the use of cassava flour in baking increases the risk to the baker by presenting 
problems of more rapid staleness; promising markets for glucose syrup were constrained 
by the costs of vacuum evaporators to achieve the clear colour required by customers; and 
the cost of underwriting the trials to test cassava-based adhesive for cardboard box 
manufacture proved too high for the project.  This research theme also illustrated the 
importance of the international context in which innovation takes place.  It appeared that 
the option that was promising commercially was the use of cassava starch in the 
manufacture of plywood.  However, it seemed that cassava-based adhesives had difficulty 
in matching the price of starch-based ones on other products that were subsidised by US 
PL480 products.  
 Another example comes from the cluster of projects concerned with informally 
vended foods and probably represents one of the highlights of the CPH Programme.  This 
cluster of projects has run for many years, initially starting with a scientific focus on 
establishing the extent of the risk, but slowly evolving into effective national coalitions, 
combining scientists with food vendors and the various regulatory authorities.  It would 
appear that, as the project evolved and the scientists engaged more formally both with 
street vendors113 and the regulatory authorities, the nature of the research shifted from 
herbicide residues114 and heavy metals115 to issues of food hygiene and bacteriological 
contamination116.  However, a key to the success of the activity would appear to be the 
engagement with the regulatory authorities, such that the food inspectors (environmental 
health officers) were transformed from being threats to the vendors to being allies in the 
battle to improve food hygiene.  The final coalitions were also able to reconcile a number 
of the conflicts that traditionally would have prevented innovation – this was said to be 
 
111 Initially, the project linked traditional ‘food research’ institutions with other research groups at the universities and 
at the  Forestry Research Institute of Ghana (FORIG) Ghana with the National Board for Small-Scale Industries and 
the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) Ghana.  By the final phase in 2005, this group had been expanded to 
include the Association of Productive Entrepreneurs in Development (APED) Ghana Cassava Processing Groups, 
Atebubu, ROSEAFRIK Ltd, Ghana, Amasa Agro-Processing Company Ltd, Ghana, Feed and Flour Ltd, Ghana, 
Bakers Associations, Atebubu, Ghana, the Ayensu Starch Company, and Golden Biscuits.  
112 Dr Nanam Tay Dziedzoave, FRI, interview, 29 September 2005. 
113 Enhancing the food security of the peri-urban and urban poor through improvements to the quality, safety and 
economics of street-vended foods (Ghana), Natural Resources Institute (NRI) UK, R7493, November 1999–October 
2000 (with FRI but no other coalition members listed). 
114 Graffham, A, Improving quality assurance systems for fresh fruits and vegetables produced by peri-urban resource 
poor farmers in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe), Natural Resources Institute (NRI) UK, R7528, January 2000–June 2003. 
“Analysis of samples of leafy vegetables and tomatoes grown by communal farmers in Zimbabwe indicated that 
pesticides are unlikely to represent a food safety problem”. 
115 Cadisch, G, Pollution and health problems in horticultural production in Harare: the need for improved quality 
assurance systems (Zimbabwe), Imperial College at Wye, UK, R7519, January 2000–March 2004. 
116 Tomlins, K, P-N T Johnson, R  M Zulu, D Chibanda, A Graffham, Developing food safety strategies and 
procedures through reduction of food hazards in street-vended foods to improve food security for consumers, street 
food vendors and input suppliers (Ghana), Natural Resources Institute (NRI) UK – Food Research Institute (FRI) 
Ghana, R8270, January 2003–December 2004. Also, Improving food safety of informally vended foods in Southern 
Africa, R8272, January 2003–December 2004. 
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particularly significant in Accra117.  It is to be hoped that during the final phase of this 
cluster these projects can not only extract the key scientific lessons learned, but also the 
key lessons about the process by which the various innovations were achieved118. 
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 It is perhaps important to stress that the ‘science’ was probably very important to this 
process, in particular, to persuade city authorities that street vendors were here to stay – it 
may have needed external actors (not just foreigners) to ‘prove’ this.  Furthermore, the 
research in Harare showed that contamination was significant (14% of samples) but not 
catastrophic, so it was worth improving hygiene, rather than eliminating the vendors.  The 
Zambian contamination appeared higher, but was more concentrated in the central market.   
 Similarly, there will be times when the scientists are trying to set the agenda, and 
are necessarily ahead of what the regulatory and other authorities believe to be the 
important issues.  This may well have been the case with the air pollution project in 
India, which looked to see if heavy metals were present in fruit and vegetables119.  The 
CPH Programme’s project had two elements: one was associated with high-quality 
scientific research, while the other was based on an NGO (Toxic Link) in order to 
influence the policy process more effectively.  Important research results appear to have 
been produced by both strands of the project.  However, as the managing partner said, 
as the work began in 2000, “the project wasn’t designed to form one particular type of 
partnership … we did not sign up to a new approach, [as] we began the work in 2000 
prior to the formalisation of a ‘new approach’”.  The project was not designed to 
complete specific tasks concerned with institutional learning.  However, they “did liaise 
regularly with regulatory authorities during the project but they were not named as core 
project partners in the documentation”120.  
Successful Coalition Projects Leading to Innovation 
 Perhaps the most dramatic example of success resulting from what might be 
described as a ‘CPH Programme-inspired (or even forced) coalition’ concerns the sorghum 
project in Hyderabad.  There have been many efforts over the years to improve the income 
to poor farmers who grow sorghum121.  The latest project funded by the CPH Programme 
enabled the researchers at ICRISAT to work in novel ways with poultry feed 
 
117 R8270. 
118 Tomlins, K and A Graffham, Maximising impact of food safety knowledge of street vended and informally 
vended foods generated by CPHP projects in West and Southern Africa using the coalition approach and extending 
the approach to India (Ghana, India, Zambia), Natural Resources Institute (NRI) UK, R8433, January 2005–
December 2005. 
119  R7530, Enhancing food chain integrity: quality assurance mechanisms for air pollution impacts on fruit and 
vegetable systems, India.  
120 The Managing Partner made a number of useful comments on this.  The following are excerpts of a longer set of 
comments: 
”We  recognised that in advanced economies, consumer awareness of the incidence of contaminated food products 
and the associated health risks has been the principal factor that has boosted demand for safety as a food quality 
attribute.  Information and incentives will also play a part in food quality assurance mechanisms, and will be very 
important  in India, where the current regulatory environment is weak.”  
“A great deal of thought and discussion was put into the social, economic and political context of our project and 
specifically into the processes that would most effectively ensure integration of the many strands of the project. 
Whilst the academic integration might not have been perfect within the team, all the team members made a very 
significant journey in this respect. Some had never worked in an interdisciplinary environment prior to this initiative, 
but are now comfortable to do this, and to engage in a wide range of fora to debate the design of studies, the 
relevance of findings to wider livelihood concerns and its significance to public policies and programmes”. 
121 Reddy, K Gurava, P Parthasarathy Rao, Belum V S Reddy, A Rajasekher Reddy, Acharya N G Ranga, C L N Rao, 
P Chengal Reddy, Ch Janardhana Rao, Enhancing technology generation and transfer through coalition approach: A 
case of sorghum poultry coalition, Andhra Pradesh, India. 
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manufacturers, to convince them (with high-quality science) that sorghum that was not fit 
for human consumption (mainly because of mould) could safely be fed to chickens and 
could substitute for high-cost maize122.   
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 The feed manufacturer sells approximately 3,000 tons of poultry feed a month.  
Currently, he is able to replace all the maize with sorghum (plus 3% stylo – a green leaf – 
to improve the colour of the chicken meat as this is what the buyer wants).  The sorghum is 
purchased in lots up to ten truck loads a month from a middle man.  The Farmers’ 
Federation is also involved in the coalition to organise Farmers’ Clubs to sell sorghum in 
bulk to the feed manufacturer and to improve the quality of the grain supplied.  The 
coalition is said to enable the “the farmers now [to] get access to the research director”.   
 This coalition massively strengthened the “demand side of the system”, and the feed 
manufacturer was able to change the nature of the research, by both demanding research 
results sooner and requiring them in terms of ‘part-by-part’ recipes, rather than in terms of 
micro-nutrients that the researchers wanted to supply.  While important scientific work had 
been undertaken on sorghum for many years, it is believed that the pressure from the CPH 
Programme and its funding enabled the various partners to work formally together for the 
first time and to convert the knowledge into profitable goods. 
 Another successful innovation project was undertaken by International Development 
Enterprises (India) who formed a coalition with a local university (The Orissa University 
of Agriculture and Technology – OUAT) and a local NGO (The Centre for Community 
Development – CCD).  It was described as an “action research project” to explore and 
develop a management system for linking tribal communities to markets through ‘value 
addition’ (R8266).  It looked at the prospects of a large number of agricultural products, 
including pineapples and tamarind.  
 A series of innovations was identified that would enable tribal people to add value to 
their crops and market them to a large-scale food processor.  As the project progressed, 
they were able to take advantage of selling semi-processed products to OMFED (The 
Orissa State Co-operative Milk Producer’s Federation Limited123).  The project was able to 
combine the scientific and technological capacities of the university, together with the 
detailed knowledge of the rural people’s capabilities to improve the quality of their 
products.  This gave them the confidence to approach OMFED and win supply contracts 
that they had not felt was possible at the outset of the project.   
 The project appears to have had the greatest ‘institutional innovation’ on the 
University, although it has had some difficulty in articulating the change.  For instance, the 
University has participated in the long-standing government process of innovation and this 
has had its successes – for instance, the selling of 30,000 power threshers.  The existing 
system is complex, long-winded, and highly subsidised.  The University said that the CPH 
Programme coalitions were a better approach and had the following innovative aspects: 
 
122 Interestingly, the private-sector person interviewed was involved (unsuccessfully) with an application to the DFID 
Business Challenge Fund.  This suggests an opportunity for more ‘joined up’ DFID activity between research and 
programme activities.  In relation to the science, he said that he wanted “part-by-part” recipes for the chicken feed, 
rather than the complex micro-nutrient data favoured by the researchers. 
123 This is an apex-level Dairy Co-operative Society to promote, produce, procure, process and market milk, milk 
products and other produce for the economic development of the rural farming community in Orissa: see 
www.omfed.com.  
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• This was the first income-generating project the University had ever had and this 
created highly motivating incentives both for the University and the staff (the fee 
was split 50:50). 
• The coalition approach was far more flexible than the government system.  This 
meant that they were able to exploit opportunities as they emerged.  For instance, 
the project switched from pineapples to other products – tamarinds, juices etc – as 
this was seen to offer better prospects for the farmers. 
• There was said to be much more rapid (and continuous) interaction with the tribal 
people that was made possible with the link to the CCD NGO. 
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 Despite the apparent success of this project, it does point to a possible danger of 
projects managed by intermediaries.  In principal, they should have been able to draw on a 
wide range of scientific and technological expertise from the University.  In the event, this 
may well have been limited and they were in danger of re-inventing the wheel.  For 
instance, the osmo-dehydration was ‘discovered’ by chance by IDE who ran across it in 
Thailand124.  OUAT described this process (essentially soaking the fruit in sugar solution 
for eight hours prior to forced air drying) as “unknown in India”, and said that the process 
was a “trade secret” of the Thai firm that they had managed to reverse engineer125.  
Similarly, they were unaware of other scientists and technologists working on cashew 
apples.  Perhaps more seriously, the team seemed unaware of the food hygiene standards 
that were required (though they may have been relying on OMFED to know about them 
and to ensure that they were met)126.   
Coalition Projects that might have had more Impact if they had Adopted the Innovation 
Approach 
 A particularly striking trend in the review of  the CPH Programme’s projects was the 
difficulty they had in developing and introducing ‘machines and equipment’.  In a large 
number of early ‘traditional’ CPH Programme’s projects, researchers developed equipment 
apparently without involving manufacturers, suppliers or credit agencies that might have 
been predicted to be likely to be required for successful innovation.  This is particularly 
apparent in the cassava chipper projects, the rice parboiling project in Ghana, and grain 
storage bins in India.  In a number of cases, such as the rice parboiler, attempts have been 
made to get round the lack of suppliers by relying on the activities of NGOs financed by 
government and aid grants to buy and distribute the equipment127.  In other cases, such as 
in northern Tanzania, there is a marked absence of some of the elements of the innovation 
system (such as micro-credit facilities); this considerably restricts the impact of research 
output128.   
 
124 India’s National Institute of Industrial Research (NIIR) provides knowledge and technical assistance about the 
Dehydration of Fruits and Vegetable by Osmodehydration Process.  Its web site says that while “this technology is 
not well established in India … osmodehydration process … is more economic and beneficial to processors”: see 
www.NIIR.org. 
125 Although the process does seem to have many advantages in converting the local sour ‘kew’ type of pineapple into 
an attractive product, this product has not been commercialised so far. 
126 A video of this project shows unhygienic practices in the processing and packing of tamarind – personal 
communication Dr Vino Graffham, November 2005. 
127 It should be noted that some of the people interviewed were optimistic about the ability of this project to attract the 
necessary funds.  However, it was reported that, although the potential users thought the technology would be very 
helpful to them, its cost was likely to be prohibitive.  It is not clear [yet] whether early discussions with existing 
manufacturers of aluminium vessels might have found a cheaper way of achieving the same technical results. 
128 The project is now working with TAMEA – a relatively small micro-finance NGO.  See R7497, 
Commercialisation of cassava processing to enhance rural livelihoods in Eastern and Southern Africa (Mozambique, 
Tanzania), October 1999–February 2003. 
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 There is now a great deal of experience around the developing world of the 
limitations of this ‘supply–push’ research, and on the whole the impacts have been limited.  
The question is whether or not the CPH Programme’s projects have added to this 
understanding.   
 The cassava marketing and packaging project in Mozambique illustrates this problem 
well129.  Many people regard this as an important and innovative project.  The main 
innovation was the development and introduction of a new extension model in which an 
NGO is contracted by the government to provide extension services130.    
 The project also involved the introduction of cassava chippers and other 
equipment131.  This activity was to “establish a local and sustainable supplier network for 
low-cost processing equipment and packaging materials”.  However, the project appears 
not to have had, or tested, an explicit model of how to introduce new technology.  The 
coalition did involve a private equipment supplier and this was itself highly significant and 
innovative.  There was said to be no credit available in the project area and the private 
supplier was not prepared to offer credit.   Thirty three cassava graters were imported from 
Brazil (at a cost of $80 each) and given to the farmers.  The private supplier wanted to 
introduce powered machines.  There is no grid electricity in the area and all motors are 
diesel.  The project’s market survey suggested that the manually operated machines would 
be better and the supplier “came round in the end”.  Nevertheless, the project did not report 
success in developing an effective supply chain. 
 A similar problem is illustrated by the case of the Diatomaceous Earth (DE) 
project132.  This project involved high-quality science, which has been widely published as 
an international public good.  Initially, this appears to have been a classic ‘science driven’ 
project, but, in this case, it was essential to use science to explore the effectiveness of these 
talcum-like dusts in killing insects before embarking on commercialisation.   
 As the project evolved, it shifted towards the coalition model and to 
commercialisation of DE.  The product that is currently used by farmers in southern Africa 
is Actellic Super Dust (a mixture containing pirimiphos methyl and permethrin), and the 
research question is whether the farmers would replace with DE either because it is 
cheaper or less toxic to humans  
 The main work recently has been to register an imported DE product that has been 
shown to be effective.  The real benefit would come from local production of the dust; this 
would possibly lower its cost.  However, local production seems to be a very long way 
away, not least because of the cost of mining, regulation and production.  It is possible that 
using the imported material will convince the mining company to proceed, because there is 
a demonstrable market.  It is also possible that the costs of opening up the mine will be 
paid, because the product is also used in other industries (paints etc). 
 However, it is not clear what motivates the local private company that is currently 
seeking registration of the imported product and is part of the coalition.  It seems a rather 
 
129 R8283, Packaging and Processing of Sweet Potato and Cassava. 
130 Regrettably, the lessons learned from this experiment were not reflected in the final project documentation.   
131 Including manual hand graters, manual choppers, clay toasters (Jinjalo), sieves, hand presses. 
132 R7034, Grain storage management using inert dusts;  R8179, Small-scale farmer utilisation of diatomaceous 
earths; and R8460, Post-harvest innovations; enhancing performance at the interface of supply and utilisation. 
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long shot for them, and, given that they supply the main alternative product Actellic Super 
Dust, it is not clear that they will make more of a profit with the new product than with the 
existing one.  The situation may well change over time, as there has been a genuine 
increase in knowledge (that is an international public good) that may be taken up 
eventually. 
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 The DE product (and therefore the project) has been stymied by difficulties in getting 
the product registered for use.  The question is whether the adoption of the innovation 
systems perspective earlier in the project would have made a difference, either in 
suggesting that the project should have been terminated with the publication of the 
scientific results, or whether the network of actors could have been used more effectively.  
The institutional barriers to commercialisation in both Zimbabwe and Tanzania would 
appear to be classic examples of failures in parts of the innovation system preventing the 
impact of good science.  The Zimbabwe coalition still does not include the key regulatory 
players or the likely local producer (the mining company).  In Zimbabwe, it is considered 
unethical to involve the regulatory authority, although the regulator is involved in 
Tanzania.  Zimbabwe has recently involved the Farmers’ Union in the coalition as a 
mechanism for putting pressure on the regulators.   
Coalition Projects that Focused on Impact to the Exclusion of ‘Research’ and the Need 
to Invest in Extracting Public-Good Knowledge 
 The project in Mozambique also exhibited characteristics that were common in most 
of the post-2002 coalition projects.  This was that the more they focused on achieving 
short-term poverty impact the less they invested in ‘research’ and the extraction of lessons 
of use to others both within the country and internationally.  The Programme manager of 
the project in Mozambique reported that the project produced “no scientific outputs”.   
 This issue is well illustrated by the rural transport project in Kenya (R8113).  This is 
again regarded as a highly successful project that has developed a major institutional 
innovation in terms of ‘community parliaments’.  This is a mechanism for involving local 
communities more effectively in placing demands on the research system (and indeed 
other parts of the government process of decentralisation).  In the first phase of the project, 
a large number of reports were produced on the basis of surveys.  Before they could 
continue to the second phase, the project was subjected to an external evaluation.  One of 
the evaluators was delighted with all the research, but the other called a halt to all this 
‘research’ and suggested that they should do what they did best, namely, participative rural 
appraisal (PRA) “as this was more important than research”.  The researchers were clearly 
being given mixed messages.  During the final phase of the project, there has been next to 
no ‘research’ output in the sense of analyses and conclusions that might be of use to others.  
One team member stated: “We lost track of the research because of the pressure to deliver 
impacts”.  The project exhibited a great deal of ‘learning by doing’: it was the first time 
many of the participants had collaborated with the private sector; and the managing partner 
has learned that they must go “beyond roads” and get into marketing and other services 
that best meet the people’s needs.  So far, little value has been added to this experience by 
setting the work in the wider context of experiences elsewhere and the context of the wider 
literature. 
 Such projects led one DFID staff member to conclude “C’est magnifique (mostly!) – 
but how far is it research?”133.  A review of the recent CPH Programme’s projects supports 
 
133 DFID, Back to the Office Report, 5 August 2004. 
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this conclusion more generally.  Indeed, this is probably one of the main findings of the 
analysis.  However, many of the CPH Programme’s projects, particularly those in India, 
show that this is not a necessary consequence of adopting an innovation approach.  This 
report will show that it is possible to achieve both poverty-reducing innovation and public-
good knowledge in the same project.  Indeed, there are likely to be opportunities to add 
this value to existing CPH Programme projects in the coming months and years.  These 
issues will be explored further in the following section, and again in Chapter 7, where 
specific actions will be proposed about how public-good knowledge can be generated from 
innovation projects. 
Impact in the Form of Institutional Change and Learning 
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 A major impact of the current batch of projects is that they are designed to produce 
‘institutional learning’ as well as more traditional scientific outputs (see paragraph 72 
above).  Hall and others define the concept of institutional learning as referring to “the 
process through which new ways of working emerge.  It concerns learning how to do 
things in new ways.  It asks the question ‘what rules and norms have to be changed to do a 
new task or to do an old one better?’”134. 
 Most of the post-2002 portfolio of projects is designed to produce this ‘institutional 
learning’.  Project documentation made such outputs ‘compulsory’ for all the new projects 
in both Africa and India.  Procedures were also put in place in all projects to capture this 
learning through the generation of project-level ‘institutional histories’. 
  The emphasis has also been on ‘action research’, ‘participation’ and ‘learning by 
doing’, and certainly the participants in all the post-2002 projects reported that they had 
learned a great deal from the new ways of working associated with coalitions and 
‘partnerships for innovation’.  
 These institutional lessons range from research institutions in India being able to work 
more flexibly and in closer proximity to rural people by forming coalitions with NGOs (as 
in the cases of Orissa, and the grain storage), through to the researchers on sweet potato 
and maize in Africa working more closely with large- and small-scale traders, as well as 
producers and processors, and to the teams working on informally vended foods 
combining strong science with the views and opinions of the traders, environmental health 
officers and city authorities. 
 Major institutional learning was also reported as a consequence of teams in 
developing countries becoming managing partners, and sharing the responsibility for the 
work across a number of diverse organisations.    
 Yet, as suggested earlier, the impact of this institutional change has been limited by 
the difficulty teams experienced, particularly in Africa, in documenting these changes in 
such a way that they would be of value to others.  Part of the problem may also arise from 
adopting an ‘action research’ approach without being clear what this involves in practice.  
On the one hand, there are NGO projects that engaged in action research in the sense of 
undertaking their normal activities in a reflective way, in order to understand and improve 
their own behaviour.  On the other hand, there is action research in the sense of activists 
 
134 Hall, A J, R V Sulaiman, B Yoganand, R S Raina, N G Clarke and Guru C Naik, Institutional learning and change: 
towards a capacity-building agenda for research.  A review of recent research on post-harvest innovation systems in 
South Asia, in Post-Harvest Innovation in Innovation: Reflections on Partnership and Learning, Box 7, p. 132,  NR 
International, 2003. 
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wishing to engage as co-researchers with their clients (or the people they wish to 
influence).   
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 Whether or not such projects are ‘research’ will depend on the extent to which there is 
a conscious process of setting up the projects so that appropriate lessons can be learned and 
conveying the results in ways that are likely to be useful to others.  This probably involves 
devising methods to test a number of different ways of doing things and reflecting upon 
(researching) what works best.  It is clear that this ‘institutional learning’ has not yet been 
adequately documented effectively, except in India.  This is taken up again in the next 
chapter.  
Impact on Policy 
 The RNRRS Evaluation suggests that there has been extensive policy impact from the 
Programme.  “Impact at policy level has been documented in Programmes’ annual reports, 
Many of the Programmes appear to have engaged successfully, through policy briefs and 
workshops, with policy makers, and international agencies”135.  
 This is certainly true with the CPH Programme, and a wide range of policy impacts 
were reported.  At one level, key informants felt justified in asserting that sweet potato and 
cassava are now a top priority in the Tanzanian Government’s Zonal Agricultural Policy to 
achieve food security as a direct result of  CPH Programme activities.  At another level, the 
large number of papers from the South Asia Regional Office on new approaches to crop 
post-harvest research, might be said to have had an important impact, not only in changing 
the direction of the CPH Programme’s own research, but also on the thinking of elements 
within the international agricultural research system.  It is likely that the CPH Programme 
has influenced the design and content of the CGIAR programme on Institutional Learning 
and Change hosted at the International Plant Genetic Research Institute (IPGRI) in Italy136.   
 There were also cases in which projects, such as the one on ethical trade in Ghana, 
which appeared to have little relevance when started, but, following changes to EU import 
regulation, the results of the research were greatly in demand. 
Impact in the Form of ‘Good Science’ 
 The innovation approach is sometimes thought to be anti-science.  This could not be 
further from the truth137.  Mention has already been made of the importance of high-
quality science in the sorghum example, in the Diatomaceous Earth project and in the air 
pollution in India.  It is also the case that the CPH Programme has chosen to fund a 
number of projects where the main output was good science, without the expectation that it 
would produce poverty-reducing impacts in the short run. 
 Some members of the PAC and a number of academics in both the UK and 
developing countries take the view that the purpose of DFID funding is to produce 
‘international public-good’ science.  The review of the PAC states that “much discussion 
has taken place within the PAC on the preservation of an overview of science issues, 
 
135 RNRRS Evaluation, paragraph 5.5.13. 
136 It appears that ICRISAT now uses the term ‘coalition’.  One senior staff member suggested that the following 
evolution had occurred: networks originally only involved other scientists; this evolved to “partnerships” working 
together, but again mainly among researchers, but now they had coalitions which involve “more target groups such as 
industry”.  
137 Clark, Norman, Science policy and agricultural research in Africa: a capacity building needs assessment, 
NEPAD’s Office of Science and Technology and the African Ministerial Council for Science and Technology, 
January 2005, page 13. 
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particularly as they emerge from an international view of science outputs across the 
regions … There was a feeling from PAC members that science issues had become 
relatively neglected, and that PAC has a particularly advantageous position to advise on 
these”138.  
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 In this context, the CPH Programme has continued to fund a very few projects that 
were specifically funded as a contribution to ‘global public goods’ and were not justified in 
terms of their short-term impact.  An example of this type of work is being undertaken by 
Dr Beeching at Bath University to identify the full set of genes involved in post-harvest 
physiological deterioration in cassava139.  Construction of a cassava genomic library is 
now said to be almost complete.  
 This is clearly ‘science–push’ research.  Dr Beeching suggests that the impact of this 
work cannot be expected for at least ten years: 
1997–2001 2002–2005 2005–2008 2008–2011 2011–2014 2014+ 
Understanding 
of the 
deterioration 
process and 
identification of 
new tools 
Development 
of knowledge 
and tools 
Experimental 
testing of tools 
Field 
evaluation of 
experimental 
plants and 
refinement of 
tools 
Release to 
NARs for 
modification of 
elite lines and 
farmers’ 
preferred 
varieties 
Multiplication 
and release to 
farmers 
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 The CPH Programme provides many other examples of excellent science.  For 
instance, R7486 developed a rule-based model to predict the numbers of Larger Grain 
Borer (LGB – Prostephanus truncatus) likely to be captured in pheromone traps under any 
given climatic conditions, so that it could be destroyed (by insecticides or biological 
control) before it caused damage to maize and cassava stores in Ghana.  While the 
accuracy of predictions was said to be much greater than had originally been expected, 
there appeared to be no evidence that the system was currently being used anywhere in 
Ghana.  
 Similarly, the work on aflatoxins in groundnut-based foods and feeds in India 
(R7809) has apparently reduced the cost of an effective ‘Elisa’ test (now costing about 50 
US cents a sample).  However, efforts to commercialise the kit “have not yet gone 
anywhere”.  At the time of the visit, a US company had been approached to make the 
testing kits for about $5–$10, but this has so far produced no response.  The innovation 
approach would have suggested that finding partners, who might work alongside the 
researchers and who had the capacity to commercialise the technology, should have 
formed part of the original concept and indeed might have been part of the initial 
‘coalition’.  Yet even more surprising for a ‘demand-led’ research Programme, it appears 
that there has been no epidemiological work to determine how important the aflatoxins 
 
138 See Coulter, John and Frank Almond, The CPHP Advisory Committee: a review 1995–2004, p. 11, NR 
International, July 2004.  
139 The current work seeks to generate knowledge of the full set of genes involved in post-harvest physiological 
deterioration (PPD) in cassava, the isolation of genetic tools that could be used for the modulation of PPD via 
biotechnological approaches and the dissemination of these findings to relevant institutions, thereby providing them 
with the means by which they may control PPD so as to benefit, in the longer term, cassava farmers, processors and 
consumers through the availability of cassava roots with a longer shelf life. 
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problems in food and feed are in the Hyderabad area relative to other researchable 
problems140.  
232.
233.
 Professor Geoffrey Campbell-Platt, a member of the CPH Programme Advisory 
Committee, has recently reviewed the contribution that the CPH Programme has made to 
science in the area of “Food Safety and Quality Systems”141.  This draws attention to 
particularly important scientific work on mycotoxins, their presence and detection in feeds 
and foods142.   
 More generally, the CPH Programme produced a significant number of scientific 
publications.  So far, 236 items have appeared as papers in peer-reviewed journals, book 
chapters, edited international conference proceedings or bulletins.  
Crop Post-Harvest Programme Publications 1997/98 to 2002/2003 
Dissemination 
Category 
1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 
(A) Papers in 
peer-reviewed 
journals, book 
chapters, 
edited 
international 
conference 
proceedings, 
or bulletins 
40 48 29 34 19 66 
Source: CPHP Annual report 2003–2004  
 
Capacity Building 
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 The Programme has also produced a range of impacts related to ‘building capacity’.  
Most projects appear to have been involved in some sort of capacity building, though this 
was rarely very explicit and indeed there were times in the early years when DFID was 
said to have looked unfavourably at the use of research funds to build capacity.  Even so, 
seven PhD, 20 MSc and numerous short courses were funded as part of projects.  
Similarly, many teams reported that the supply of equipment was a particularly valuable 
part of their collaboration with foreign organisations. 
 Since 2002, support has been provided in the area of helping developing-country 
institutes to develop the capacity to write funding proposals.  In the early phases of the 
CPH Programme, this was usually the task taken on by the UK research partner.  The new 
coalition approach required substantial inputs by the Programme management team and 
their consultants to help teams complete the paper work.  Many teams reported that 
training to write funding proposals was one of the most useful activities that they had been 
involved in. 
 
140 Personal communication from Dr Farid Waliyar (ICRISAT-IN): “To the best of our knowledge no work was done 
on epidemiology of aflatoxin poisoning in humans in Andhra Pradesh”. 
141 CPHP, Review of Progress Towards Achieving CPHP Programme Indicators, November 2005 
142 R5898, Development of a second generation biosensor for the detection of Mycotoxins; R6091, Yeast Bioassay 
for the detection of Mycotoxins; R6127, Rapid methods for the analysis of Mycotoxins and related projects. 
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The Question of Commercialisation  
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 Two projects specifically addressed the issue of full commercialisation.  In the 
industrial uses of cassava in Ghana, the project worked with a number of private 
companies and to some extent underwrote the risks of these companies testing new 
products.  In the case of testing cassava starch in the adhesives used in cardboard box 
manufacture, the cost of trials could be covered by the project when the production runs 
were small.  However, when the company moved to Tema and purchased high-speed 
machines, the cost of getting the recipe glue wrong was too expensive for the project to 
finance.  Therefore, the project reported that “we have not resolved the issue of adapting 
the glue to the faster speed” (a problem of viscosity at the point of ‘cooking’ on the heated 
roller). 
  A similar constraint arose with the experiments to export sweet potato from Uganda 
to the UK143.  The project was not able to meet the importer’s request that they should 
underwrite the cost of the first trial 40 tonne shipment.  They needed $40,000 to underwrite 
shipment.  They approached both NAADS and the Ministry of Finance to support the 
shipment, but they were rejected on the grounds that “it was not a priority crop”. 
 Commercialisation of parboiling equipment will similarly require a combination of 
higher-volume production to reduce costs, retail delivery mechanism, and consumer credit 
to facilitate the purchase of the technology.  
 
 
143 R8273, Sweet Potato Uganda. 
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7 Lessons for Forming and Operating Coalitions 
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
                                                
 The next five chapters draw out some of the lessons from the experience of the CPH 
Programme for each of a number of audiences.  This chapter focuses on the lessons to be 
learned about implementing an Innovation Systems approach at the project level.  This 
then leads on to the implications for the funding of research, the management of research 
Programmes, and for UK research institutions. 
 One of the more surprising conclusions of this review is just how effective the IS 
approach appears to have been even at the project level and even in very hostile research 
environments.  The surprise comes from the fact that the literature takes a national focus in 
examining innovation systems.  It seems that, as the national environment for research 
deteriorates in developing countries, so projects have to do much more themselves if 
change is to be successful.  However, there is also a growing sense in industrialised 
countries that the innovation approach has its greatest policy relevance at the sectoral or 
product level, precisely because the problems are often so sector specific.   
The Requirements are Substantially Documented 
 The CPH Programme has spent a considerable amount of effort in developing the 
details of the ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ approach, and in specifying what would be 
required from new projects if they were to be transformed from ‘research’ to ‘innovation’.   
 The process has been set out in a number of Guidance Notes and Sheets144.  These 
cover the following topics: 
• Guidance Note: Livelihood analysis; 
• Guidance Note: Gender analysis; 
• Guidance Note: Stakeholder analysis; 
• Guidance Sheet 1: ‘Partnerships for Innovation’; 
• Guidance Sheet 2: The role of the managing partner(s); 
• Guidance Sheet 3: Developing a LogFrame; 
• Guidance Sheet 4: What DFID means by ‘poverty reduction’; 
• Guidance Sheet 5: Risk analysis; 
• Guidance Sheet 6: Budgets and financial information. 
 Many of these topics were backed up by face-to-face training sessions with 
researchers and this was supported by additional documentation145. 
 In 2002, the ideas surrounding the ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ approach were new 
to both Programme management and to researchers146.  It was clearly intended at the time 
that there would be considerable ‘learning by doing’, and the Programme managers, 
particularly at the regional level, took it upon themselves to learn more about the 
innovation systems in which they operated.  It now seems that a considerable amount of 
 
144 These are available on the web site http://www.cphp.uk.com/aboutcphp/default.asp?step=4&pid=30.  
145 For instance, Frank Almond provided training material on CPHP Partnerships for Innovation, a Strategy for 2002–
5.  This drew on the Tomato Box project in India.  
146 Of course, many of the building blocks of the approach, such as livelihood analysis (much favoured by DFID at 
the time), gender analysis, stakeholder analysis and Logical Frameworks, had been part of the discourse for many 
years and were much more familiar to all concerned. 
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learning has taken place and the current view of what innovation systems are is more 
sophisticated and more nuanced than it was when the Programme began.  Indeed, it is now 
difficult to distinguish between what was known at the start of the Programme and what in 
effect are the results of hindsight.   
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 Many researchers remarked that the training they received from the CPH Programme 
after 2002 about the new approach and how to prepare project proposals was the most 
important and valuable ‘capacity-building’ activity that they had ever been involved with.  
In part, this was because they felt that they were being treated as adults, in that proposal 
writing had previously been the prerogative of the expatriates.  However, the CPH 
Programme’s training was not regarded as a universal success, and lessons need to be 
drawn about the clarity of training material and the choice of effective trainers147.  
Variability in Understanding and the Issue of ‘Institutional Incentives’ 
 The results from the field visits provided striking evidence of just how many 
researchers and CPH Programme staff not only fully grasped the shift in paradigm but 
were enthusiastic supporters of it.  However, there must be an expectation that, in a review 
of this sort, people would say positive things about the approach, not wishing to bite the 
hand that feeds them.  Even so, a strong impression formed that there was a genuine 
change of perception.  The heads of a number of organisations stated that they felt they 
would try to adopt this model in their future work.  There was particularly strong support 
for the approach in parts of the system in India, in Ghana at the level of the Food Research 
Institute and in Uganda at the National Agricultural Research Organisation in Uganda.  
 Inevitably there are people who disagreed with the approach and there were many 
instances of very different meanings being attached to particular terms.  Mention can be 
made here of the terms ‘partnership’148 and ‘demand-driven research149, which have so 
many different meanings as to be almost worthless.  
 For many of the interviewees in East Africa, the new approach was seen only as a 
new way of doing ‘extension’ rather than necessarily a new way of doing ‘research’.  This 
view probably arose from the fact that the coalition projects in this region (as in the others) 
were the continuation of previous more ‘research-like’ phases, so some people saw the 
‘new approach’ as a better way to get the knowledge from research to users.  In the 2004 
East African workshop, one team reported that “there were problems of conceptualising 
the new CPH Programme partnership requirements”150.   
 There were also examples, both in developing countries and the UK, of respondents 
feeling that the new approach was just a new way of describing what they had been doing 
for years (there was some truth in this).  Even within organisations, views varied 
 
147 One group of researchers in India described the Log Frame training they received as “very bad”.  Similarly, some 
UK researchers remarked on “the inadequate experience of trainers taken on to explain the process, the 
impenetrability of the guidance documentation, the lack of feedback and QA procedures within CPHP, and errors in 
the documentation” (RNRRS Evaluation, Annex 10: Specialists Reports Annex 3 CPHP Comments from Project 
Leaders, p. 371). 
148 A comment from a recent DFID workshop in Harare was that everyone was in a partnership, but that there was no 
agreement as to what this meant in practice. 
149 The issues of ‘demand’ have been extensively elaborated in ECPDM 2001, Declaration of Maastricht, 12 October 
2001, Demanding innovation: articulating policy for demand-led research and capacity building, an international 
policy seminar by ECPDM and DGIS Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation.  It is 
also dealt with in a discussion note commissioned by DFID from Simon Anderson, Imperial College, Making 
demand-led research effective and pro-poor (no date, no reference). 
150 Uganda transport, A toolkit for Rural Transport Projects, KENDAT, Kenya, December 2004, p. 32. 
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considerably.  A senior researcher in Uganda said he regards words like ‘coalition’ as buzz 
words.  The RNRRS Evaluation also reported that “very simple concepts such as the value 
of having truly collaborative projects were presented as new and novel requiring training 
workshops where the ideas were wrapped up in ‘development speak’ and ‘jargon’”151.   
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 It seems likely that some participants signed up to the new approach because they felt 
this was required to get the money, but their research activities were conducted in a 
traditional way and they failed to contribute to the agreed tasks concerned with 
institutional learning.   
 Some of these differences no doubt do stem from poor training and documentation, 
but they are also likely to arise from the very different incentives faced by each 
stakeholder.  Regardless of the merits of the Innovation Systems approach in affecting the 
lives of poor people, the promotion prospects and sense of personal achievement for many 
researchers continues to depend on their record of publication in peer-reviewed 
international journals.  This was confirmed in many interviews.  Similarly, private-sector 
participants may feel that it makes little business sense to enter a coalition associated with 
a market identified by poor people or by researchers.  Certainly the move to the new 
paradigm resulted in many researchers losing control over resources and, in some cases, to 
an absolute fall in the funds available to them.  
 Despite these concerns, the overall impression from most of the participants is that the 
CPH Programme has broken new ground, which encouraged traditional research institutes 
to work effectively, and for the first time, both with the private sector and with NGOs.  It 
seems likely that some of these projects will result in an irreversible improvement in the 
way that research is conducted in these institutions.  It was widely accepted that both the 
CPH Programme and DFID had significantly “moved the goal posts”.  Overall, most 
interviewees regarded the changes as a positive step in the right direction. 
 Two lessons arise from this: first, that institutional incentives and disincentives are at 
the heart of any change process and probably need to be addressed directly.  A number of 
respondents said, for instance, that, in India, the agricultural research system suits many of 
the participants and there is little incentive for change. 
 Second, these various exchanges underline the obligation to improve training and 
documentation and to state even more clearly what the essence of the innovation process 
is.  The lessons from the CPH Programme suggest that this essence is centrally connected 
to the continuous interaction between researchers and ‘users of knowledge’ that enables 
users to know what can be done and researchers to know what is needed.  This places a 
high value on flexibility at the level of project management.  The model assumed that users 
will not initially be able to specify their needs adequately, not least because they do not 
know what the options are152.  Similarly, the researchers will not initially know precisely 
what the users need – not least because they have not interacted with some of the users 
 
151 RNRRS Evaluation, Annex 10: Specialists Reports Annex 3 CPHP Comments from Project Leaders, p. 371.  The 
evaluators also remarked: “Interestingly the single overseas respondent felt that the change had been a significant 
improvement”, p. 373.  The implications for UK-based institutions of the changes will be examined further in 
Chapter 10.  NRI has said that “the subsequent problems that NRI staff had with the innovation systems approach 
adopted by the CPHP were not about the concepts and principles of the approach, but the way that the CPHP chose to 
implement the approach”, personal communication, A Westby, 3 January 2006. 
152 This has implications for those countries, of which Uganda is one, that are trying to strengthen farmers’ demands 
(why only farmers’) on the research system – it is probably unrealistic to expect them to do this until they know more 
clearly what is on offer, and to specify their problems more precisely. 
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before.  Viewed from the perspective of researchers, the essential indicator of the 
innovation model is that the nature of the research will change153, through continuous 
interaction between researchers and other elements of the innovation system including 
machine makers and retailers, credit institutions etc)154. 
Institutional Learning – the Need to Extract Public-Good Knowledge 
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 It has been commented on earlier that the one area in which the process and methods 
have not been well documented is institutional learning and the extraction of public-good 
knowledge.  A major finding of the previous chapter was the tendency that the more the 
projects focused on achieving short-term poverty impact, the less they invested in 
‘research’ and the extraction of lessons of use to others both within the country and 
internationally.  However, the review shows that there was a great deal of potential 
‘public-good knowledge’ present in almost all projects.  These knowledge-based public 
goods concern both the process (how to improve the innovation process) and the content 
(particularly the science and technology).  The problem was that many teams found it 
difficult to extract these lessons and convert them into generalised lessons of relevance to 
others. 
 The exception to this tendency is to by found in the CPH Programme’s India 
portfolio.  The team there showed that it is possible to achieve both poverty-reducing 
innovation and public-good knowledge in the same project.  They also showed how it can 
be done155.  However, many respondents, particularly in Africa, reported that they felt ill-
prepared to undertake this type of lesson-learning analysis and that it was outside their area 
of expertise.  The Programme attempted to address this problem by providing a great deal 
of support to help teams produce ‘institutional histories’.  This has not proved very 
effective and, in addition, the cost of this task was not always included in project budgets.  
 In this connection, it is interesting to note that the standard approaches to monitoring 
and evaluation (which all the CPH Programme’s projects were required to adopt) did not 
generate the basic building blocks of information required for this lesson learning.  Nor, 
indeed, did the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes provide the raw material from 
which indicators of impact might have been drawn, such as the numbers of farmers trained, 
tonnages of high-quality flour sold, prices achieved by the trained farmers versus those 
obtained in general etc156. 
 A number of respondents felt uncomfortable with the open-ended questions being 
asked and the lack of clear methodology about how to learn institutional lessons.  The CPH 
Programme insisted that post-2002 projects contained an “institutional hypothesis”, but in 
retrospect it can be seen that there was not enough guidance as to what this meant and how 
 
153 There is evidence of such change within CPHP, most notably in Orissa with the shift from pineapples to tamarind, 
in the informally vended food projects, which tended to migrate from work on heavy metals to bacteriological 
contamination.  Change of focus can also be seen in the Kenya transport project, which shifted from donkeys and 
transport to a wider range of issues associated with access to markets. 
154 This issue was raised in the East African workshop document in the following way: “Farmers have complex 
agendas that are sometimes difficult to disentangle and yet, in most cases, are too broad for projects … these needs 
and demands cannot be ignored so as to pursue narrow project objectives”, p. 7. 
155 Andy Hall and others have explored the problems of evaluating whether systems have improved capacities to 
innovate and when these capacities are pro-poor in: Hall, A J, Rasheed V Sulaiman, N G Clark and B Yoganand, 
From measuring impact to learning institutional lessons: an innovation systems perspective on improving the 
management of international agricultural research, Agricultural Systems, 78, 2003, pp. 213–241. 
156 Projects did remark that the M&E processes did provide useful management information that allowed them to 
adjust the management of resources as difficulties arose or partners were unable to deliver particular inputs. 
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to do it.  One explanation for this is that the Programme became excessively bogged down 
in phrases such as “institutional histories” without being clear about what was wanted.   
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 A more fundamental concern is the apparent lack of ‘methods’.  One authority in this 
area who has been closely associated with the CPH Programme over the years is Professor 
Norman Clark.  He has recently provided valuable insight into this question in his report to 
NEPAD where he says: 
understanding the complexity of science policy issues cannot easily be 
demonstrated from ‘first principles’.  There is no ideal template or cookbook set of 
recipes.  In most cases examined what seems to be much more effective is to 
proceed inductively.  Here the use of illustrative case study material has proved to 
be quite successful157. 
 He is likely to be correct in suggesting that the inductive approach is probably 
inevitable, but it is far from easy.  It is not that there is no method, but that the method is 
difficult to specify in advance and in a way that would cover every situation.  The people 
who do it well are observing project-level phenomena in relation to their wider experience 
of the issues in the literature and experience elsewhere.  The difficulty of conducting an 
‘innovation system diagnosis’, for instance, has been described in the following analogy: 
This process can be seen as being similar to diagnosis of a patient performed by a 
physician.  This analogy suggests the need for holistic diagnosis, and the need for 
‘generalists’ before more specialists.  While this process can be assisted by a set of 
procedures, there is likely to be no substitute for the experience and judgement of 
seasoned and experienced persons on the application of the procedures.  In 
essence common sense suggests that much of this tacit knowledge cannot be 
codified into a simple set of action points (if it could, there would be no need for 
physicians)158. 
 There are, of course, people who have attempted to describe the methods of ‘policy 
analysis’159, but these often lack the rigour of the ‘scientific method’ with which many 
CPH researchers are familiar. 
 The CPH Programme in India has shown what can be done to extract the general 
institutional lessons from projects160.  It has produced a body of work that demonstrates 
how such case studies can be written up, and the considerable influence they can have on 
the way research is conducted.  A project of the CPH Programme in India specifically set 
out to identify a number of innovation case studies and draw out the institutional 
 
157 Clark, Norman, Science policy and agricultural research in Africa: a capacity building needs assessment, 
NEPAD’s Office of Science and Technology and the African Ministerial Council for Science and Technology, 
January 2005. 
158 Dr A Rath in Rath, Amitav and Andrew Barnett, Innovations Systems: Concepts, Approaches and Lessons from 
RNRRS, RNRRS Synthesis Study No 10, The Policy Practice Limited, discussion draft, 23 November 2005. 
159 http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Publications/Tools_handbook.html. 
160 A review of the Indian case histories does suggest one possible area of improvement.  Some of the case histories 
make quite severe criticisms of particular organisations.  It would add even greater insight if the subject of the 
criticism were allowed a right of reply – either in a footnote or in a very short annex.  This is particularly so in some, 
but not all, of the documents reviewing R7551, the tomato box case study.  In this case, an international NGO is 
severely criticised, and indeed stepped down from the project leadership role.  It would have been useful to have their 
side of the story: see Sustainable retailing of post-harvest technology to the poor: alternative institutional mechanisms 
for developing and transferring technology, World Development, 31(11), p. 1845.  
 
76 Chapter 7 Lessons for Forming and Operating Coalitions 
lessons161.  This resulted in the important and influential book, Post-Harvest Innovations 
in Innovation162. 
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 Two final points need stressing at this stage.  First, it may be believed that ‘action 
research’ and ‘learning by doing’ do not require any documentation of higher-level 
generalisations.  This view suggests that research institutions will be changed inevitably 
and permanently by being forced to work in a new way163.  Certainly personal learning is 
important, and it is clear that the participants in the CPH Programme’s projects learned a 
great deal.  Yet there is an emerging literature that suggests there is value in using this 
experience to produce the kinds of ‘evidence’ that is required to change institutional 
arrangements within and between organisations164.  
 The second point is that, although the biggest weakness has been in extracting these 
institutional lessons, it seems likely that more could have been done to ‘mine’ higher-order 
lessons about the science and technology of the recent projects and to write them up 
authoritatively (particularly across projects, and between countries).   
 A number of important lessons follow from this: 
• First, if innovation projects, including ‘action research’, are to produce public-good 
knowledge as well as innovation, they must include elements of a research design 
that tests different ways of doing things165.  
• Second, if public-good knowledge is required, it will be necessary to invest 
resources specifically to learn and extract these lessons.  Furthermore, it is likely 
that skills required to set project-level activities in a wider context of experience 
and literature will be different from those associated with the implementation of 
localised innovation. 
• Third, ‘learning projects’ will probably require systems to record and extract, 
throughout the whole project, impact lessons that are different from, and additional 
to, the M&E systems necessary for effective project management. 
Value can be added through Targeted Cross-Project and Cross-Regional Learning 
 A related concern is that the project approach (and possibly the processes of 
competitive tendering) appeared to militate against extracting lessons by comparing 
different projects from a number of different countries.  Many projects operated as if they 
were ‘stand alone’, even if they were conceived as being part of a planned sequence of 
activities.  These ‘higher-level generalisations’ or ‘international public goods’ were few 
 
161 R7502, Optimising institutional arrangements for demand driven post-harvest research, delivery, uptake and 
impact on the livelihoods of the poor through public and private sector partnerships.  This was started in 1999.  
162 Hall, A J, B Yoganand, R V Sulaiman and N G Clark, Post-Harvest Innovations in Innovation: Reflections on 
Partnership and Learning, 2003, ISBN 0-9539274-8-2.  Another good example of such a history is provided by 
Prasad, C Shambu, A preliminary note on institutional arrangements for the decentralised grain storage project, 
CPGP, 2003. 
163 For instance, see Naik, G and R V Sulaiman, Project Final Report for R8310, Institutional learning and change: a 
capacity development approach to exploring and strengthening post-harvest innovation systems in South Asia, 
Livelihood Solutions, August 2003–December 2004, p. 26. 
164 The interconnections between research and policy are being explored in the major DFID-funded Rapid 
Programme at ODI, London. 
165 In addition, if projects are involved in the development and introduction of new machines, then, if they are to 
adopt an Innovation Systems approach, they must specify the process by which this is to be achieved, even if it is 
adjusted in the light of new knowledge. 
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and far between in the recent period of the CPH Programme.  However, there may be an 
opportunity to remedy this under the new DFID research-funding facility.   
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 A case in point would be the various attempts to improve the marketing of cassava.  
Within the CPH Programme, there were at least six different approaches taken to this 
problem166.  This would appear to represent an area for substantial added value by 
comparing and contrasting these experiences and summarising what had been learned167. 
 Again this tendency could be countered by setting strategic objectives at the 
Programme level covering these issues, providing specific funding, and engaging specialist 
staff to do this (see paragraph 378).   
 There are examples of synthesis being undertaken by the Programme, but they are 
few and serve to illustrate just how much more could usefully be done.  One example of a 
synthesis is the volume on the Sweet Potato Post Harvest Assessment Experience of East 
Africa.  Another is the three-volume text book on Crop Post Harvest Science and 
Technology produced by NRI168.  However, this latter work does not appear to have been 
initiated nor funded by the CPH Programme (indeed it does not appear to have received 
any DFID funding) and does not seem to include any authors from developing countries 
who collaborated with NRI in their CPH Programme research.  Some activities along these 
lines are now being undertaken and others might usefully follow under future funding 
programmes169. 
The Need for Intervention and Additional Transaction Costs 
 It has been argued earlier in this report that the Innovation Systems approach required 
a substantially different strategy towards project development.  In particular, it needed a 
greater level of intervention both from the Managing Partner (project leader) and from the 
Programme managers than had been their practice in the past.  
 Mention has been made already of the need for training, capacity building at the 
project level and the setting up of coalitions.  These issues will be dealt with more fully in 
Chapter 9 in relation to Programme management.  The evidence, however, from the CPH 
Programme shows that these new processes also mean prospective teams themselves have 
had to allocate considerable amounts of time to the processes of forming coalitions, to 
 
166 R8268, Sustainable uptake of cassava as an industrial commodity; R7497, Commercialisation of cassava 
processing to enhance rural livelihoods in Eastern and Southern Africa; R8283, Packaging and processing of sweet 
potato and cassava; R6504, Expanded markets for locally produced cassava flours and starches in Ghana; R7036, An 
enterprise approach to commodity system improvement: sweet potato in Uganda and Kenya; R7580, Improved 
cassava chip processing to access urban markets; R7495, Identification of an approach to the commercialisation of 
cassava fufu processing in West Africa that maximises benefits to sustainable rural livelihoods; R8432, Cassava as an 
industrial commodity – improving access to knowledge on approaches and options for expanding markets for 
cassava. 
167  The Regional Office in Ghana has tried to tackle this at a country level, by preparing a monograph entitled: The 
eleven years of DFID funded post-harvest research in West Africa, draft 2005.  This is a useful attempt at synthesis, 
but could be made more so by both cross-reference to a project index and citation of the key supporting 
documentation that provides the ‘research results’. 
168 Crop Post-Harvest Science and Technology, Blackwells, London, 2002, Volume I by P Golob, G Farrell and J E 
Orchard; Volume II Durables by R J Hodges and G Farrell; Volume III Perishables by D Rees, J E Orchard and G 
Farrell. 
169 For instance, there was useful experience with informally vended foods in a number of countries.  It would appear 
that there were important common lessons coming out of this work both in terms of the coalition approach and about 
what worked and what did not.  Efforts are now being made to extract these lessons.  The conference report on 
Informally Vended Foods does not (yet) attempt this higher-level synthesis of lessons learned.  In Ghana, there has 
been some effort to link to similar work in the parboiling of rice.  Interestingly, there does not seem to have been any 
attempt to generalise from the various attempts to find commercial uses of cassava nor to extract from the many 
projects that attempted to introduced small-scale agro-processing machines. 
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being trained in the new approach, to the specification of the problem through some form 
of ‘systems diagnosis’, and to preparing the necessary documentation.   
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 Many interviewees described the increased costs to the researchers of obtaining 
funding for their work, running projects and reporting to NR International.  One researcher 
in India remarked that “the many [project preparation] modules were very time consuming 
to complete and … it was difficult to know what they want us to say”.  Another felt that 
“the livelihood analysis was a strait-jacket and did not really meet the needs of all the 
coalitions members”.   There is even some suggestion that without e-mail it would have 
been physically impossible to reach agreement between all the parties over the various 
documents that were required.  
 This additional effort was anticipated by the Programme’s managers and a number of 
steps were taken to minimise these costs to the applicants, including grants being provided 
to help successful teams develop coalitions and prepare project documentation170.  It was 
noted that a number of key coalition partners felt that they were just too busy to participate 
fully in the process.  This was particularly so for the private-sector participants171. 
 The question as to whether these costs of additional intervention should be considered 
as ‘overheads’ or investment in capacity building will be dealt with in Chapter 8. 
The IS Approach and the Identification of New Project Activities 
 It is important to stress that most of the coalition projects that have been examined 
were at the later stages of the innovation process.  This has meant that some coalition 
partners see the IS approach as merely a better way of ‘doing dissemination’.  It is, of 
course, far more than this.  Luckily, the CPH Programme in India provides a number of 
examples of ‘innovation’ projects that were started from scratch, and there are lessons that 
can be learned from this.   
 First, though, it is important to sort out a misunderstanding.  There is a tendency to 
assume that, if the Innovation Systems approach is adopted, then all projects are expected 
to contain all aspects of the model simultaneously.  This tendency is reinforced by the 
highly stylised diagrams of ‘National Systems of Innovation’, such as the one in Chapter 4 
(which was not used in 2002) or in training material that was used at the time172.  These 
provide a static view of the ‘system’ in which the time dimension has been assumed away.  
In practice, as the innovation process proceeds through time, some actors will become 
more involved than others: sometimes it will be the suppliers of new knowledge, 
sometimes the users, while at others it will be the actors that perform the functions of 
intermediation.  The portfolio of CPH Programme projects exhibits characteristics of 
different stages in the innovation process.  
 By 2002, many CPH Programme projects had arrived at the stage when they needed 
to add value to their earlier work by communicating the results more widely.  In this sense, 
there were forces within many projects that propelled them to engage with users of new 
 
170 Training was also provided in how to complete the project proposals.  Many teams remarked that they found this 
training specially valuable, as they felt particularly weak when competing for funds internationally. 
171 NRI stated in evidence to the RNRRS Evaluation that it spent £241,000 in 1999–2000 bidding for CPHP work 
(P371) and implies that this was largely due to the new processes.  This underlines the cost of tendering generally and 
the difficulty of providing a level playing field given that the location of the bid process (either in the UK or in 
developing countries) considerably affects transaction costs of those involved.  
172 See, for instance, Frank Almond’s PowerPoint presentation prepared in March 2002, Partnerships for Innovation: 
a strategy for 2002–2005. 
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knowledge and in effect to form coalitions.  As one observer in Ghana noted, “the time had 
come” for these projects to form coalitions173.   
278.
279.
280.
281.
                                                
 Some of the documentation prepared by the CPH Programme in 2002 suggests that 
the primary motivation for setting up coalitions was indeed because they represented the 
best “uptake pathway”174.  The CPH Programme’s Regional Strategy for East Africa 
clearly takes this view and justifies the coalition approach partly in these terms: 
The [partnerships for innovation] approach conceptualises the technical 
innovation process to be embedded in a system of institutional relationships and 
processes (coalitions).  CPHP believes that getting these relationships and 
processes right in its last three years is the avenue through which it shall achieve 
sustainable impact.  Through carefully designed coalitions, a portfolio of action 
research projects will be developed and implemented, centring on ‘uptake’ of 
existing outputs (where ‘uptake’ may involve validation and 
adaptation/modification of outputs). 
 Chapter 6 provides a number of examples where the CPH Programme’s research is 
‘supply-driven’, but on occasion this is a necessary part of the innovation process, 
particularly where there is a need for work that sets the agenda, either by exploring the 
extent of a problem (such as heavy metal contamination in India), or opening up a way of 
thinking about a problem (the development of theory, or developing a set of basic tools or 
methods, such as the DNA sequencing).  This only becomes a problem when it is 
undertaken to the exclusion of other work, and when the objective is short-term poverty 
impact. 
 In terms of insights as to how the IS approach can be applied to new project areas, the 
India projects have tested a number of approaches.  In most recent ‘field’ projects, this has 
involved picking an institution, or even an individual, that can be trusted both to 
understand what is required of the coalition approach, and to implement it effectively.  In 
these cases, they commissioned what was in effect a ‘project champion’ associated with an 
‘intermediate organisation’ namely IDE or an ex-IDE employee.  They undertook a 
‘system diagnosis’, which included both the livelihood analysis and stakeholder analysis 
insisted upon by NR International.  They also undertook an additional analysis on 
marketing, since this was regarded as essential, even though it was not required in the NR 
International methodology.  In these cases, they first selected areas in which they knew 
(and already trusted) some of the potential partners.  Then they worked with the partners to 
identify the problem.  This was in contrast to most traditional projects, which start with the 
‘research problem’. 
 Such a suggestion is clearly not without problems.  Not least, it raises the important 
issue of whether all the partners required in coalition need to be involved from the outset.  
Innovation system theory suggests that ‘problem definition’ requires people outside the 
research system to be fundamentally involved.  Certainly one of the indicators of genuine 
‘partnership’ in research is the extent to which the partners are involved in all aspects of 
project development, including the allocation of the budget.   
 
173 However, if the time was right it was not inevitable.  Many other DFID-funded research programmes also 
recognised the need to add value to past research, but appeared to take what might be labelled a ‘communications’ 
approach to the problem. 
174  This point was made by Dr Emily Twinamasiko, NARO in Uganda. 
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 The Indian cases provide examples where the project champion was committed to, 
and fully understood, the innovation approach.  It such cases, it probably does not matter 
who is involved at the outset, as an objective of the ‘intermediation’ activity is to consult 
and draw in the key players.  However, where projects and their initiators or champions are 
unfamiliar with, or uncommitted to, the approach, the CPH Programme’s insistence on a 
stakeholder analysis is an essential first step.  Just how complicated this process can be in 
practice will be explored in the next section. 
 In India, the Regional Office appears rightly to have been given considerable latitude 
by NR International in how it identified and developed projects.  For instance, in a number 
of these projects, the documentation apparently did not list the names of the project 
partners in advance (that is, at the project proposal stage) and, in some other cases, even 
the ‘problem’ was not specified.  One project at least (R7551 related to tomato boxes) was 
initially rejected by the PAC on the grounds that it did not specify the “technical 
constraint”.  
 This part of the Indian experience suggests two key lessons: first, that, with projects 
that do not build on existing research networks, project selection criteria will necessarily 
have to be sophisticated and flexible and may well depend on the extent to which the 
project promoter can be trusted, rather than on any formula about collaborating partners.   
 Second, that a systems approach in general, and a ‘system diagnosis’ in particular, are 
crucial.  The system diagnosis can be simple or complex (adopting different ‘fractal levels’ 
of analysis depending on the resources available and how wide the problem boundaries are 
set).  It essentially requires: a vision of the strengths and weaknesses of the system 
involved in effective innovation; the involvement of a wide range of key players; and a 
mechanism to allow the diagnosis to evolve as more experience is gained and as the 
operating environment changes. 
Don’t Contract Partners too Early 
 All the CPH Programme coalition project teams were required to undertake 
stakeholder analyses before they created a coalition.  The review of this experience 
provides valuable insights into the process and the difficulties of selecting these coalition 
partners. 
 A number of interviewees concurred with the view of an African researcher who 
warned project developers “not to jump into bed” with partners too early.  This adds 
weight to the need to distinguish between potential coalition partners and stakeholders.  
The same African researcher also suggested that you “don’t want a marriage certificate 
with all the people you drink with”.  DFID makes the same point in its most recent request 
for expressions of interest in its research consortia175. 
 The CPH Programme web site includes in its definition of the coalition approach to 
project management the idea of “joint ownership” and the idea that the “project design and 
implementation team is drawn from key stakeholders (we call them ‘core partners’)”.  
Many of the partners in developing countries said during interview that they felt this was a 
 
175 “It is vital that the proposed consortium is feasible: it should not be overly ambitious relative to available 
resources. Consortium partners are major contributors to the RPC but they are unlikely to include all organisations 
with which the RPC is likely to collaborate or consult during its life”: DFID call for Expression of Interest, 
September 2004, paragraph 7. 
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crucial step in shifting to the new paradigm, as they felt (rightly or wrongly) that they had 
often been excluded from these key processes in previous research projects.   
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 However, the CPH Programme’s requirement was that project proposers had to 
specify the names of coalition partners in the proposal document.  This made sense in 
those coalition projects that were essentially continuations of previous work.  In these 
cases, the partners were already known to each other, and had built up a certain amount of 
trust.  Nevertheless, as suggested in the previous section, where coalitions have to be built 
from scratch, projects may need the flexibility to identify potential partners and to build 
trust with them during the early stages of the project before entering into a contractual 
relationship.   
 The portfolio inevitably provides examples of project managing partners now 
believing that they would have been better off with other partners, either because the ones 
that were chosen were not pulling their weight, or certain critical inputs could not be 
provided by existing partners.  Projects reported particular difficulties in finding private-
sector partners176. 
 Uganda provided examples of projects involving what turned out to be the wrong 
partners.  Some partners were not able to carry out some of the tasks assigned to them.  
Part of the problem probably arose from partners being involved on a very part-time basis.  
Such tasks had to be transferred to others in very difficult circumstances – though it is a 
tribute to the coalitions that they managed this.  This probably suggests that mechanisms 
for such transfer of funds should be agreed by partners at the outset. 
 One key player in the East African scene, who has reflected on the role of coalitions, 
even goes as far as to suggest that coalitions may take as long as two years to develop177.  
If this view were widespread, it would provide important lessons for future project design. 
Characterising of Successful Coalitions 
 Early CPH Programme documentation made the distinction between the “two 
strands” of the 2002 strategy: first, there was the coalition approach to project 
management, which involved joint ownership, flexibility and “institutional learning”; and 
second, there was the Innovation Systems Research, which was to look into the 
institutional and organisational context within which Post-Harvest Research takes place, 
which regarded projects as case studies, and aimed to produce policy recommendations178. 
 The Partnerships for Innovation approach was described, therefore, as having both 
internal and external characteristics.  Internally, coalition projects were said to represent a 
better way of managing projects, by providing wider ownership among the partners.  
While externally, coalitions were thought to provide a better way of engaging with 
stakeholders.  Clearly under this characterisation of coalitions, partners did not have to be 
the same as coalition stakeholders.  
 
176 In the tomato box project in India, IDE now feel that they should have introduced the private sector sooner, in fact 
it took 18 months.  In the Uganda Sweet Potato project, it took a long time to find an appropriate private-sector 
partner too. 
177  This point was made by Dr Emily Twinamasiko, of NARO in Uganda.  See her PowerPoint presentation to the 
CPHP workshop in Kampala, Reflection and Lesson Learning on Partnerships for Innovation, 17–18 February 2004, 
Kampala, Uganda 
178  See Frank Almond, PowerPoint presentation, footnote number 172. 
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295. Looking at the whole portfolio, the successful CPH Programme innovation projects 
might be said to fall into four categories: 
Characteristic Typical Example 
Demand-led The Fruits of the Nile Project in Uganda (R5539(CB)) 
Intermediary- led The Indian ‘field’ projects facilitated by IDE (R7551) 
‘Natural’ coalitions The Industrial uses of Cassava, Ghana (R8268) 
‘Induced’ coalitions Sorghum Poultry Feed in India (R8267) 
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 A number of the projects achieved innovation because they had a strong demand from 
a manufacturer or formed ‘natural coalitions’ because of the system characteristics of the 
task being undertaken179.  However, the interesting feature of the CPH Programme 
portfolio is that there were also successful innovations where either an intermediary was 
able to form the link between suppliers of new knowledge and users of new knowledge, or 
the participants were induced to work in coalitions with others because they understood 
that their only chance of obtaining grant funds was by joining the coalition (or were 
persuaded by the project catalysts).  Some of these latter participants seem to have gone on 
to learn that such arrangements are beneficial to them.  This suggests that the proactive 
approach can be, and has been, successful. 
 The essence of the coalition, indeed the reason why the term coalition is used at all, 
is that various actors, with differing goals and objectives, see their individual interests 
(the balance of incentives) being met by combining in joint actions with other actors180.  
They come together for as long as they believe their best interest is being served.  
Sometimes this may be short lived – until the task is performed – or it may be long-
standing, as their goal is likely to be achieved most effectively by working with the 
same actors over many years. 
 What is interesting is that some of the coalitions are likely to continue even after 
the incentive provided by CPH Programme funds comes to end.  They clearly see the 
value of working together outweighing the transaction and other costs.  In Uganda, the 
sweet potato coalition project has evolved into the legally constituted Uganda Sweet 
Potato Development Association181.  In Ghana it, was suggested that, as a consequence 
of lessons learned form CPH Programme coalitions, The Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture had created a “Soya Bean committee”.  This was described as utilising 
many of the characteristics of a coalition approach, as it apparently involves all the key 
players in a coalition that agrees how to harmonise the needs of the buyers with those of 
the producers. 
 
179 See paragraph 48 above. 
180 There are strong ‘natural’ incentives for research institutes not to form coalitions, the principal reason being that in 
coalitions they are required to ‘give away’ funds that they could otherwise have spent on their own staff and facilities.  
The incentives to form coalitions may be (a) that they may not win the bid without certain types of partner, (b) certain 
types of output will not be achieved without coalition partners. 
181 See their web site: www.sweetpotatocoalition.org.  
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The Range of Coalition Partners is more Important than the Number 
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 The CPH Programme portfolio demonstrates that the nature and number of coalition 
partners varies considerably across the coalition projects.  Two types of problem arose 
from which lessons can be learned.  First, some projects saw the issue as merely increasing 
the number of partners and just added more research institutes.  Second, some projects 
added so many partners that the coalition became difficult to manage. 
 In most cases, the addition of more research institutes was probably part of an 
essential learning process as research institutes began to understand what was required.  In 
a number of projects, the range of partners did increase as the projects evolved from phase 
to phase.  This again re-enforces the need for project leaders to have a clear understanding 
of the innovation process in which they operate before deciding which partners are likely 
to be necessary for effective innovation.   
 The portfolio suggests that, in addition to the more obvious partners, such as the 
private sector, farmers, processors and traders, NGOs seem to have played a particularly 
important role in CPH Programme coalitions.  Particularly valuable has been their role in 
enabling the formal research institutes to break free from their more restrictive 
administrative controls and to provide better two-way communication with farmers’ 
groups and small-scale processors.  NGOs were found to be able to procure equipment and 
release funds for travel and subsistence far more quickly than government organisations in 
the countries visited.  Nevertheless, the portfolio also contains examples of the transient 
nature of many NGOs.  They were strong and powerful at one moment, and wracked by 
weak financial control or indeed corruption on others (paragraph 152).  So, while NGOs 
provide valuable inputs in the short run they may well not provide a long-term solution to 
reforming national research systems. 
 The problem of having unmanageable numbers of partners in coalitions seems to have 
arisen in part from the tendency to take the line of least resistance and divide the funds 
equally among all the participants at the planning meetings.  One interviewee mentioned 
that “all stakeholders expect a hand out”.   
 Some project coalitions found it difficult to decide which partners should be in the 
coalition and receive funding from the project, and which would merely be dealt with as 
stakeholders.  There are cases in the portfolio of private-sector participants who can be 
regarded as key coalition members that in fact did not receive any funds from the project.  
This again suggests a more nuanced interpretation of the categories of actor involved in 
coalitions, ranging from participants with contracts, through to passive stakeholders who 
are merely affected by the project outcome whether or not they participate.  
 It also suggests that Programme management needs to find ways of ‘protecting’ 
Regional Office staff from the consequences of the difficult decisions that inevitably arise 
in the allocation of funds between competing stakeholders. 
 Others solved the problem of selection by setting up criteria that would give 
legitimacy to excluding many potential bidders.  In Ghana, it seems a choice was made in 
2002 to concentrate most future funding on activities in the northern region.  This may 
well have been a good pragmatic choice that would allow a concentration of effort in an 
area that was particularly poverty stricken.  Even so, all proposals were approved by the 
independent Programme Advisory Committee. 
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 Perhaps the most useful lesson in this respect was that project partners were 
encouraged to work ‘outwards’, first by defining the tasks, then by deciding which partners 
were most appropriate to undertake the tasks (trying to define their ‘comparative 
advantage’) and only then deciding on the allocation of the money in terms of the costs of 
performing the necessary tasks.  This did not work in every case, but it certainly resulted in 
changes in project management (where the partners felt that someone other than the project 
initiator would be most appropriate to run the project) and helped add some rationality to 
the division of the funds (when some partners cost so much more than others and an equal 
division of the budget would not have been satisfactory). 
Establish Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution 
 Coalitions are temporary agreements for organisations to work together.  Necessarily, 
there are differences in the objectives pursued by each partner.  For instance, the director of 
an early attempt at a coalition in India described how each party had different objectives:  
“the CEC [the NGO] wants ‘products’ while others wanted ‘research’”.  Initially, CEC was 
said to have felt diffident about the research issues and the director now believes that “the 
research element should have been built more effectively into the project … I was not 
confident in [this area of] leadership”.   
 The CPH Programme’s projects showed that there were other sources of conflict.  
Many of these arose about whether or not particular partners had delivered what they had 
promised and whether any failure was as a result of circumstances beyond their control.  
Other coalitions talked of the different cultures between researchers and the private sector.  
One private-sector partner in Uganda said that “coalition meetings were not business-like 
and took far too much time – meeting all day and still not making decisions!”.  Another 
said that “too many meetings waste time and this means I am losing money”.  The 
researcher countered that “I am a researcher and I have to do these things”.  
 Only one project addressed the issue directly by creating a formal conflict-resolution 
procedure.  This project, on the sustainable uptake of cassava as an industrial commodity 
(R8268), agreed in advance that, if the parties involved are unable to resolve a conflict 
themselves, it had to go to arbitration.  The partners created a three-person arbitration 
committee that operated according to a pre-established set of rules.  The cost of this system 
was met out of each partners’ budget.  When a conflict did arise, a rather different process 
had to be invoked, as one of the parties in the conflict was a member of the arbitration 
committee.   
 It was a measure of the robustness of the CPH Programme’s coalitions that they were 
able to resolve conflicts amicably.  In one case, the conflict arose over disputes about 
jurisdiction between two regulatory authorities.  The key innovation system lesson here 
was that, had both these parties not been part of the same coalition and built up mutual 
trust, there would have been no process to resolve the conflict and the project would have 
failed from what is often described as a lack of political will.  Similarly, it is to the 
considerable credit of the coalitions that they were able to take funds away from partners 
that were not able to deliver. 
Don’t Spread the Funds too Thinly 
 An obvious danger of the coalition approach is that the level of funding that used to 
be given to a single research institute is now spread across a larger number of partners, 
with the risk that they all received sub-optimal funding levels.  While it is difficult to 
generalise, there is prima facie evidence that coalition projects are likely to need more 
funds and therefore there should be a smaller number of larger projects.   
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 In the case of the first round of CPH coalition projects, this problem was exacerbated 
because it was decided that each coalition project should be relatively small.  This was for 
a number of reasons: to ensure that many project clusters could have funds to add value to 
previous research; to spread the risk across a number of projects, as the approach was 
novel; and because the projects would be inherently smaller, as most of the managing 
partners were likely to be in developing countries and would have lower costs.  
 Many projects ascribed the problems they had to the lack of funds and to the fact that 
too many partners were only able to contribute to the projects on a part-time basis. 
 For this reason (and others, such as system capacity building, and the need to achieve 
a critical mass of effort over a long enough period), the lesson here is that, if an Innovation 
Systems approach is to be adopted, this will require a smaller number of larger projects.  
The advantages of programme funding are discussed in paragraph 371.  
Establish Real ‘Ownership’ 
 The question of ownership was raised in a number of interviews.  While most 
respondents felt that the creation of coalitions meant everyone had responsibility for the 
work, a few felt that the process actually resulted in nobody taking responsibility.  This 
was said to be especially so if there were a large number of partners, for whom the project 
represented a tiny amount of their workload.  It is believed that this problem could be 
exacerbated by ‘basket funding’, where neither the donor nor the recipient knows whose 
money is used for any particular activity. 
 The portfolio also contained examples where particular project partners overly 
dominated the coalition.  These examples are drawn mainly from the early attempts at 
coalitions prior to 2002, and involve the impression that either a particular institution was 
more prestigious than another or that a particular discipline was more important than others. 
Funding the Management of Coalitions 
 The main lesson in this regard from the current batch of coalition projects is the very 
large amount of effort that is required by the managing partner.  In some cases, particularly 
where the managing partner is an NGO or a consulting firm, the costs of these efforts are 
paid by the project.  However, there are cases, such as in Tanzania, where government 
regulations limit such payments and this has caused difficulties for the managing partner as 
it took them away from other work. 
 A related concern, mentioned by many of the projects that were managed by partners 
in developing countries, was how to cover the costs of the cash flow.  These problems are 
said to arise because DFID provides funds to its RNRRS Programmes in arrears.  
Contractors such as NR International then cascade this condition in their contracts for the 
CPH Programme’s projects.  One of the great advantages of working with UK institutions 
is that they are able to carry the cash flow of the projects in which they are the managing 
partners.  Many donors, such as the Canadian International Development Research Center 
(IDRC) avoid this issue by paying a proportion of their grants in advance.  DFID will need 
to consider this issue if it wishes to support more in-country institutions in the future.   
A Summary of the Lessons Learned at the level of Projects: 
 Among the key lessons that were mentioned by the current managing partners were:  
• The need to take specific actions to build coalitions – they do not happen 
‘naturally’; 
 
86 Chapter 7 Lessons for Forming and Operating Coalitions 
• The need to specify the tasks, then cost them, and then divide up the funding cake; 
• The importance of getting both the right organisations and the right people within 
the organisation in the coalition (in order to get the right mix of representation, 
skills, continuity, trust and chemistry); 
• The need to work at keeping weaker but essential partners in the coalition, and 
helping them to come up to speed – a necessary component of capacity building 
(who/how to pay?); 
• The value of formal conflict-resolution mechanisms with procedures agreed before 
conflicts arise; 
• Importance of clear criteria for including and excluding partners (this appeared to 
arise from the threat of legal action on the part of excluded players); 
• Importance of clear responsibilities, milestones, and performance criteria (so that 
sanctions can be applied for non-performance – such as exclusion and non-
payment); 
• Need for leadership by managing partners in the form of a ‘mild autocracy’ rather 
than majority opinions; 
• Importance of pre-financing and cash flow; 
• The importance of improving proposal- and report-writing skills; 
• The important roles for expatriates (this is discussed further in Chapter 10); 
• ‘Successful coalitions’ do not necessarily result in innovation – many projects now 
face difficult next steps. 
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 The previous chapter drew out a number of lessons from the CPH Programme’s 
experience at the project level.  Many of these lessons have implications for the way that 
DFID and other donors can improve the impact of their research funding.  These include: a 
more hands-on approach to project development; the need to invest in the extraction of 
public-good knowledge; the approach to project identification and the development of 
project teams; and the need to locate projects in the wider national context.  These are 
explored in this chapter. 
 In Chapter 3, a number of trends were identified that provide the context in which 
DFID will provide its future support to research.  The main lesson from this would appear 
to be that DFID will have much less capacity in future to engage with, and learn from, the 
research it funds.  The drivers of these changes seem to be downward pressure on DFID 
staff numbers, a desire to provide budgetary assistance rather than project and technical 
support, and a desire to delegate responsibility and resources to staff at the country level.  
Added to this is the long-standing requirement to have a direct impact on poverty 
reduction.  Recently, this has been tempered by recognition of the importance of investing 
in infrastructure, widely defined to include research and skilled human resources.  Equally 
important, investments in infrastructure (including research) are in turn to be based on 
international competitive tendering rather than being tied to UK suppliers. 
 In relation to research, the RNRRS Evaluation poses one inescapable conclusion: that 
there is a range of possible objectives for DFID’s investment in research, but only DFID 
can decide what it wants in terms of generic knowledge, adaptive research or capacity 
building182.  Equally, the changes within DFID determine what it is capable of doing.  
Certainly the options facing DFID Central Research Department are severely constrained 
by the lack of staff, weakening links to Policy Department, and the rules and procedures 
restricting interactions between headquarters and country Programmes.  There is a growing 
perception of a curious paradox: as DFID’s language relating to research, partnerships, 
ownership, and poverty has become more sophisticated, its actions have become more 
simplistic183.  
 However, it does appear that DFID wants poverty impact and public-good knowledge 
from its research: “walk[ing] the tightrope between scientific knowledge generation and 
livelihoods impact”184.  If this is the case, then this review of the CPH Programme’s 
activities provides a number of lessons about how to do it:   
The Innovation Systems approach provides a framework for actions that range 
from the simple to the most complex;   
The CPH Programme ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ approach provides practical 
examples and advice about how to do it and what the pitfalls are likely to be.  
 
182 These option are presented in more detail in Section 7.7 of the LTS RNRRS Evaluation. 
183  Dr Amitav Rath reports that this view was expressed in different ways by a number of RNRRS Programme 
Managers during the recent RNRRS Innovation Synthesis Study, 2005. 
184 RNRRS Evaluation, p. 71. 
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Is the IS Approach Relevant to all Problems and Sectors? 
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 It might be argued that the Innovation Systems approach is particularly applicable to 
narrowly defined crop post-harvest systems, particularly those associated with equipment 
for storing and processing crops.  Yet the CPH Programme showed that the Innovation 
Systems approach not only could be applied to equipment-based projects, but also was 
effective in the introduction of new ways of doing things, and in achieving policy change.  
In each of these cases, the IS approach provided insights about priority setting and the 
range of actions that are likely to be required.  The key insight is that a whole-system 
perspective is required and that a wider range of actors and experience needs to be 
involved. 
 However, as has been repeatedly stressed, the innovation process proceeds through 
time.  This means that there is also a need for ‘science–push’ at certain times.  The CPH 
Programme’s ‘science–push’ projects were probably at their most useful when they were 
agenda-setting activities that used advanced science to demonstrate to policy makers and 
others the importance of issues that they may not have thought about.    
 It has also been suggested that one important type of ‘science–push’ research involves 
the search for ‘vaccines’.  This may be said to represent the ‘ideal type’ of research to 
which DFID’s centrally funding aspires185.  Such research might be considered closest to 
the ideal of international public-good research (where the private sector is said to be 
unwilling to invest in research related to diseases that largely afflict people who are unable 
to pay for its prevention), and has the potential for major global impact.  There is certainly 
a need for this type of research and Chapter 6 has provided a number of other examples of 
‘good science’ within the CPH Programme that may be thought to have some of the 
characteristics of investment in vaccines: that is, they required heavy investments in the 
types of advanced science and technology in which the UK and other OECD countries 
have a comparative advantage.   
 It should be noted that, in the language of National Systems of Innovation, research 
on vaccines may be attractive to donors because much of the system is outside developing 
countries, and many of the mechanisms required for its successful innovation are assumed 
to be already in place, including its manufacture, testing and (aid-funded) distribution.  The 
weakest part of the vaccine innovation system is likely to be the ‘last mile’ of the supply 
chain, particularly in its delivery to the poorest people in the remotest areas.  However, the 
lesson here is that very few areas of research that have an impact on poor people are likely 
to be of this type.  A danger therefore arises when what might be called the ‘vaccine 
model’ is unthinkingly applied to other quite different problems, where the innovation 
system is far less developed. 
 Perhaps the strongest argument for the widespread applicability of the IS approach is 
the recognition that the many of the elements of the traditional linear agricultural research 
system are not (and probably never were) in place, particularly in the form of effective 
extension systems.  It is now widely accepted, for instance, that only a small proportion of 
new seed varieties are actually used by farmers.  DFID itself reports that “there are some 
areas where we do have answers, but these answers have not yet reached the poor.  Most 
Kenyan farmers still use seed varieties that are 20 years old” (Research Framework, 
paragraph 120).   
 
185 Research Framework, paragraph 29 and elsewhere. 
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 As suggested at the outset, this problem has been compounded in recent years by the 
progressive withdrawal of many elements of DFID’s own innovation system.  At the time 
that RNRRS started, it was assumed that DFID itself would be the major implementer of 
new knowledge generated by DFID-funded research (see paragraphs 26 and 96). 
 So it can be concluded that both theory and experience from the CPH Programme 
suggest that the IS approach does indeed have wide applicability to a range of activities 
with which DFID may wish to be involved through its investment in research.  The various 
types of new knowledge and the extent of interaction with the wider innovation system can 
be summarised in the following typology: 
Types of knowledge Extent of interaction with the rest of the innovation system 
Paradigm Shifting Einstein working on his own186: little interaction with National Systems of 
Innovation, but intellectually located deep within the body of scientific knowledge 
Agenda Setting Researchers necessarily ‘ahead’ of the users but clearly must be closely in 
touch with both current theory and practice, and with actual and potential 
audiences (users) 
Policy Changing Strong frequent interaction between understanding the needs of policy makers 
(public, private and civil society) and the generators of new ideas 
Changing Practices, 
Procedures and 
Services  
Strong frequent interaction between understanding the needs of administrators 
and implementers (public, private and civil society) and the generators of new 
ideas 
Introducing ‘New’ 
Commodities, such as: 
 
vaccines Strongly supply-driven science, but with substantial parts of the innovation 
system already in place 
new plant 
varieties 
Well-known system for plant breeding, replication and distribution; probably 
deteriorating in some areas and changing rapidly in others through increasing 
private-sector involvement and changes in technology (biotech) 
machines The quintessential case for strong and continuous interaction among networks 
of supplies of new knowledge, manufacturers, retailers, intermediaries and 
customers for the final products or services 
 
Does Research have a Role in Fragile States? 
331.
                                                
 Doubts have recently been expressed about the value of research in ‘fragile states’ 
because of the lack of ‘complementary conditions’187.  The IS approach predicts that this 
will be so.  Perhaps more interesting is that even the most cursory innovation system 
diagnosis would indicate where investments were likely to provide the greatest return, 
 
186 In a single year – 1905, a year that would become known as Einstein’s miracle year – he published papers that 
would redefine how we see our world and universe.  One was: On the electrodynamics of moving bodies.  It 
contained his Theory of Special Relativity.  From this paper would come an additional three pages, finished in 
September of the same year, that would contain the derivation of e=mc², the most famous mathematical equation ever 
written.  In 1921, Einstein was awarded the Nobel Prize, not for his theories of relativity, but for another paper 
published in 1905.  In this paper, he proposed that light was not simply made up of waves, it could also be thought of 
as discrete, individual particles or quanta.  Ten years after his Theory of Special Relativity, he published his Theory 
of General Relativity – a piece of work widely acknowledged as his masterpiece.  Excerpts from BBC web site: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sn/tvradio/programmes/horizon/einstein_symphony_prog_summary.shtml.  
187 Rates of return to research: a literature review and critique, draft paper commissioned by DFID (DFID web site, 
November 2005). 
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either in terms of innovation or of enabling fragile states to begin the long process of 
harnessing existing knowledge in their development process.  It is likely that investment in 
a country’s innovation system is a necessary condition for development – though the most 
valuable investment may well not be narrowly defined ‘research’188. 
The Need to use a Wider Range of Aid Instruments 
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 The issue of fragile states is a subset of the large issue of deteriorating infrastructure.  
Chapter 5 provided a brief insight into the inadequate and probably deteriorating National 
Systems of Innovation in a number of states that are not necessarily fragile.  That chapter 
concluded that, in such countries, a wider range of instruments may be more effective in 
producing beneficial change in the innovation system than individual, narrowly defined 
research projects.  It was suggested that many of the instruments DFID uses to achieve 
‘good governance’ reforms in other sectors might well be more appropriate.  In particular, 
the ‘institutional incentives’ that drive or inhibit institutional change that were observed in 
many of the CPH Programme’s coalitions may well represent a major area for intervention 
and reform. 
 Such attempts to induce institutional change at a level higher than that of projects 
would appear to have considerable promise both in countries such as India, which have 
huge scientific and technological resources tied up in unproductive institutional 
arrangements, and in countries with less developed technological capacity (paragraph 124).  
The lesson to be learned from the IS approach is that there are many possible areas for 
intervention within the system, but that the allocation of  all ‘research resources’ needs to 
be guided by a vision of the strengths and weaknesses of the system rather than by a 
predetermined notion of a narrowly defined research project. 
 DFID endorses this view, but suggests that their Central Research Department can do 
little to deal with it.  Their Research Framework states: 
Yet where research capacity is weak, the main causes are not in fact specific to 
research.  Rather, they affect the whole public sector: unreliable finance, poorly 
paid and managed staff, weak and unreliable infrastructure, sometimes a lack of 
security.  Tackling these issues is central to DFID’s wider work in such countries.  
DFID has moved away from funding standalone projects to working directly with 
governments and civil society to change these underlying problems.  This will have 
the greatest impact on improving research in the long run, by maximising the 
prospect of creating capable and effective public institutions, which can make a 
sustained contribution over the long term. (DFID Research Framework, paragraph 
46). 
 An Innovation Systems approach to research funding would mean DFID shifting 
resources away from ‘research projects’ towards strengthening the weakest links in the 
systems that use new knowledge.  The CPH Programme demonstrates (though has not 
necessarily evaluated) a range of possible instruments, in addition to formal ‘research 
projects’, by which innovation systems (and therefore poverty impact) can be improved.  
At the project level, they mainly involve encouraging the various actors to change their 
practices by participating in ‘learning by doing’ action-research projects, or by investing in 
 
188 In particular, it appears that one of the major outputs of ‘research’ programmes is the development of trained 
people. 
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strengthening capacities through training189.  They also include initiatives, such as those 
recently in India, directly at the policy level.    
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 The importance of investing in capacity development has run through many of the 
conclusions of this study.  DFID rules and procedures have made this difficult in the past, 
but do now seem to be changing.  Interviewees in Africa clearly felt there was no 
alternative but to build capacities at the national level, not least as these are the elements of 
the system that need to absorb and implement new knowledge even if this knowledge were 
generated regionally or already existed internationally. 
Mechanisms to increase the demand for new knowledge 
 There are, however, an even wider range of policy instruments available to bilateral 
and other donors.  DFID’s new Research Framework rightly draws attention to the need to 
increase the ‘demand’ for new knowledge, rather than concentrate, as in the past, on 
increasing the supply190.  CPH research either identified or demonstrated some interesting 
possibilities for using ‘research funds’ to increase demand, shifting control over resources 
to actual or potential users of new knowledge (see paragraphs 74 and 184).  Changing 
these power relations appears to be fundamental to successful innovation. 
 These projects lead to the speculation about how other projects in the CPH 
Programme might have evolved if the funds had been given to other potential members of 
a coalition, such as the manufacturers of rice parboilers in Ghana, the villagers in Ghana 
who wanted to explore transport alternatives, or even the cardboard box manufacturers 
looking for cheaper sources of starch for their adhesives191.   
 Such novel arrangements also suggest opportunities for public–private partnerships.  
The CPH Programme provides a number of examples of such partnerships in both 
manufacturing and processing.  It has also funded research relating to the nature and form 
of private-sector regulation, in the setting of standards, in creating transparency and 
‘levelling the playing field’.  The CPH Programme has supported such work, for instance, 
in relation to EU regulations governing the export of crops to the EU192.   
The Need for Intervention 
 One of the major lessons from the CPH Programme’s experience is the need for a 
more hands-on approach to project development.  The implementation of the IS approach 
required interventions to help teams in developing countries to prepare project 
documentation, to develop and implement innovation projects.  The previous chapter 
showed in particular that project participants were not able to understand and apply these 
processes on the basis of written instructions and guidance.  They required assistance and 
face-to-face discussion. 
 
189 An example of an action research project with the explicit objective to change the behaviour of a research institute 
by encouraging them to learn from the experience of working with an NGO is provided by the Tropical Forest 
Research Institute (TFRI), which has not previously worked with an NGO that is in close touch with the target 
population.  See R8262, Developing a coalition approach to non timber forest produce for better livelihoods of tribal 
communities of Madhya Pradesh, India. 
190 DFID Research Framework, item 52iv. 
191 Direct subsidies to the private sector would have to be dealt with using a certain amount of ingenuity and care, not 
least to ensure that the results were placed in the public domain and so as not to provide any one company with an 
unfair advantage.  Vouchers for research that were tied to a specific knowledge supplier have been suggested as one 
possible alternative. 
192 R7528 in Zimbabwe, R8271 in Zambia, R6611 in Uganda, R7168 in Ghana.  In some of these cases, the work was 
carried out before the private sector knew that such regulations were important to its activity – this was particularly so 
in the case of Ghana.  
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 This mirrors the experience of IDRC in Canada, which is considered by some people 
to exhibit best practice in financing research.  According to DFID’s Surr Report, IDRC 
spent 18% of its budget on what it calls “operational activities” (mainly technical 
assistance to researchers) and a further 22% on overheads and more tightly defined 
administrative costs193. 
 The CPH Programme’s experience suggests that this may well represent best practice.  
If DFID is unable or unwilling to perform this task itself through its country offices, this 
leads to only one conclusion: the creation and funding of some form of regional or country 
representation.  The CPH Programme has experience of establishing such representation 
through its four Regional Offices.  As the Programme shifted towards the innovation 
approach, the staff of these Offices were seen to be increasingly necessary to bring 
Programme management nearer to the researchers, to provide day-to-day management of 
the local Programme and to provide technical assistance at the project level.   
 The regional focus of the SRSA provides important support for such a local presence.  
However strong the original arguments were for exploiting the economies of scale in 
administration by forming Programmes in the RNRRS, it seems likely that such economies 
are even greater at the country level, suggesting that there would be considerable 
advantages in a single in-country office194.   
 DFID will clearly face a considerable challenge in the next phase of research funding, 
whether to build on local institutions within developing countries to improve innovation or 
to set up parallel systems (such as using CPH Programme-like Regional Offices) in each 
developing country or run the whole operation from a UK base.  If the parallel option is 
chosen, an objective of DFID’s investment could be the creation of adequately functioning 
local innovation systems in developing countries at the end of ten years.  This probably 
requires the development of joint partnerships based on local institutions supported by one 
or more external partners. 
Separating Research Fund Management from Project Execution 
 A related question is whether to continue the separation of the management of 
research from doing research.  The CPH Programme provides valuable evidence about the 
advantages and disadvantages of separating the administration of the Programme from the 
execution of projects.  DFID currently appears to favour the so-called Development 
Research Centre (DRC) model, in which there is no separation, as the prime contractor is 
likely to be a research institute, that is, a knowledge supplier rather than a research user or 
indeed a national research organisation.   
 There are good arguments both for and against separation.  From the point of view of 
innovation theory, whatever arrangement is chosen, it should have the facility to fund 
organisations other than research institutes (e.g. users of new knowledge or intermediary 
organisations) and ideally should be allowed to strengthen any element of the innovation 
system within a country.  DFID’s recent DRC arrangements do not necessarily imply that 
 
193 Surr Report, paragraph 165. 
194 It should be noted that some recipient governments are also seeking to reduce transaction costs in research and 
other funding, by insisting on donors pooling their resources in specific nationally controlled ‘funding baskets’.  This 
idea appeared to be particularly advanced in Uganda.  This has the potential for conflict between the aims of centrally 
funded research programmes and the control on who can fund what through basket funding at the country level (see 
also paragraph 154). 
 
  Chapter 8 Lessons for Funding Research 93 
 
research consortia should involve only ‘research’ institutions but they may need to be 
encouraged to seek partners from other parts of the innovation system.   
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 The arrangement under which the CPH Programme was run by NR International has 
not been without its critics and problems of implementation.  However, the separation does 
seem to have provided increased flexibility in implementing an Innovation Systems 
approach.  The innovation literature attaches considerable importance to the role of 
‘intermediary organisations’ and the balance of power relations between the supply side 
and the knowledge side of the innovation system.  This is probably easier to achieve when 
fund management is kept separate. 
 Both DRC and ‘Research Programme Management’ models provide opportunities for 
intellectual leadership, but they are likely to be of different types.  The advantage of DRCs 
is that they can be selected precisely because they are believed to have the intellectual 
capacities to design and implement programmes that make an original contribution to 
knowledge.  The Research Programme managers can also exercise intellectual leadership,  
but probably in a different way, for instance, by managing the processes necessary to 
determine what the needs are, by establishing what others are doing, and by searching out 
and nurturing the individuals and institutions (including coalitions) that can make an 
effective contribution.  However, the extent to which the CPH Programme added value in 
practice by producing international public goods at the Programme level was probably less 
than desired.  As suggested at paragraph 266, there is still more that could be done in the 
next phase to exploit this largely untapped resource.  
Is the IS Approach too Complicated? 
 It is certainly the case that the IS approach is more complicated than administering a 
passive research grant programme.  However, the CPH Programme’s experience shows 
that the passive approach is probably no longer an option if the objective is impact through 
innovation.  The CPH Programme demonstrates the necessity of an interventionist 
approach to the formation of coalitions, that innovation requires capacities to be 
strengthened in many parts of the ‘system’, and engagement between the public and 
private sectors has to be facilitated.  The CPH Programme also demonstrates that the key 
elements of the IS approach are simple, widely understood and that they can be 
implemented effectively even at the level of individual projects. 
Is the IS Approach too Costly? 
 Certainly there are additional costs associated with the proactive interventions 
necessary to bring key actors to work together and to strengthen the weaker elements of the 
system to facilitate innovation.  There is, however, some confusion about the costs 
involved.  In most cases, these are not ‘overheads’ that need reducing, but rather 
‘investments’ in capacities that are necessary for innovation.  The costs may be high, but 
the costs of not doing it are higher.  Only in those innovation systems that are well 
resourced and operating effectively is a passive approach to research funding possible.   
 There are also costs involved with the competitive tendering approach, and these were 
increased by the CPH Programme’s requirements.  Some of these costs were reduced by 
the combination of short concept documents preceding full proposals.  Some other costs 
were reimbursed.  In future, such costs could be lowered by having larger projects and 
longer projects.  Nevertheless, these costs remain a major problem for many partners, 
including the private sector, which cannot afford the time to participate in lengthy 
meetings. 
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 The CPH Programme shows that the way that DFID organises its research is a major 
determinant of its effectiveness.  DFID’s rules and procedures both constrain and empower 
its contractors.  During the field visits, there was a strong sense that both researchers and 
research managers wanted far greater links with DFID’s country offices and country 
programmes195.  While this may well run counter to current rules and philosophy within 
DFID, it appears to be an inevitable consequence of DFID wanting research to have more 
impact on the ground196.   
 The IS literature suggests that organisations such as DFID could add substantial value 
to its research investment if it were to ‘partner’ more effectively with the researchers it 
finances and in some sense ‘own’ the knowledge generated.  Yet, over the period of the 
RNRRS, DFID has largely abrogated this responsibility and, as one researcher 
commented, tended to “contract out its brain”.  This left three major gaps: links between 
research funded by DFID’s Central Research Department and DFID’s other activities in 
developing countries; the lack of ‘ownership’, which has meant that DFID has been unable 
to play its part in feeding these results into the international development process using the 
networks in which it is involved, qua UK government; and it has under-invested in 
systematic cross-Programme efforts, which are necessary to learn from its research 
management experience and use the knowledge gained to strengthen the evolution of the 
Programmes197.   
 At one level, DFID has sought to ‘learn the lessons’ continuously from the CPH 
Programme through its representation on the governance system, namely the PAC, but it is 
likely to need much more than this.  Given the reduction in DFID staff, it is likely to 
require a dedicated team (externally if need be) whose function is not to monitor financial 
and management issues, but to learn the lessons from both the process and product of the 
research DFID finances.  DFID needs to develop the capacity to meet its obligation to feed 
this knowledge into key ‘pressure points’ of the international development process.  
 DFID also probably needs to foster a culture in which research contractors are 
encouraged to report what they have learned rather than report ‘success’.  This latter seems 
to be an unintended consequence of competitive tendering198.  Part of this change in 
culture will mean DFID-funded researchers being rewarded as much for achieving 
poverty-reducing innovation as for the number and quality of their publications.  
 Hopefully, DFID’s role in the international innovation systems will be clarified and 
strengthened in their forthcoming “Science and Innovation Strategy”. 
 
195 DFID makes the point that a closer relationship with DFID country offices might be a mixed blessing.  At worst, it 
might mean that, if contact with the local office was a requirement of future research funding, then refusal of a 
country office to fulfil this role would mean that DFID’s centrally funded research could not take place in that 
country.  Similar points have been made by British researchers who like the fact that DFID does not interfere in the 
decision about what is, and what is not, researched 
196 Certainly there have been people within country programmes that also saw the value of research and were keen to 
both learn from the research and help to disseminate the results.  The same very few names of DFID staff were 
mentioned frequently as being particularly helpful. 
197 This is one of the main conclusions of the RNRRS synthesis study on innovation. 
198 Typical such pressures were described by the Director of a large NGO in south India.  He described himself and 
people like him as “success driven writers” and he believed that “donors only ask if you are successful”.  He 
explicitly stated that for him “incentives are not to report failures and learning”.    
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The Need to Exploit the UK’s comparative advantage 
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 A major challenge for DFID will be how best to exploit the UK’s comparative 
advantage both in funding, and in carrying out, research.  Part of DFID’s comparative 
advantage stems from the potential flexibility of its procedures, from its long experience in 
funding research, and from the capacities of British institutions and people.   
 Although the responsibility for maintaining and building the UK capability in the 
future does not necessarily fall to DFID, it would appear that DFID should have some 
interest in how effectively it is maintained and developed199, not least because many of its 
advisors gained experience and training by undertaking research.  
 The challenge will be to utilise UK capacities in ways that do not infringe the policy 
to ‘untie’ British aid to research, and in ways that complement, rather than undermine, the 
innovation systems of developing countries.  Part of the solution will be to develop a 
clearer idea of what precisely it is that British institutions do best (their current and future 
comparative advantage).  This is discussed in some detail in relation to the CPH 
Programme in Chapter 10.   
Public Goods and the Issue of Access 
 An important lesson for DFID that arises from the CPH Programme concerns access 
to the results of DFID-funded research.  While one of the objectives of DFID centrally 
funded research is to produce ‘public-good knowledge’, there is considerable confusion 
about what this means in practice.  Many UK researchers who were interviewed say they 
face conflicting incentives: either to share their knowledge or to publish in journals that 
help their careers but are largely unavailable in developing countries.  This problem is 
described in more detail in the following chapter.  The lesson for DFID is that there is 
uncertainty and this situation needs to be resolved.  At the least, contractual arrangements 
should be put in place to ensure that, if research outputs are not published within a fixed 
period after the research contract ends (such as a year), then their Final Technical Report 
(that must contain the main results of the research)  and associated data sets can be placed 
on the web by the Programme.   
What Criteria might DFID use to Ensure an Innovation Approach? 
 From this and other chapters it should, in principle, be possible to develop a set of 
criteria that DFID might use in its tendering process to ensure that successful contractors 
adopt an innovation approach.  These might involve making it explicit that bids would be 
favoured that: 
• Give equal weight to poverty-reducing impact and the production of national and 
international public-good knowledge; 
• Guide the allocation of resources by a process of ‘system diagnosis’ and problem 
specification that involved a wide range of stakeholders; 
• Demonstrate how ‘intermediary organisations’ will be utilised to facilitate 
interactions between the producers of new knowledge and the users of new 
knowledge;   
 
199 The question of responsibility for maintaining British capability in science and technology of relevance to 
developing countries was dealt with in part in the recent report of the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Science and Technology. 
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• Develop consortia (or coalitions) in which ‘users’ of new knowledge as well as 
suppliers of such knowledge are fundamentally involved at the outset (and 
distinguish between users of new knowledge and ‘beneficiaries’); 
• Develop networks that facilitate effective, continuous and ‘two-way’ 
communication between the different elements within the innovation system; 
• Develop consortia and networks that go beyond ‘partnerships’ between research 
institutions, and go beyond ‘participation’ just with farmers and other beneficiaries; 
• Involve the full range of skills necessary to solve a problem (particularly ensuring 
that ‘social science’ skills are combined in strategic partnerships with scientific and 
technological institutions that really understand the underlying science and 
technology of the problem they are addressing) and produce international public-
good knowledge;   
• Demonstrate knowledge of, and an ability to build on, the activities of other 
research funders, including local governments; 
• Demonstrate an ability to identify and utilise the UK’s comparative advantage.   
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9 Lessons for Managing Research Programmes 
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 It is not within the terms of reference of this review to examine how well NR 
International has managed the Crop Post-Harvest Programme.  However, many of the 
conclusions from previous chapters have implications for the way that Programmes are 
managed.  This review of the portfolio of projects did provide insights into the issues that 
research-fund managers face in general, but particularly when they take on an Innovation 
Systems approach.   
 The reasons for adopting the ‘Partnerships for Innovation’ approach were discussed in 
Chapter 3.  The CPH Programme has shown itself both willing to learn and willing to 
innovate.  The management has subjected itself to independent review and criticism and 
has adopted a flexible approach that facilitated change.  Once the decision was taken, firm 
actions were taken to steer the staff, project contractors and Regional Offices in the new 
direction.   
 Many of the characteristics and problems of the CPH Programme derive from the 
decisions taken by DFID at the outset of the Programme to divide the funds into particular 
thematic areas, such as crop post-harvest systems, and to locate the management of the 
Programmes in the UK.  In the next round of funding, resources will be allocated to 
‘Regional Research Programmes’ in East, West and Southern Africa as well as South Asia.  
Some problems will disappear while others will increase. 
 If an innovation approach is adopted to these new Programmes, as suggested in the 
previous chapters, the CPH Programme’s experience suggests that the Programmes will 
need to: 
• Take an interventionist approach to programme and project development, including 
support to project development, mentoring and support; 
• Instigate processes for ‘innovation systems diagnosis’, which establishes a vision 
of the strengths and weakness of the processes by which new knowledge is 
transformed into goods and services, but is also able to evolve as greater 
experience is gained.  This will be substantially different from previous 
‘technology needs assessments’;  
• Invest in networks that enable a wide range of stakeholders to engage in the 
innovation process, paying particular attention to seeking the views of a wider 
range of actors, particularly actual and potential users of new knowledge.  This will 
extend ‘participatory processes’ beyond final users (such as farmers) to actors such 
as manufactures, retailers, providers of credit and business development services; 
• Consider investments to strengthen parts of the innovation system in addition to 
those associated with ‘research’; 
• Take a strategic view at the outset about the processes required to produce 
international public goods.  This will involve allocating resources to learn the 
lessons from the processes of innovation, in terms of both the process itself and the 
substantive content, in order to produce national and international public goods, as 
well as transform knowledge into goods and services that reduce poverty.   
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New Areas of Concern 
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 The CPH Programme’s experience indicates four areas of concern: tendering; 
regional versus country representation; Programme-level public-good knowledge; and 
access to new knowledge. 
The Competitive Tendering Model 
 The CPH Programme’s experience shows just how big a challenge it will be for 
Programme Managers to provide a level playing field for the competitive tendering of 
‘research’ contracts.  A guidance note to staff quoted by the Surr Report states that:  
Even with the best will in the world, it will be difficult for many non-British 
institutions, in particular from developing countries, to break into the market for 
DFID research funds.  This is for a variety of reasons (e.g. proposal writing skills, 
familiarity with DFID procedures, scale, culture) and has been demonstrated in 
recent competitions which were not tied200 . 
 This presents a major challenge for research managers in finding ways to enable 
developing-country institutions to learn what DFID (or any other donor) wants, and to set 
up procurement systems in which the value of insider knowledge is limited.  Even where 
there is a separation between management and research, many informal networks exist that 
link some researchers more effectively than others with research funders.  Such 
interactions are inevitable and may well form part of a successful innovation process.  On 
the whole, the CPH Programme managed these relationships effectively, but it was not 
easy and they did not always get it right201.   
 More generally, there were examples of complex power relations between the people 
involved202.  There are clear lessons from this experience.  It will be important to 
acknowledge the existence of these interconnections more explicitly, to find mechanisms 
to build trust with a wider range of players (for instance, by face-to-face contact rather than 
e-mail), and to ensure that such ‘social capital’ does not exclude critically important 
players, just because they are newcomers. 
 The costs of competitive tendering can be large, and the CPH Programme developed 
a number of mechanisms either to minimise them or to fund them, although, as suggested 
in the previous chapter, they remained substantial for many players.  These costs could 
probably be further reduced in consultation with potential bidders and with DFID. 
 The move to regional and country research programmes will provide an opportunity 
for reducing tendering and other transaction costs through the use of ‘programme’ rather 
than ‘project’ funding.  This involves providing larger (though necessarily fewer) grants 
and adopting more of a process model, in which tasks, objectives and outcomes are 
allowed to evolve as the participants gain more knowledge and experience.  In such an 
 
200  Quoted in the Surr Report, paragraph 186, where the reference is given as paragraph 6 of Funding research Post-
Untying: Guidance for Staff, no date, no reference (attached to memo from Phil Marker 23 April 2001. 90 HM letter 
to DFID dated 9 July 2002 setting out DFID’s budget settlement for 2003–06). 
201 DFID’s guidance note cited in footnote 200, goes on to suggest that  “… research and other programme managers 
need to consider whether the objectives of untying could be served by new approaches to research procurement. This 
could include for instance, special programmes with a capacity building objective orientated to developing countries. 
Other imaginative ways of procuring research, and developing research capabilities, in developing countries need to 
be experimented with”.  CPHP seems to have done this. 
202 One sub-set of this issue was the fact that some people were working some of the time as equals in research 
partnerships, while at other times they were working in highly dependent relationships as PhD students with their 
supervisors.   
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approach, a balance has to be struck between exercising accountability and ‘control’ on the 
one hand, and trusting regional and country staff to act responsibly on the other.   
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 However, there are downside consequences of large contracts: one tendency is that 
the winner takes all, as the competitors wither and die due to lack of alternative funds; 
another is that all potential bidders adopt ‘gaming’ responses and form strategic alliances 
so that they all have a high chance of winning something from the tendering process rather 
than having a low chance of winning a great deal. 
 Generally it has been argued earlier that innovation coalition projects need to be 
larger than recent projects of the CPH Programme, not only to reduce the costs of 
tendering but so that each partner can attain a critical mass of effort.   
Country versus Regional Representation 
 It is difficult to believe that the recent CPH Programme would have been possible 
without the Regional Offices.  They have been a considerable success.  However, the CPH 
Programme’s experience points to four areas of concern.  First, there is a tendency for 
Regional Offices to become country offices.  This underlines the importance of a local 
presence and the need for local knowledge to manage innovation effectively.  It is just 
difficult for Regional Offices to gain the same level of understanding and to maintain the 
contacts in other countries in the Region.  Regional Offices tend to do more work near to 
the base office203.  This may well be a major problem for DFID’s future Regional 
Research Programmes and will be compounded by the substantial differences in the 
circumstances facing the individual countries within a region.  While there may be new 
knowledge that is of relevance to a region, a country’s ability to use this knowledge will be 
a function of its own national innovation system, infrastructure and framework conditions.  
 Second, there is a danger that the roles of Regional Offices become confused in the 
minds of governments and contractors as the staff become more involved in projects.  In 
India, for instance, one project praised the catalytic role that the Regional Office played in 
bringing a project coalition into existence and in writing the project proposal, but was 
deeply shocked when the Regional Office staff member “withdrew from the project” and 
was replaced by someone from the UK who “never really understood the project” and did 
not get on with the project manager.  
 Third, the legitimate desire to delegate both funds and decision making to the 
Regional Offices may weaken the overall quality assurance and lesson-learning 
mechanisms at the Programme level.  In the proposed new DFID funding scheme, this 
problem is likely to arise in the relationship between the region and the individual 
countries within the region.  Clearly these systems only work with a high degree of trust, 
but a balance has to be struck between trust and good governance, and between the 
interests of a country Programme and the intellectual needs of the overall Programme. 
 Fourth, from the point of view of the outside observer it appeared that the CPH 
Programme often had difficulty building on, or contributing to, the research activities 
funded by others, such as the host government, other foreign donors, such as the World 
Bank, or even other parts of DFID.  This situation is no doubt eased at one level by local 
in-country representation, but might well lead to greater difficulties in locating new work 
 
203 Of course, this is not always the case, for instance, the Southern Africa Regional Office has undertaken a 
considerable amount of project activity outside Zimbabwe. 
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in the context of work going on in other parts of the world.  The new Regional 
Programmes have the potential to contribute to the region but it seems likely that particular 
mechanisms will have to be put in place to ensure that they also contribute to the global 
effort.   
Investing in Learning to Produce Programme Public-Good Knowledge 
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 Much has been made in previous chapters of the need to invest funds at the 
Programme level in order to compare and contrast the results of similar projects across a 
number of countries and to synthesise the results for a wider audience.  This is not an 
inherent weakness of the research management model, but does point to the need for future 
programmes to plan specifically for, and invest in, the extraction of these public-good 
knowledge products.   
 DFID itself argues for this type of synthesis when it says in its new Research 
Framework, “as part of our research programmes, we will support synthesis reviews of 
available knowledge.  Synthesis reviews that distil and evaluate available evidence can 
greatly facilitate objective decision-making by policymakers and technology users – many 
of whom are bombarded by a wealth of (often) conflicting information” (paragraph 52). 
 While it remains important for the funding body to be able to terminate support for 
lines of inquiry that reach a dead-end, even more might have been achieved if there had 
been a more strategic vision of what had to be achieved at the level of both a whole 
country and the whole programme.  In such a case, each project might have been viewed 
as part of a pre-planned sequence designed to achieve a bigger goal204. 
 The shift in focus to regional programmes will require mechanisms to be put in place 
to communicate with, and learn from, other regional programmes.  The possibility of 
duplication of effort between regions is likely to be greatly increased under the next round 
of DFID research funding.  
Access to ‘Public-Good’ Documentation 
 In the course of this review, a large number of documents were examined.  In general, 
the project proposal documents and Logical Frameworks were informative.  However, this 
was less so with the Final Technical Reports (FTRs), whose usefulness varied 
considerably.  The format of the FTR has been changed over the years, but it would seem 
that researchers have very different views about what should and should not be put in it.  
At one level, it would appear that project teams have a contractual obligation to put the 
results of their research into the public domain, together with major data sets (or at least to 
say where the data sets are located).  At another level, there are researchers who are 
concerned to minimise what is put in the FTR so as not to jeopardise their chance of 
publishing the results in peer-reviewed scientific journals.  There appears to be no evidence 
that ‘prior publication’ of results in a FTR (even if it were put on the web) has ever in fact 
prevented subsequent publication in a journal.  FTRs are sent out for independent review 
and are sent back to the authors for revision where there are major concerns.  There do not 
appear to have been cases where the final project payments have been denied on the 
 
204 Peter Golob, a member of the PAC, expressed a similar view when he argued that: “The absence of a consistent 
strategy from the outset of the Programme led to inappropriate planning, which prevented some longer-term outputs 
being achieved by the termination of project clusters.  Future programmes would be more effective if composed of 
fewer but larger and longer projects. Such an approach would allow even relatively academic, upstream research to 
progress towards practical implementation and yet be regularly monitored to ensure achievement of milestones and 
objectives”: see his Thematic review of the loss reduction projects funded by the Crop Post-Harvest Programme, 
draft, August 2004 (storage technologies). 
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grounds that the FTR did not achieve an acceptable standard or did not cover what was 
specified in the contract.  Surprisingly, the PAC’s own review of its effectiveness205 notes 
that even they did not see FTRs routinely, even though many were reviewed by individual 
PAC members. 
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 Many researchers remarked on the conflicting incentives that they faced.  For many 
of them, promotion depended on the number and quality of their scientific publications, 
while the incentive for other project partners (and indeed the funder) was that the research 
should have an impact on poor people, and would have its greatest impact when put into 
the public domain.  It seems likely that these conflicting incentive structures could be 
resolved either by the research fund manager or by DFID.  In particular, it would appear 
that contractual arrangements should be put in place to ensure that, if research outputs are 
not published within a fixed period after the research contract ends (such as a year), then 
the Final Technical Report and associated data sets will be placed on the web.  In response 
to a House of Commons Select Committee, this would now appear to be Government 
policy206. 
 
 
205 see paragraph 397 below. 
206 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/235/23504.htm.  Recommendation 
paragraph 27. 
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 The portfolio of projects provides valuable insights into the changing role of 
organisations and individuals in northern industrialised countries in contributing to the 
CPH Programme.  Although NRI at the University of Greenwich has been the major 
source of expatriate input to the CPH Programme, a number of other British institutions 
have managed projects and supplied individual researchers.  The comments that follow 
therefore do not refer exclusively to NRI. 
 Undoubtedly British institutions and people have provided high-quality research and 
made a valuable contribution to the Programme.  However, as described in Chapter 3, they 
have also suffered considerable hardship in recent years as the proportion of DFID 
research funds that they have attracted has fallen.   
 During the review, it was striking just how much developing countries resented the 
huge differences in the proportion of project funds going to UK staff and institutions.  
Researchers in all countries mentioned this and referred to all UK institutions.  It was a 
considerable area of conflict.  In some of the early cases, it seems likely that attempts were 
explicitly made to minimise these conflicts by keeping budgets secret..  However, in more 
recent projects, the balance of funding seems to be more transparent and equal.  This has 
been accompanied by strenuous efforts to ensure that developing-country researchers are 
acknowledge as joint authors in the CPH Programme’s publications.  This is highly 
appreciated. 
 However, the fact remains that the costs of doing research in the UK and other 
industrialised countries are far higher than in developing countries.  In some cases, the 
CPH Programme’s contribution to a single expatriate exceeded the total budget available 
to the crop post-harvest research institutions funded by the local government207.  
Ultimately it became untenable to have expatriates spending long periods of time resident 
in developing countries.  
UK Institutions’ ‘Comparative Advantage’ 
 The relative costs of researchers in the north and south focuses attention on a key 
question of the so-called ‘comparative advantage’ of foreign (UK) institutions.  The CPH 
Programme is able to shed light on this.  From an analysis of a large number of interviews, 
it is clear that the major contribution of UK expertise to the CPH Programme is widely 
recognised and highly valued.  The main advantages of institutions in industrialised 
countries were reported to be their ability to: contribute experience from a wider and 
longer international experience; synthesise experience across a number of countries and 
regions; write reports that are credible to international policy makers (World Bank, DFID, 
EU, FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation)); and raise funds.  UK institutions have 
also provided rapid and flexible procurement of equipment and services, and provide 
‘protection’ for local researchers in sensitive areas of research. 
 The following list provides a summary of the major positive contributions mentioned 
in interviews of researchers: 
 
207 This appears to be the case with Dr Raman’s IGMRI Hyderabad, and at the Food Research Institute in Ghana. 
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• ‘Policing’.  It was felt that a foreign institution was more able to ensure compliance 
with contract terms and timetables than indigenous organisations (who were aware 
that they would have to work with the same colleagues for many years to come and 
may well need them as allies in future).  Indeed some of the criticism levelled at 
expatriates is now being levelled at locally based managing partners. 
• ‘Technical back stopping’.  In particular, it was recognised that foreign researchers 
were able to contribute experience from a wider and longer international 
experience. 
• Fund raising.  Many respondents in developing countries specifically mentioned 
NRI’s ability to attract funds, particularly in recent years from the EU.  This was 
extremely valuable (especially as the EU terms usually required partners from at 
least two European countries). 
• Rapid procurement.  UK institutions in general, and NRI in particular, were 
complimented on their ability to procure and deliver equipment and consumables 
very quickly indeed, and being able to bypass the complex and time-consuming 
rules that apply to Ghanaian and Indian institutions. 
• Training for MSc and PhD.  Despite the fact that ‘training’ was generally not 
allowed in DFID centrally funded research projects, it appears that northern 
partners had found ways to provide and fund MSc and PhD training for 
developing-country researchers.  This was much appreciated as promotion often 
depends on such qualifications.  However, some senior staff in developing 
countries thought that short-course training was often more valuable.  As British 
institutions derive income from these training activities, great care needs to be 
exercised to see that there are no conflicts of interest in the choice of candidates or 
the types of course on which they are placed. 
• Cash flow.  Some UK institutions appear to be able to carry project cash flow that 
many organisations (particularly NGOs) cannot208.   
• Sophisticated equipment.  Where very advanced science, or esoteric procedures, 
are involved, UK institutions were seen as providing particularly useful inputs.  
• Sensitive policy advice.  This was said to be more easily provided by expatriate 
organisations where such advice is either highly political in the developing-country 
context or highly sensitive within DFID.  
• Independent validation.  UK institutions were said to supply a valuable service by 
providing independent validation or corroboration of sensitive research results (this 
was cited in the case of heavy metals found in food crops in India).  Indian 
institutions were said to be quite able to undertake the analyses, but need foreign 
support to avoid the charge of bias. 
• Specialist advocacy skills.  It was suggested that UK institutions were particularly 
skilled at writing scientific and other reports that were designed to influence 
international policy makers (World Bank, DFID, EU, FAO). 
The Lessons Learned 
390.
                                                
 There would seem to be a pressing need for British institutions (and for DFID) to 
define more clearly where their comparative advantage lies, and to find mechanisms 
through which their contribution can be made on a sustained basis and at reasonable cost.  
 
208 NR International does now also allow early invoicing. 
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 The House of Common Select Committee on Science and Technology has underlined 
the necessity for the British Government (rather than DFID alone) to take responsibility for 
ensuring that British capacity to contribute effectively to reducing poverty in developing 
countries is maintained and further developed. 
 Given that some UK institutions were involved in a number of similar projects, it 
would appear that they could usefully have been funded to do more to exploit this 
advantage and draw out the lessons from their experience in many countries.  However, 
there are sensitivities here and it would have to be done in such a way that it is not 
perceived as exploiting the research of developing countries. 
 More generally, the UK is said to be the world leader in multidisciplinary 
development studies: it may be that the production of international public-good knowledge 
for the institutional lessons learned at the project level is part of the UK comparative 
advantage.  However, even if this is so in the short run, it will be important in the next 
phase to make sure that this capacity is also developed in Africa over the next ten years . 
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 The CPH Programme set up a governance structure that included a Programme 
Advisory Committee.  The CPH Programme was said to be the only one of the RNRRS 
Programmes to expand the membership of its PAC to include people from developing 
countries.   
 More generally, this is in keeping with the IS approach, which suggests that 
successful innovation requires changes in the governance of the research programmes to 
prevent ‘capture’ by any one particular interest group, and particularly to strengthen the 
voice of what might be called the ‘users’ of new knowledge.  This implies the need to 
widen the representation on future PACs both in the UK and in country or regional 
programmes.  It is now common practice in Europe to widen the range of people who 
perform these governance and referee functions to include those in the productive and 
service sectors as well as research and public-sector staff.  The increase in information and 
communication technology makes this more feasible. 
 The PAC made, or supported, changes in the strategic direction of the Programme in 
many ways.  In retrospect, though, it seems the PAC might have been more insistent that 
the Programme added value to the research work both at the level of larger cross-cutting 
themes and indeed whole countries.  Furthermore, while huge effort was put into the 
appraisal of proposals, there was probably a need to increase the inputs to the quality 
assurance processes at the end of projects in relation to project documentation and the 
generation of international public goods209. 
 These and other lessons from the experience of the Programme Advisory Committee 
have been usefully drawn out in their own publication: The Crop Post-Harvest Programme 
Advisory Committee: a review 1995–2004, by John Coulter and Frank Almond, July 2004.  
In summary, those most relevant to the current exercise would appear to be: 
• The issue of science.  “There were always active concerns about ‘balance’; and in 
particular whether the PAC was paying enough attention to the bigger picture in 
science terms.  Specifically, the need to ensure that the overall pattern of research 
reflected international priorities, and that it was ‘additive’ in the sense that it filled 
genuine gaps, and complemented existing knowledge.  There was also concern 
that, whatever the balance of issues, a scientific research approach should not be 
neglected.”   
• Lesson learning.  “More opportunities could have been made to share lessons 
across programmes at a PAC level, to have improved project lesson-learning 
through more systematic reporting back, and to have had more structured links to 
DFID to improve policy debate.”  
• “Lesson-learning could have been more deliberately factored in.  The fact that 
project Final Technical Reports were not circulated to the PAC, for example, 
hampered their ability to monitor the success of the Programme.  In retrospect, 
more opportunity should have been created for an exchange of experiences and 
lessons between research programmes at a PAC-to-PAC level.  The absence of this 
 
209 It has been pointed out that a large number of FTRs were reviewed by individual members of the PAC. 
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probably reflects a more general lack of contact at a programme-to-programme 
level.” 
• Strategic advice to DFID.  “The PAC constitutes a large body of specialist 
expertise, and there was some sense that not enough opportunity was taken – either 
by the PAC or by DFID being more proactive – to make use of that expertise in 
policy dialogue.  A separate channel of communication would have helped, since 
there was reluctance to use PAC meetings for wider ranging debates on issues that 
might have ranged beyond the PAC’s immediate responsibilities, or which might 
have detracted from the DFID/Programme Manager relationship.  Indeed, such a 
mechanism might have been useful at a cross-programme level.  The PAC also felt 
that it could have been more proactive in building links with the other DFID 
programmes.” 
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 This review describes the bold and imaginative process by which the staff of DFID’s 
Crop Post-Harvest Programme have transformed the way they work.  They have 
effectively transformed the Programme from one that focused on research and the delivery 
of scientific knowledge, to one focused on ‘innovation’, that is, on the generation and 
transformation of new knowledge into goods and services that reduce poverty.  This 
experience in applying an Innovation Systems approach to research management provides 
lessons for the future of British development research and guidance to the managers of 
research programmes and projects.  
 Some of the opposition to the innovation approach seems to be based on a 
misunderstanding.  It is not a new fad, nor is it ‘anti science’.  It is a summary of best 
practice in many countries over many years for integrating scientific and other knowledge 
into the continuous improvement of production of goods and services.  It certainly involves 
a different perspective, a different set of incentives, and changes in power relations 
between the various actors.  It is about evolution, learning from experience, networks and 
the operation of systems.   
 Innovation requires a systems perspective and the allocation of resources based on a 
‘systems diagnosis’.  This diagnosis can be simple or complex (adopting different ‘fractal 
levels’ of analysis depending on the resources available and how wide the problem 
boundaries are set).  It also requires a vision of the strengths and weaknesses of the system 
involved in effective innovation, rather than a focus on narrowly defined ‘research’. 
 Whether or not the Innovation Systems approach to research management is in some 
sense better than any other must surely depend on what the objective is.  If DFID wants its 
investment in research to achieve poverty impacts, then this is most likely to be achieved 
through adequately functioning ‘innovation systems’.  If innovation is the objective, then 
the world has a huge experience about how to do it.  Yet it does mean that it is critically 
important (as the RNRRS Evaluation also concludes) for DFID to specify clearly what it 
wants to achieve from its research investment.   
 The CPH Programme demonstrates that the innovation approach can, in principle, 
provide both ‘impact’ and public-good knowledge at both the national and international 
level.  However, the research evaluation literature shows that attributing particular research 
investments to particular impacts is difficult, if not impossible.  The innovation systems 
literature tells us that innovation of any kind is going to be difficult with existing 
framework conditions and lack of infrastructure facing developing countries.  It is unlikely 
that individual programmes, let alone projects, can buck international trends that are 
operating against poor people in renewable natural resource systems. 
 The recent experience of the CPH Programme also demonstrates the dangers of 
innovation investments being overly focused on short-term impact at the local level.  The 
evidence shows that, to obtain the greatest value from this investment, it is necessary to 
devote resources explicitly to the learning processes needed to extract the higher-level 
generalisation about both the process (programme management and innovation) and the 
content of the innovation process.  The CPH Programme’s experience suggests that these 
learning processes probably need specialists who can link local research results to the 
wider international experience.   
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 Experience shows that successful innovation requires high-quality science, but it is 
likely that, if an innovation approach is adopted, the focus of the scientific research will 
change, as a result of the continuous interaction between researchers and other elements of 
the innovation system.  This also suggests that a very flexible and evolutionary approach to 
Programme finance and management will be required. 
 This review of the CPH Programme’s experience shows that, if the objective is the 
reform of national agricultural research systems to enable them to contribute more 
effectively to poverty-reducing innovation, this will require a wider range of instruments, 
beyond those of narrowly defined ‘research’ projects.  Many of the problems faced by 
research systems derive from the incentives and disincentives facing the various actors in 
the system.  These probably need to be addressed directly using the instruments associated 
with good governance and institutional reform.  Successful innovation requires a shift of 
power from a narrower to a wider set of actors and changes in the governance of resources 
to prevent ‘capture’ by any one particular interest group.  This in turn raises important 
questions about whose (research) priorities are to be met, and who wins and who loses 
from research and the process of change.   
 Strengthening innovation systems in developing countries is a large task.  It will 
inevitably involve strengthening local scientific, technological and other capacities.  This 
will be expensive and will require long-term commitment.  This points to the need for 
DFID to work with other donors at the international level, and to facilitate research funding 
groups at the national level that include governments, other donors and Foundations etc.  
More importantly, it suggests that DFID itself has a major role (and responsibility) to learn 
from the experience of DFID-funded research and feed it into the international 
development process.   
 The future of DFID’s funding for research faces two major challenges.  First, whether 
to provide its finance through existing national or regional organisations in developing 
countries, or whether to set up new institutions such as Regional Offices (or UK-based 
programmes) in parallel to existing institutions.  Second, how to identify and better utilise 
the UK’s comparative advantage in this endeavour.  
 Much valuable work has been undertaken by the CPH Programme that is likely to 
have favourable consequences for many years to come, even if direct poverty-reducing 
impact is difficult to attribute to particular projects at this time.  DFID’s current intention to 
fund a “facility to add value to this massive resource” is certainly supported by the findings 
of this review. 
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Annex 1. Terms of Reference 
The original terms of reference (dated 4 July 2003) and the work plan were revised to 
enable more time to elapse for project impact to occur in the response to the extension of 
the RNRRS to 31 March 2006.   
Summary 
A1. The evaluation will be undertaken to extract the positive and negative lessons that 
can be learned from the way that the CPH Programme has evolved over its lifetime.  
This will involve two sets of semi-structured interviews in the UK and developing 
countries: the first, to be undertaken in 2003, will examine a sample of completed 
projects; and the second will examine a sample of ongoing projects towards their 
completion in the last half of 2004.  An interim progress report will be completed early 
in 2004, and a final report will be produced at the end of 2005.  The final report will be 
summarised in a number of different forms to meet the needs of different audiences.  
The evaluation will be undertaken by Andrew Barnett of Sussex Research Associates 
Ltd.  Staff of NR International both in the UK and overseas will contribute to the 
activities as specified below. 
Purpose 
A2. The purpose of this activity is to undertake an evaluation of the Crop Post-Harvest 
Programme as a whole, in order to add value by extracting the positive and negative 
lessons that can be learned from the various approaches that have been used, 
particularly from the traditional form of research contracts, through the ‘Partnerships for 
Innovation’ approach to project management, and the ‘coalition approach’ to project 
design and implementation, to the current National Systems of Innovation approach. 
The Questions to be Addressed 
A3. According to the current Log Frame, the purpose of the CPH Programme is that 
“national and international crop post-harvest innovation systems respond more 
effectively to the needs of the poor”.   
A4. This suggests that the key lessons to be learned should focus on whether the new 
approach is in some sense more effective than the previous one.  This in turn requires 
the evaluation exercise to elaborate the essential elements of the new approach, the 
extent to which these elements are addressed in the new projects, the elaboration of the 
changing nature of outcomes that are to be achieved more effectively and what 
improvements can be expected. 
A5. DFID’s funds usually form only a small part of the resources currently going into 
any particular innovation sub-system, and it will therefore be difficult if not impossible 
to ascribe any particular outcome to DFID’s limited input.  Furthermore, in addition to 
the well known problems of ‘attribution’, the limited lapsed time between the start of 
the CPH Programme’s new projects and the evaluation further limit what can be 
expected in terms of observable change.   
A6. While the purpose of DFID centrally funded research has always been the reduction 
of poverty in developing countries, the new approaches place greater emphasis on 
‘process outcomes’ such as changes in the behaviour of systems, the building of 
 
112 Annex 1 Terms of Reference 
capacities and ‘institutional learning’, rather than the production of research papers or 
the development of a new device or technique (or even than direct poverty reduction).  
It is unlikely that it will be possible to determine quantitative links between inputs and 
outcomes in statistically significant terms.   
A7. In sum, the aim will be to go beyond projects and regions to the level of the whole 
programme in order to derive ‘higher-level generalisations’ about the ‘lessons learned’ 
rather than to provide a blueprint for best practice. 
Tasks  
A8. Task 1. Developing a common understanding of the “new model”.  A process 
involving the preparation of papers and presentations to the CPH Programme’s staff in 
the UK and overseas to develop a clear and commonly held view about the approaches 
used by CPH Programme and the extent to which they reflect ‘innovation system’ 
thinking.   
A9. It is understood that many of the coalition projects have been developed 
‘organically’ through processes of negotiation and therefore reflect differing contexts 
and differing interpretations of the underlying principles of innovation systems. 
A10. Task 2. Baseline analyses of a sample of coalition projects.  In order to extract the 
lessons from the experience provided by the programme’s ongoing portfolio of projects 
document baseline information.  Advice will be provided as to how this process can 
form an extension of routine project monitoring processes and so that it provides a 
benchmark against which to examine changes resulting from the projects’ activities.  
This baseline work will be carried out by September 2003 by project teams with the 
assistance of the Regional Coordinators and written advice has already been provided as 
to how these need to be improved.  
A11. The baselines will identify those elements of the ‘innovation systems’ in which the 
current crop of new projects is operating, and in which elements have been targeted for 
change.  As a minimum, each baseline will provide some institutional mapping of the 
innovation sub-system in which each project activity is taking place so as to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current ‘system’ and identify those weak or missing 
elements of organisational partnerships, institutional capacity, knowledge, or enabling 
environment that are to be addressed during the project.    
A12. Task 3. A backward look using a ‘NSI lens’.  This will be a relatively quick and 
largely subjective examination of a sample of the portfolio of the previous 7 years 
project activity within the CPH Programme.  The aim will be to try to explain subjective 
impressions of success/failure in terms of the existence or absence of the various 
elements of the innovation systems (and partnerships) in which the activity took place.  
It is believed that many elements of the portfolio of completed projects were 
‘successful’ both in their own terms or in the wider terms of successful innovation, 
institutional learning and behavioural change.  The hypothesis is that these successes 
and failures were in part due to the existence or absence of the other parts of the 
‘system’ necessary for successful innovation.  Clearly successful research can lead to 
innovation even if the inputs to the process are not seen by the participants as forming 
part of a knowledge or innovation system. 
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A13. This task will be carried out primarily by Andrew Barnett with the assistance of 
the Regional Coordinators.  A sample of projects will be examined in three of the four 
regions (Ghana, India and either Uganda or Zimbabwe).  Visits will last approximately 
14 days and will take place between September 1st and November 31st 2003. 
A14. The sample will be agreed in advance by the evaluator and the CPH Programme’s 
staff.  The sample will be drawn on the basis of a sampling frame developed by the CPH 
Programme’s staff in the UK (with the assistance of Michael Flint).  This will list all 
completed projects (projects relating to the same topic may be grouped together if this 
adds clarity) and score them according to two sets of indicators: conventional evaluation 
indicators including impact and uptake, and indicators of the extent to which the 
projects contain characteristics of the National Systems of Innovation Approach.  It is 
anticipated that an initial draft of this sampling frame will be available early in 
September 2003. 
A15. The findings of this first part of the evaluation will be written up in a short report 
(with country annexes) in the early part of 2004. 
A16. Task 4. ‘Coalition project evaluations’.  This task will be the main lesson learning 
evaluation of a sample of coalition projects that will take place towards the end of each 
project’s existence (i.e. towards the end of 2005).  This task will again be undertaken by 
Andrew Barnett with the assistance of the Regional Coordinators.  It is expected that 
these evaluations will be undertaken in partnership with the project teams and in 
consultation with other stakeholders.  
A17. The total population of recent projects in three of the four regions would be 
examined (probably the same three countries as visited in task 3).  Visits will last 
approximately 14 days and will take place between September 1st and November 31st 
2004. 
A18. Efforts will also be made to consult key stakeholders in the relevant innovation 
systems, including those not directly involved as coalition partners.  Consideration 
might also be given to enabling each Regional Coordinator to contribute to the 
evaluation of other regions. 
A19. Task 5. The Final Report.  The final report would be the responsibility of Andrew 
Barnett.  It will be a two step process in which a first draft (produced at the end of 2004) 
will be circulated to primary stakeholders (including the Programme management and 
Regional Coordinators) for comment, and a final version would be produced in the light 
of comments received.  The final report will not exceed 30 pages (excluding annexes) 
[this was subsequently changed to 100 pages].   
A20. In the spirit of the innovation system thinking it will be important to tailor 
different versions of the final report to meet the needs of a number of different 
audiences.  This may include stakeholders in the National Systems of Innovation in 
developing countries, CPH researchers, DFID, and the wider international community 
involved and the management of research and the strengthening of innovation systems. 
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Annex 2. Interview Guide Sheet 
Semi Structured Interview Guide.  Revised May 2005 
1. Briefly describe the history of the project – were there different project phases 
that should be considered together.  
2. By what process was the project identified: 
a. who identified the project – whose problem was it, etc, did it follow from 
needs studies, earlier work or previous relationships. 
3. Which institutions received DFID funds from the project:  
a. who are the main coalition partners in each project  – how were they 
identified and selected; 
b. who are the stakeholders who did not become coalition members 
(informal partners, paid and unpaid); 
c. have coalition partners worked together before; 
d. were other resources contributed by others:  
i. ‘In kind’ contributions;  
ii. Other donors (‘co-funding’); 
iii. Ghana government resources; 
iv. Private sector. 
4. What is the nature of partnership (who controls budget, what are the power 
relations – signing off on quality etc –  
a. what has been the changing relationship with NR International over time 
(covering changing power relations, responsibilities, share of budgets, 
roles of each partner etc);  
b. how were these changes manifest  (what drove these changes – were 
these changes coming from DFID); 
c. do they perceive a change from ‘traditional’ research funding to the 
Partners for Innovation approach – do they recognise the terms, why do 
they think it occurred. 
5. How does the DFID/CPH Programme compare with other donors from whom 
they receive funds (if any) now and before.  Who is the ‘best’ donor (why).  
6. What would they regard as the ‘successes’ of the project: initially leave open the 
many types of possible success, then prompt: 
a. scientific papers (additions to the stock of knowledge); 
b. capability development (who, how, what evidence); 
c. building coalitions; 
d. sustained uptake by knowledge users; 
e. sustained uptake by ‘end users’ – ‘beneficiaries’; 
f. changes in ‘policy’; 
g. indicators of the impact in the reduction of poverty; 
h. changes in physical and biological environment. 
7. What was the uptake model – actual or implied, at outset / now.  Contrast: 
a. a ‘linear dissemination model’ versus  
b. an interactive ‘NSI business model’ that takes up the project’s results on 
a sustainable basis 
i. Who developed it;  
ii. Was it the result of the project. 
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8. Who performs the ‘intermediate functions’ necessary to interact between 
suppliers and users of new knowledge. And between poor people and service 
providers (prompt with diagram if necessary). 
9. What is the condition (strengths and weakness) of the NSI system or ‘enabling 
environment’ in which the project operates (institutional and organisational 
capability, initial conditions etc):   
a. is the situation improving or deteriorating;   
b. are there ‘macro effects’ (drought, sector reform) that swamp the effects 
of the research;  
c. the nature of formal and informal networks (improving/deteriorating). 
10. Are ‘capabilities’ being built (and if so how – what works) 
a. in host organisation; 
b. in partners; 
c. in the rest of the ‘system’. 
11. Do organisations behave differently now compared to when the project started – 
how much was this the result of this project 
a. DFID rules or objectives changed; 
i. what evidence / what mechanisms; 
b. do they perceive changes to the CPH Programme’s rules / objectives 
changed; 
i. what evidence / what mechanisms; 
c. the ‘rules of the game’ from other parts of the system. 
12. If they had their time over again, how would they do things differently (what 
have they learned). 
a. what would they consider to be an ideal funding arrangement (project 
versus core funding, funds for overheads, capacity building etc); 
b. larger amounts for fewer projects; 
c. direct relations with DFID/High Commission. 
13. Do they need an overseas (UK) partner  
a. what is the value added by these institutions; 
b. do they provide value for money; 
c. what could they contribute that they currently do not.. 
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Annex 3. An Impact Matrix 
The idea of the Matrix was to find a simple way to summarise a large sample of the CPH 
Programme’s old and new projects in terms of two sets of indicators.  The first set was 
based on the ‘normal’ impact indicators used in the CPH Programme’s  Final Technical 
Reports (see first Box following).  The second set was indicators of the extent to which 
each project contains the elements of ‘best practice’ defined by the ‘National Systems of 
Innovation’ literature – that is its ‘NSI-ness’ (see second Box following)210.  It was hoped 
that, by comparing the two sets of indicators across a large sample of projects, it would be 
possible to provide insights into the key task of the study as to whether the new approach is 
in some sense more effective than the previous, more traditional, one. 
The indicators of ‘NSI-ness’(henceforth ‘IS scores’) were designed to be cumulative, in the 
sense that those projects that exhibit more indicators could be said to have the greatest 
chance of achieving innovation.  Also, they were sequential, in the sense that each 
indicator is easier to achieve than the indicator that follows. 
While certain insights were obtained from this process, in the event, the construction of the 
whole matrix proved unworkable.  This is described in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                 
210 Initially, the term National Systems of Innovation (NSI) was used, as this is the term used in the literature, but this 
was changed to Innovation Systems (IS) as the study progressed, as this better reflected innovation systems at the 
sub-national and project level. 
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Indicators of Impact211
 
1. Institutional uptake 
What do we know about the uptake of research outputs by other intermediary 
organisations or projects (local, national, regional or international)?  What 
uptake by which organisations/projects where? Give details and information 
sources. 
2. End-user uptake 
What do we know about the uptake of research outputs by end-users? Which 
end-users, how many, and where? Give details and information sources. 
3. Impact rating – knowledge 
What do we know about the impact of the project on the stock of knowledge? 
What is the new knowledge? How significant is it? What is the evidence for this 
judgement? 
4. Impact rating – institutional 
What do we know about the impact on institutional capacity? What impact on 
which organisations, and where? Give details and information sources. 
5. Impact rating – policy 
What do we know about any impact on policy, law or regulations? What impact 
and where? Give details and information sources. 
6. Impact rating – poverty 
What do we know about any impact on poverty or poor people? What impact on 
how many people where? Give details and information sources. 
7. Impact rating – environment 
What do we know about any impact on the environment? What impact and 
where? Give details and information sources. 
8. Impact and uptake information 
Details and sources.  What specific exercises, if any, have been undertaken to 
determine uptake or impact.  Give references if any. 
 
 
                                                 
211  These indicators were developed in consultation with Michael Flint, CPHP advisor on Monitoring and 
Evaluation. 
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Indicators of ‘NSI-ness’ or IS scores 
 
1. Suppliers and users of ‘codified knowledge’ centrally involved.   
Does the project contain organisations (or individuals) in some form of 
partnership212 (or coalition, or strategic alliance of mutual benefit) that cover 
both the provision of ‘codified knowledge’ (usually an R&D institution) and the 
use of such knowledge213? 
2. User needs understood.   
Genuine and continuous involvement of all ‘end-users’ (producer, consumer or 
processor) to assist in the determination of the initial problem and to provide 
iterative feedback as innovation evolves. 
3. Investment in ‘system’ development 
Project involves significant expenditure in non-R&D organisations, 
and/or Project documentation contains an explicit objective to 
develop innovation system (at Project Concept, and/or Log Frame). 
4. Intermediary functions performed 
One or more ‘intermediary organisation’ (or organisation that performs 
intermediary functions – likely to be a consulting firm, an NGO, or a CBO) 
actively involved in coalition to assist two-way communication between 
knowledge suppliers and users, and or facilitate the new use of knowledge by 
the end-user individuals or organisations. 
5. Financially sustainable delivery system exists 
Innovation system contains, or explicitly develops, a financially viable (and 
socially and environmentally sustainable?) business model214 to supply the 
innovative technology or service (this probably involves one or more 
manufacturers, service providers, credit suppliers, and providers of technical 
assistance to users). 
6. Learning results from iterative action research 
Project exhibits an iterative process that enables the organisations within the 
system to learn and improve their performance (such a project is likely to be 
associated with changes in the project log frame as the diagnosis of the 
‘problem’ improves and possible responses – ‘solutions’ – evolve). 
7. Pro-poor innovation takes place 
Viable innovative use of new technologies and/or new ways of doing things 
observed to take place on a financially, socially and environmentally sustained 
basis (as a result of the project) that demonstrably improves the livelihoods of 
poor people.  If this occurs, the innovations system clearly works effectively. 
8. Rules of the game changed 
Project results in changes in the institutional arrangements (‘rules of the game’) 
by which the various organisations in the system operate.  This might also 
include changes in the Framework Conditions in which the Innovation System 
exists. 
9. Infrastructure strengthened 
Aspects of the infrastructure that supports and enables the innovation system 
to operate effectively are strengthened (not only are micro-credit organisations 
brought into the coalition of actors, but micro-credit services are strengthened, 
for example). 
                                                 
212  There is a huge literature on what constitutes a ‘partnership’: see, for instance, KFPE, Guidelines for Research in 
Partnership with Developing Countries: 11 principles, KFPE, Berne, Switzerland, 1998. 
213  Suppliers and users of codified knowledge are difficult to distinguish in practice (most organisations do both) ,  
but they do help to identify those R&D institutions (suppliers) that try to operate on their own, pushing new 
knowledge down an ‘uptake pathway’ that does not exist. 
214  The business model could involve extensive government subsidy, particularly to poor people – the key is that 
there is a delivery mechanism that is financially sound and responsive to the needs of poor people. 
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Annex 4. Principal People Interviewed 
Ghana 
Dr Ben Dadzie, Regional Co-ordinator, West Africa. 
David Crenstil, MoFA. 
Panni Johnson,  MoFA. 
Vincent Akoto, MoFA, IMT. 
Rexford Quaye, DFID, Ghana. 
Paa Nii Johnson, FRI. 
Stephanie Gallat, NRI.   
Dr William Ellis, University of S and T at Kumasi. 
Mr Fuseini Haruna Andan (‘Prince’), MoFA Tamale.  
James Atarigiya, MoFA Bolgatanga.   
Chris Avoka, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation. 
Salifu Zibilim, Bogatanga MoFA.   
Sam Addo, Independent consultant, LGB grouping.  
Dr Plahar, Director of the Food Research Institute.  
Ms Emma Spicer, Deputy Director DFID, Ghana. 
Mrs Wilhelmina Quaye, Socio-economist at FRI. 
Joseph Gayin, Processing and Engineering Division of FRI.  
Seidu Ali Sampare, Engineering Department, FRI.  
Ramatu Maham Al-Hassan, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Ghana, 
Legon. 
Dr Nanam Tay Dziedzoave, FRI. 
 
Kenya 
Pascal Kaumbutho, Kendat.  
Eston Murithi, Kendat. 
Chairs of ‘Community Parliaments’, namely, John Njongoro, Chair of Mwea Transport 
and Marketing Organisation; Lennox Barasa, Busia Integrated Agriculture and 
Marketing Forum; Philip Kilaki, Kalama Donkey Users Association. 
Peter Njenga, IFRTD. 
Rahab Mundara, ITDG. 
William Gachanja, Zuzuka Ltd, three-wheeled motor bikes. 
Stephen Muthua, ASSIST, ILO. 
 
Zambia 
Dr Rodah Zulu, NISIR. 
Mr Brighton Sinkala: District Health Management Team. 
Mr Abraham Chiwana, Economist, Ministry of Trade And Industry. 
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Mr Albert Nsonda, Environmental Health Officer, Lusaka City Council. 
Ms Alinesi Chakwinja, NISIR. 
Josephine Mulenga, Environmental Health Officer, Lusaka City Council.  
Mrs Avet Hakalims, Environmental Health Officer, Lusaka City Council. 
Mr Fordson Nyaenda, Central Board of Health, Environmental Health Specialist. 
Mrs Christabel Malijani, Ministry of Health: Chief Policy Analyst, Food Safety. 
Food sellers in Soweto and other Zambian markets. 
Jennifer Chanda Yuyi, Chelston Market. 
Joseph Ssuuna, Secretary General of Pelum. 
 
Zimbabwe 
Ms Tafadzwa Marange, Regional Co-ordinator, Southern Africa. 
Mr Charles Dhewa, Communications Officer, Southern Africa Regional Office. 
Ms Sindiso Ndlovu, Personal Assistant, Southern Africa Regional Office. 
Dr Tunga Rukuni, Director of DTC, University of Zimbabwe. 
Dr Benson,  Zimbabwe Standards Authority. 
Panorama Peanut Processing Group at Farmers’ Trust training centre near Mt Darwin. 
Matthew Gwirize, MD and Tapera Mubvekeri, Tanroy Engineering Ltd. 
Mr Dombo Chibanda, City Health Department, Harare.  
John Kandwe, City Health Department, Harare. 
Henry Gadaga, University of Zimbabwe. 
Cabinet C Musuna, Kutsaga Research Station.  
Paulina R Zindi, Government Analyst Laboratory. 
Mereki market traders, Harare. 
Dr Brighton Mvumi, University of Zimbabwe . 
Elijah Dube and Arex Mutari, Diatomaceous Earths project. 
Tirivangani Koza, Department of Agricultural Engineering, University of Zimbabwe. 
Lewis Muhwati, Export Business Manager, EcoMark Ltd. 
Alfredo Chamusso, Care Mozambique. 
 
India 
Dr Andy Hall, Regional Co-ordinator South Asia. 
Dr S Prasad, Visiting Scientist: Innovation Policy, South Asia Regional Office. 
Ms P Keskar, Special Project Associate Co-ordinator, South Asia Regional Office.  
Dr Rasheed Sulaiman, NCAP. 
Dr Rajeswari S Raina, NISTADS. 
Guru Naik, Livelihood Solutions.  
Ravi Agarwal, Toxic Link. 
Dr Madhoolika Agarwal, Botany Department, Banaras Hindu  University, Varanasi. 
Dr Kevin Crockford, Senior Rural Livelihood Advisor, DFID Office New Delhi. 
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Ken de Souza, Rural Livelihood Advisor, DFID Office New Delhi. 
Dr Viju James, Independent Consultant.   
C P Raman, ex-Director of the IGMRI. 
Jaya Raj, IGMRI. 
Dr Farid Waliyar, ICRISAT. 
Raghunadha Reddy, Visiting Scientist, ICRISAT. 
A Bhavani Prasad, Vice President of the Federation of Farmer Associations. 
Dr V L K Prasad, Prof and Head of the Department of Livestock Production and 
Management at ANGRAU University. 
Mr C L N Rao, MD Janaki Feeds Pvt Ltd. 
Preddireddy Chengal Reddy, Honorary Chair of Federation of Farmers Associations. 
Rama Devi Kolli, Principal Director, Society for Transformation, Agriculture and 
Alternatives in Development (STAAD), Hyderabad. 
Dr N Seetharama, Director, National Research Centre for Sorghum. 
Dr Dayakar Benhur, Economist, National Research Centre for Sorghum. 
G P Singh, Joint Director, Mahatma Gandhi State Institute of Rural Development 
(MGSIRD), Jabalpur (MP). 
Dr Belum V Reddy, Principal Scientist Sorghum Breeding, ICRISAT. 
P Parthasarathy Rao, Senior Scientist, Economics, ICRISAT. 
Guava Reddy, Visiting Scientist, extension, ICRISAT. 
Amitabha Sadangi, CEO, International Development Enterprises (India). 
A J Raju, Centre for Community Development (CCD) Orissa, India together with 
colleagues from the producer groups. 
Dr S Swain, Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology (OUAT) India. 
Emma Crewe, CRISP, ICRISAT. 
Shambu Prasad, CRISP, ICRISAT. 
 
Uganda 
Dr Dan Kisauzi, Regional Co-ordinator, East Africa. 
Ms Agnes Nayiga, Assistant Regional Co-ordinator, East Africa. 
Stephen Ecwinyu, Matilong. 
Hugh Bagnall-Oawely, Consultant to NARO. 
Constance Owori, Horticulture Programme, Kawanda Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI). 
Dr Emily Twinamasiko, NARO. 
Dr Clesensio Tizikara, NARO. 
Dr Ambrose Agona, Kawanda Agricultural Research Institute (KARI). 
Dr Regina Kapinga, CIP, ex-Tanzania Lake Zone Agric Research Institute. 
Angello Ndyaguma, Fruits of the Nile Limited. 
Stephen Kalunda, Agricultural Economist, KARI. 
Chris Balya, Afro Kai Grain Traders. 
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Arthur Musoke, BUCADEF. 
Berga Lemaga, PREPACE. 
Immaculate Sekitto, PREPACE. 
Irene Mutumba, Enterprise Development Ltd. 
Rose Kiggundu, UNU-Intech. 
 
Tanzania 
Dr Gabriel Ndunguru, Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC), Ministry of Health.  
Felix Kimenga Ndunguru, Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC) 
Nicolas Mlingi, Acting Director of the TFNC. 
Ruth Kamal, Ministry of Agriculture. 
The Association of Food Product Dealers Limited. 
Kiddo Mtunda, Sugar Research Institute, KIBAHA. 
Marton Muhana, Sugar Research Institute, KIBAHA. 
Farmers’ Group near Dar es Salaam. 
Suleiman Kaganda, Acting Director, Ukiriguru – Lake Zone Agricultural Research 
Institute. 
Theresia Ngendello and her Roots and Tubers team Ukiriguru, Lake Zone Agricultural 
Research Institute (LZARI). 
Simon Jerimia, LZARI. 
Fidelis Kaihura, LZARI. 
Masalakulangwa Farmers’ Group, LZARI. 
Paresh Kapoor of Pamba Industries.  
Elias George Kisamo, TAMEA – a micro-finance organisation. 
Appia Mkoba, CARE International. 
David Selby, Director, CARE International.  
 
UK  
Dr J K Coulter, Chairman, Programme Advisory Committee (PAC). 
Mr J Harvey, DFID Lead Adviser, PAC Member, DFID. 
Prof G Campbell-Platt, Food Safety, PAC Member, University of Reading. 
Dr P Golob, Post-Harvest Technology, PAC Member, Independent. 
Prof C J K Henry, Tropical Nutrition, PAC Member, Oxford Brookes University. 
Dr D Sautier, Social Development, PAC Member, Centre de Cooperation Internationale en 
Recherche Agronomique pour le Developpement (CIRAD), France. 
Prof M Rukuni, Agricultural Economics, PAC Member, Kellogg Foundation, South 
Africa. 
Dr G R W Wint, Environment, PAC Member, Environmental Research Group, Oxford Ltd 
(ERGO). 
Mr Tim Donaldson, CPHP Programme Manager, U K. 
Ms Christine Wheeler, Personal Assistant, CPHP Office, UK. 
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Ms Karen Wilkin, Deputy Manager, CPHP Office, UK. 
Dr Vino Graffham, Assistant Manager, CPHP Office, UK.  
Mr Frank Almond, Partnerships Adviser, CPHP Office, UK.  
Mr Michael Flint, M&E Adviser, CPHP Office, UK. 
Paul Spray, Central Research Group, DFID. 
Simon Anderson, Central Research Group, DFID. 
Guy Poulter, Director, Natural Resources Institute. 
John Orchard, Natural Resources Institute. 
Andrew Westby, Natural Resources Institute. 
Paul Hindmarsh, Natural Resources Institute. 
Andrew Grafham, Natural Resources Institute. 
Fiona Marshall, Science Policy Research Unit, formerly at Imperial College. 
Nigel Poulter, previously Natural Resources Institute. 
Alan Marter, previously Natural Resources Institute. 
Colin Poulton, Wye College. 
Gina Porter, University of Durham. 
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